

## Détente and exchange of information between East and West

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On July 30, 1975 *Helsingin Sanomat* welcomed CSCE visitors on behalf of the Finnish press with an editorial entitled "The free flow of information builds the foundation for co-operation in Europe." The newspaper remarked that the principles of freedom of information written into the United Nations Charter at the end of the 1940s confront numerous obstacles in practice:

Countries with different political and social systems interpret the jointly approved principles in different ways. The acquisition and dissemination of information is unfortunately still restricted in many countries. Also, political decision-makers occasionally attempt to limit the freedom to disseminate information in countries with traditional freedom of speech.

The CSCE has also dealt thoroughly with the dissemination of information. The results do not correspond to the most optimistic expectations, but the document approved by 35 nations does offer a new basis for efforts to carry out freedom of communication in practice, this fundamental human right which is the pre-requisite for other freedoms.

To the West of Finland public discussion of the CSCE, and particularly the preparations for it, has stressed the essence of the "third basket." The belief that the "free flow of people, ideas, and information" is the most important and difficult problem facing the conference has been fostered. In the climate of opinion created by the Cold War this type of thinking is consistent, for people in the West have learned to regard the socialist countries as "closed" and their citizens as lacking many "freedoms and human rights." Thus the function of the CSCE was seen to be a kind of export of Western freedom to peoples living under socialism.

It is true that the third basket was originally a Western product. Its embryo was part of the first

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stand taken by the NATO Council of Ministers on the CSCE in 1970 and it was concocted during the Dipoli consultations in 1973, primarily from materials provided by the EEC countries. But in other respects, the viewpoint outlined above is, to put it mildly, misleading, and in many respects unfounded.

First of all, it can be shown with objective data that the socialist countries are much more "open" and "freer" than is usually supposed in the West and that correspondingly the Western free-market countries have proved, despite their ideology of freedom to be even more "closed" in the light of factual flows of information than the socialist countries.

Besides, the third basket has by no means been central to the CSCE, but an organic part of a larger structure of security and co-operation, as Osmo Apunen's article reveals. This leads to what will be concluded below: in the final analysis, the third basket does not represent an undisputed "victory" for the traditional (Western) free flow of information, but rather a more modern and balanced interpretation for international freedom of communication.

Furthermore, it must also be remembered that the declarations registered in the UN in the 1940s, in which unrestricted freedom was made the goal of international communication, are not purely universal, apolitical statements but were in fact an integral part of the ideological arsenal (e.g. for anti-communist purposes) used to mobilize for the Cold War.<sup>1</sup> In the 1970s the "free flow doctrine" confronts a different world from what it faced at birth. The official foreign policy of the United States no longer needs it as a weapon in the same sense in expanding its economic and political sphere of influence and (together with the other NATO countries) in opposing socialism. In addition, the third-world front which has appeared on the international political scene feels a natural hostility towards it (in many places it is regarded as a guise for cultural and information imperialism). It would appear that the ideology of "freedom of information," which has established itself firmly in the West, is at present suffering a decline or going through a substantial crisis.<sup>2</sup>

1) See the article by U.S. scholar Herbert I. Schiller, "Genesis of the Free Flow of Information Principles: The Imposition of Communication Domination", in the journal of the Tampere Peace Research Institute, *Instant Research on Peace and Violence*, no. 2, 1975, pp. 75-86. 75-86.

2) The development of this crisis is the result of both changes that occurred on the international political stage and of phenomena on the national level such as the concentration and commercialization of the press. The author is at present working on a separate study of freedom of speech. This article is limited to a discussion of the *free flow of information*, i.e. mass communication that crosses international borders and the regulation thereof. It is to be distinguished from the concept of *freedom of speech*, which is at once more inclusive and more complex.

President Kekkonen's well-known speech on communication policies, delivered over two years ago, is not an isolated phenomenon. Indeed, the same reassessment of freedom of information is evident in e.g. decisions made by the United Nations and Unesco in recent years.

Today freedom of information is not, at close inspection, and particularly in comparison with the Cold War years, a notably potent weapon in the big leagues of international politics. It is noteworthy that President Ford placed little emphasis on the free flow theme in his speech at Finlandia Hall, a speech worth contrasting with the statement made thirty years earlier by the then Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, the principal architect of the Cold War: "If I were to be granted one point of foreign policy and no other, I would make it the free flow of information." (Dulles of course used the word "freedom" to mean the uninhibited advance of the United States toward ideological dominance in accordance with its economic and military interests).

But the world has changed since the days of Dulles, and what was previously an instrument of foreign policy for the United States and its allies has, under conditions of détente, become something of an embarrassment and has therefore been relegated to a secondary role. Why then, did the free flow of information play such an important role in public discussion in the West? There are at least three major reasons.

First of all, there are, particularly among Western journalists, a large number of "apolitical idealists" who sincerely believe in the noble principles of the free flow of information and who have never clearly perceived their political character - neither during the Cold War, or now, under conditions of détente. Furthermore, these quarters either do not sense or do not want to understand the facts about the imbalance in the exchange of information between East and West (more Western information and culture is exported to the East than vice versa). Here the words of President Kekkonen come to mind: "Somewhat amusedly, I have followed those prophets who, staring at the heavens, faithfully declare the ideals of freedom of speech - and, equally faithfully, keep their eyes closed to what is happening on the ground. I say amusedly, though this is far from being a matter of fun." (The above *Helsingin Sanomat* editorial as well as certain International Press Institute (IPI) activities may be placed in this category.)

Secondly, there are influential circles, not the least among newspaper owners (for example the *New York Times*), which for one reason or another purposefully oppose détente or forms thereof. For them the third basket has been a useful instrument of propaganda: it has been used both to foster Cold War attitudes and to smite the proponents of détente for having won only limited concessions from the socialist countries.

Thirdly, it is apparent that some Western governments exploited these themes in diplomatic

propaganda and agitation. On the one hand the third basket offered a readily comprehensible argument to the wide public for participation in the CSCE process. However, this strategy became somewhat problematic during the course of the negotiations: the image of a third basket filled with Western freedoms (the decision-makers and diplomats themselves scarcely put much faith in it) did not live up to expectations, and one's own logic became a trap. But a consistent overemphasis on the third basket, particularly in the so-called "quality" press, also proved to be good bargaining tactics for the West (especially the EEC) because it strengthened the West's position in making diplomatic deals with the East.

Here there is no more need for a detailed analysis of efforts to mold public opinion by means of the third basket than there is for an account of progress on these matters at the negotiating table itself. The following section takes up the "completed" third basket and especially the part concerning the dissemination of information and its significance with regard to future developments in Europe.

### The third basket and the "package deal"

It has sometimes been suggested in assessments of the CSCE that the conference is the first instance in which the problems of the dissemination of information have been included in negotiations and instruments of international politics. This is not the case, however, for guidelines on information dissemination appear (as *Helsingin Sanomat* also states) in decisions made e.g. by the UN and Unesco.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, the International Convention concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Course of Peace was approved by the League of Nations in 1936. (This in itself was a paradox, in view of the widespread war propaganda that followed it and the subsequent Cold War.)

On the other hand the Final Act of the CSCE can be regarded as unique in the sense that the problems of information, human contacts, culture and education — and all the technical and economic aspects of the second basket as well — have been approached for the first time not only with resolutions of a general nature but also with rather detailed recommendations. In this respect the words of President Giscard d'Estaing at Finlandia Hall are relevant: "For the first time, in a negotiation such as this one, quite new topics were examined, whether the dissemination of information, the movement of persons or the circulation of ideas"; or the words of General-Secretary Brezhnev: "Possibilities for co-operation extend now also to areas where it was unthinkable in the years of the cold war".

As Apunen points out in his article, détente is expressed rather concretely in the Final Act, not the least in the "humanitarian and other fields": i.e. the four sub-areas of the third basket: 1) human contacts, 2) information and 3) co-operation and exchanges in the field of culture and 4) education.

The participating states have decided to undertake co-operation in these areas, "desiring to contribute to the strengthening of peace and understanding among peoples and to the spiritual enrichment of the human personality without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion; conscious that increased cultural and educational exchanges, broader dissemination of information, contacts between people, and the solution of humanitarian problems will contribute to the attainment of these aims," as the preamble to the third basket states.

On closer examination, the Final Act reveals e.g. the following recommendations for the "improvement of the circulation of, access to, and exchange of information":

— To facilitate the improvement of the dissemination, on their territory, of newspapers and printed publications, periodical and non-periodical, from the other participating States. For this purpose:

they will encourage their competent firms and organizations to conclude agreements and contracts designed gradually to increase the quantities and the number of titles of newspapers and publications imported from the other participating States. These agreements and contracts should in particular mention the speediest conditions of delivery and the use of the normal channels existing in each country for the distribution of its own publications and newspapers as well as forms and means of payment agreed between the parties making it possible to achieve the objectives aimed at by these agreements and contracts:

where necessary, they will take appropriate measures to achieve the above objectives and to implement the provisions contained in the agreements and contracts.

— To contribute to the improvement of access by the public to periodical and non-periodical printed publications imported on the bases indicated above...

— To promote the improvement of the dissemination of filmed and broadcast information...

-- To encourage co-operation in the field of information on the basis of short or long term agreements or arrangements. In particular: they will favour increased co-operation among mass media organizations, including press agencies, as well as among publishing houses and organizations...

— The participating States, desiring to improve the conditions under which journalists

<sup>3</sup> Various "instruments" on freedom of information have been approved in the UN, around ten in fact. Regulation of the dissemination of information has been evident in Unesco since the charter of this organization was approved in 1945.

from one participating State exercise their profession in another participating State, intend in particular to:

- examine in a favourable spirit and within a suitable and reasonable time scale requests from journalists for visas...
- increase the opportunities for journalists of the participating States to communicate personally with their sources, including organizations and official institutions..."

The influence of the Western concept of freedom of information in these recommendations is obvious. It is to these very formulations that Western mass media have referred when assessing the results of the CSCE in the light of the ideology of freedom – sometimes describing the achievements approvingly, sometimes deploring their inadequacy. In any case there is no doubt that although the participating states formally approved every word of the text (in fact every comma) unanimously (by a consensus procedure whereby no-one expressly objected to the text), this part of the Final Act concurs with Western views of the dissemination of information. As a matter of fact, the structure and content of the section concerning the dissemination of information conforms rather closely to the guidelines brought to the negotiating table during the initial phases of the Dipoli consultations in January 1973 by the EEC countries (in the names of Belgium and Denmark).

On the other hand, the sentence regarding radio broadcasting across international frontiers, part of the paragraph on audio-visual information, is rather vaguely worded from the Western point of view:

"The participating States note the expansion in the dissemination of information broadcast by radio, and express the hope for the continuation of this process so as to meet the interest of mutual understanding among peoples and the aims set forth by this Conference."

This wording is a further-refined version of that (already greatly diluted in the Western view) which the Nato countries presented in May 1975 as their "final offer" regarding the third basket:

"(The participating States) ... express the hope that the broadening of dissemination of broadcast information will continue, recognising that broadcasts to the other participating States contribute to the mutual understanding among peoples."

Thus those Western circles concerned about maintaining the traditional freedom of information have well-grounded reason for both satisfaction and dissatisfaction.

However, the detailed or operative recommendations of the Final Act should not be taken out of context. Here the wording of the preamble to

the paragraph on the dissemination of information:

"The participating States

*Conscious* of the need for an ever wider knowledge and understanding of the various aspects of life in other participating States,

*Acknowledging* the contribution of this process to the growth of confidence between peoples,

*Desiring*, with the development of mutual understanding between the participating States and with the further improvement of their relations, to continue further efforts towards progress in this field,

*Recognizing* the importance of the dissemination of information from the other participating States and of a better acquaintance with such information,

*Emphasizing* therefore the essential and influential role of the press, radio, television, cinema and news agencies and of the journalists working in these fields,

*Make it their aim* to facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds, to encourage co-operation in the field of information and the exchange of information with other countries, and to improve the conditions under which journalists from one participating State exercise their profession in another participating State, and

*Express their intention* in particular..."

This general section of the text which precedes the detailed recommendations – and in a way is politically more important than they are – is a rather balanced statement of the views of the East and the West on the ends and means of the dissemination of information. It contains many views which have become internationally significant and which can be found in both the Unesco Constitution approved in the 1940s ("...for the purposes of mutual understanding and a true and more perfect knowledge of each other's lives ...") as in President Kekkonen's view in the 1970s ("...information based on facts about conditions in other countries...").

However, the recommendations concerning the practice of dissemination of information must be connected with even more general principles in analyzing the third basket in the spirit of the CSCE. First of all, the weighty political content of the preamble to the entire third basket must be noted. In the form of a general political declaration, this preamble introduces all four of the sub-areas within the third basket. Secondly, the third basket, including the preamble, must be seen as only one component of the carefully constructed entity of the Final Act, and particularly in relation to the first basket, which is politically the most important. The third basket and its compo-

nents should not be regarded as "bricks" which can be picked out at random for purposes of study, but as part of a "natural stone" entity. Apunen has shown in his article (see his figure 3).

Still, the entity is not merely the outcome of analysis, for the first and third baskets were linked together during the Geneva negotiations in summer 1974 by means of an expressly political "package deal." This solution rests on three primary elements; it is like a three-legged table supported on the one hand by the preamble to the third basket and on the other by two principles contained in the first basket.

It was agreed in the talks that the principles governing the relations between states would include a statement according to which the participating states "will also respect each other's right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems as well as its right to determine its laws and regulations." (1st principle). Moreover, the following sentence is included in the tenth principle of the first basket:

"In exercising their sovereign rights, including the right to determine their laws and regulations, they will conform with their legal obligations under international law; they will furthermore pay due regard to and implement the provisions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe."

The preamble to the third basket, for its part, contains the following sentence;

"Convinced that this co-operation should take place in full respect for the principles guiding relations among the participating States as set forth in the relevant document."

In this way one of the most intricate problems of the CSCE was solved. The solution is a typical compromise between two fundamental approaches. The socialist countries in particular have argued that they could agree to the measures to be achieved in the area of the third basket only on the condition that they are carried out in accordance with the laws and customs of each country and on the basis of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. The EEC countries in particular have argued that conditions such as these weaken the results of the entire third basket. An attempt at reconciling these differences, made by the non-aligned countries (initiated and led by Finland), provided a way out of the impasse.

Although the "package deal" is to be regarded as one of the most significant structures in the Final Act, it is not a completely new construction in international politics. Fundamentally the same elements can be found for example in the Declaration of the principles for international cultural co-operation approved unanimously by the General Conference of Unesco in 1966.

"1. Broad dissemination of ideas and knowledge, based on the freest exchange and dis-

cussion, is essential to creative activity, the pursuit of truth and the development of the personality.

2. In cultural co-operation, stress shall be laid on ideas and values conducive to the creation of a climate of friendship and peace. Any mark of hostility in attitudes and in expression of opinion shall be avoided. Every effort shall be made, in presenting and disseminating information, to ensure its authenticity." (Article VIII)

"1. In their cultural relations, States shall bear in mind the principles of the United Nations. In seeking to achieve international co-operation, they shall respect the sovereign equality of States and shall refrain from intervention in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State.

2. The principles of this Declaration shall be applied with due regard for human rights and fundamental freedoms." (Article XI)

Such diplomatic wordings, designed to strike a balance, can be considered an indication of the readiness to compromise evolving from détente and also of the reshaping process which the ideology of freedom of information is at present undergoing.

Despite the practical recommendations written in the spirit of the "free flow principle," the Helsinki text should not be regarded as a manifesto for the Western concept of freedom of information (which, for example, the 19th Article of the Declaration of Human Rights is). Instead, there are grounds for viewing the "message" of the third basket as a new interpretation of an old doctrine. Freedom of information has not been made absolute. It has been carefully situated within a general political framework, which inevitably leads to further qualifications concerning the content of information and the restrictions on complete freedom. On the other hand, neither is it a solution which conforms solely to the socialist concept of freedom: the central goal remains "a freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds."

### Basic ideologies

Still, there are no grounds for belief that the traditional doctrines of the East and West are losing their sharpness in this ideologically sensitive area and approaching some sort of third course. Therefore the Final Act may misleadingly imply convergence in the conflicting ideologies that govern the cultural and informational exchanges. The speeches made at Finlandia Hall offer ample evidence of this:

Ford ("to the countries of the East"): "But it is important that you recognize the deep devotion of the American people and their Government to human rights and fundamental freedoms and thus to the pledges that this

Conference has made regarding the freer movement of people, ideas, and information."

Brezhnev: "It is no secret that information media can serve the purposes of peace and confidence or they can spread throughout the world the poison of discord between countries and peoples. We would like to hope that the results of the Conference will serve as a correct guideline for co-operation in these areas as well."

Tindemans: "To achieve real and lasting détente, mutual confidence between all countries must be build up. This cannot be done at Government level alone but must be founded on mutual knowledge and appreciation between peoples and individuals. Bringing people together in this way is in keeping with the basic principles of human rights, and will come about through the flow of ideas and people. This is not to be left to the responsibility of Governments alone, but is to be achieved by initiatives taken by individuals."

Ceausescu: "Intensified cultural exchanges and a better information through the press and other media should serve the rapprochement and friendship among peoples; it should not admit the advocacy of racialism, of war propaganda and of anything that can foster enmity among nations. On the contrary, such actions are bound to be conducive to a stronger respect for the traditions and culture of every people and, concurrently, to help to spread wide all the best creations of mankind in every field of human activity and knowledge."

These quotations reflect the well-known fact that the Western view underscores contacts at the *individual* level while the Eastern stresses contacts between the *states* and other *institutions*. This difference, however, is not particularly interesting — after all both approaches aim at similar political realities: the prevailing "public opinion" or social consciousness (and not in the least its class content). More fundamental to the ideological difference of opinion between East and West is the manner in which the concept of cultural and information exchange is linked to that of international security.

In the Western view human contacts, the free flow of ideas and information and other practical forms of cooperation by nature advance security between states; co-operation at the practical level is a *functional prerequisite* for peace and security. The Socialist countries hold that the forms of co-operation — not the least in the field of information — are *consequences* of the general situation with regard to security. While in the West it is thought that increasing co-operation automatically promotes détente, in the East it is felt that increasing security also leads gradually to increased co-operation by selective means.

Thus the equations formed from the concepts of security and co-operation in the two fundamental ideologies are opposites: one sees security and

peace as an "effect" of "causes" such as the free flow of people, ideas, and information, while the other considers peace and security the primary factors determining the degree and forms of co-operation. The distinction is summed up in the formula: "Co-operation *will* serve security — co-operation *shall* serve security."<sup>4</sup>

The speech delivered by President Kekkonen at Finlandia Hall characterizes both fundamental ideologies:

"We know by experience that increasing contacts and better knowledge contribute to the strengthening of understanding and the weeding out of suspicion. We perceive the different cultural traditions of Europe and the creative power of the present communities as the common riches of our peoples. Likewise, we believe that the continuous process of détente between States is a necessary premise for reducing the bounds which either in the minds of people or between their communities still defy the rapprochement of peoples."

As the quotations selected above indicate, the Western approach avoids defining the "people, ideas, and information" dealt with in co-operation; in fact the Western tradition of freedom of information is traditionally applied to *all kinds* of information, thereby ignoring precise definition of content, which is seen as a step toward censorship. The Socialist countries take the opposite approach; the determination of content is an inseparable part of the exchange of culture and information. Actually the latter approach is not limited to the Socialist countries since it is also found in the West, for example among the cultural intellectuals as well as in morally conservative circles, e.g. in the United States.

In the present context it is interesting to read the Finnish-Soviet resolution issued at the conclusion of the 25th anniversary celebration of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance in April 1973 (during the second phase of the Security Conference). The excerpt from the resolution presented below — dealing with the field covered by the third basket — contains several of the fundamental elements found in the document which the heads of state from 35 countries convened to sign in Helsinki a good two years later:

"Finland and the Soviet Union announce that they continue to support energetically everything that may contribute to the reciprocal intellectual enrichment of the peoples of

<sup>4</sup>Dr. Klaus Törnudd in a speech before the international colloquium of journalists in Tampere on May 7, 1975. See Tapio Varis (editor), *Journalists and Détente 30 Years after the End of World War II: Colloquium Proceedings*. Reports by the Institute of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Tampere, No. 25/1975.

Finland and the Soviet Union and to increasing reciprocally knowledge of their life and culture and to strengthening mutual understanding and mutual trust. The achievement of these goals will be furthered by activation of exchanges in the spheres of radio, television, art, cinematography, education, culture and sports, and by broadening the contacts between the corresponding organisations in both countries. It was noted that the mass information media of both countries have a significant task in serving the further strengthening of friendship and trust between the Finnish and Soviet peoples with the sense of responsibility and with the objectiveness that this important matter requires, without jeopardising the favourable development of friendly relations between both countries."

Here it is also interesting to note how the second principle of the first basket – forbearance from the use of force – refers to refraining from the "threat of force" and the "manifestation of force" (compare with Apunen's presentation above).

Thus there are at least some grounds for arguing that the general tone of this part of the Final Act has been "Finlandized" – in the positive sense of the word. But this would tend to make the third basket and the "package deal" connected with it look like a systematic policy, such as Finnish policy toward the Soviet Union. This is not the case, however, for the result is more of a compromise between the two fundamental ideologies than a policy which the participating states have adopted because it reflects their national interests. If a durable "third road" to these questions could be found, there would probably be no reason to speak of the continuation of the "ideological struggle" during the period of détente.

The ideology and policies of the Socialist countries include the concept of continued ideological struggle under conditions of détente. However, these countries sought in the CSCE talks – as they have everywhere else in dealing with the international exchange of information and culture – to specify the exchange of ideas and information so that it would serve peace and friendly relations between nations. Inconsistency is not difficult to find: on the one hand the existence of different ideologies and the consequent "ideological struggle" is recognized, and on the other hand there is a desire to cushion the impact of this struggle by establishing various "shock absorbers" as selective conditions for cultural and informational cooperation.

### The "ideological struggle" and the "media CSCE"

The question of the extension of détente to the area of informational and cultural exchanges has recently come to the fore, particularly during the

visit to the Soviet Union of French President Giscard d'Estaing in October 1975. He apparently tried to persuade the Soviet Union to abandon its hard-line policy of "ideological struggle" and adopt more relaxed and open forms of co-operation. Reports on his visit indicate that the French President was unable to convince the Soviet leadership to accept this interpretation of détente.

In fact, the Socialist countries have developed a rather thorough-going position on this question already long ago. An authoritative view was published shortly after the CSCE on September 3, 1975 in *Izvestia*, the organ of the Soviet government. Academician G. Arbatov, director of the America Institute, which specializes in research on the United States, wrote the following.

"The Soviet Union perceives in earnest the provisions recorded in this respect in the Helsinki document and will fulfil them in the forms provided for by agreement. But if some people regard them as an obligation for flinging open the door for anti-Soviet subversive propaganda of materials preaching violence, fanning up national and racial strife and spreading pornography, then they are labouring in vain. The document signed in Helsinki and détente in general do not provide for such an obligation.

On the contrary, détente aims at eliminating the vestiges of the cold war in all spheres, including propaganda. This does not mean that the ideological struggle will be over. There is an objective need for continuing it in conditions of peaceful coexistence. However, a transition to these conditions requires that propaganda activities should be conducted within certain bounds, excluding slander, the fermenting of hatred and distrust, ideological subversion and the subversive methods of "psychological warfare." This does not in the least contradict the principle of freedom of expression and the press or international law."

These views will remain somewhat puzzling, unless they are examined against the broader background of socialist ideology. First of all, it must be noted that in this context "struggle" does not literally mean a state of war. Both "class struggle" and "ideological struggle" refer to the fact that there are in the world today two *irreconcilable* or antagonistic social systems, capitalism and socialism, which compete with each other. If this irreconcilability is recognized, then it goes without saying that there are antagonistic ideologies behind them, which also compete. Indeed, Western observers concur, although they do not normally use the concept of "ideological struggle."

Secondly, it must be stressed that in speaking of continued and even intensified ideological struggle, Soviet politicians, researchers, and observers underscore the fact that this struggle will intensify primarily *within the capitalist countries*.

It will not take the form of "information warfare" between countries with different social systems. On the contrary, it is well known that "information warfare" of this kind is opposed in the socialist countries, where efforts based on the export of both revolution and counter-revolution were abandoned as early as the Russian Revolution. Thus the class struggle will continue unabated in the capitalist world, and not the least on the level of ideology. But at the same time there is a readiness for peaceful exchange between capitalist and socialist countries in various areas, on the condition that this exchange takes place on the basis of non-intervention in the internal affairs of each country and of equal competition.

Thirdly, in discussing the ideological struggle it should be noted that according to their own understanding, the socialist countries have never taken up forms of propaganda which diverge from objective truth and of which Western cold warriors are accused. The socialist countries hold that any changes in the ideological struggle resulting from détente will primarily mean *more truthful* international information: an ideological exchange which has lost the aggressive elements of the Western Cold War, but not the analytical criticism of the essence of social systems (the untenability of capitalism).

This same move toward a more refined approach, toward more gentlemanly manners in international contacts and discussions, is also evident in the West at the present time. Even Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, U.S. radio stations with a reputation as Cold War fortresses, have new programming guidelines which conform to the spirit of CSCE (moreover, their face was cleansed of the disgrace brought on by CIA funding). The Chairman of the reorganized U.S. Board for International Broadcasting writes in the *NATO Review* in 1975 (No. 2, p. 29) that "we are working in a political atmosphere marked by broad understanding of the radios' (Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty) essential role in furthering détente..."

But there are still those in the West who have misgivings about détente in general and particularly about its extension into the field of ideology, something they regard as a doubtful and fateful development — "Finlandization" in the negative sense of the word. For example, Georg Kahn-Ackermann, Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, made the following statement in May 1975 at the IPI's Annual Assembly, a couple of months before the summit conference in Helsinki:

"During the period of so-called détente it has become popular to minimize the effects of ruthlessness in nearly all the totalitarian regimes of the East for the sake of peace. And we should not overlook the fact that most governments and political forces in our part of the world rate peace higher than freedom — a change which is reflected in the manner in

which many governments deal with terrorist movements." (IPI Report No. 7/1975, p. 1).

On the other hand it is evident that those circles in the West that attempt to keep the Cold War going are in a sense on the defensive, despite outbursts of Western ideology such as perhaps the latest Nobel peace prize. Still, the new situation is reflected in the dissemination of information in the West, as gradual headway toward détente in the content of mass communications and in the Western "journalism ideology" that guides it.

Admittedly, Western mass communications on the everyday level are still remote from the principles set forth in the Final Act, just as mass communications in the East are far removed from the operative recommendations of the Final Act. The socialist countries have rightly said that the West should concentrate on its own media, and attempt to increase coverage of the socialist countries therein. Arbatov, for example, points out in the above-mentioned article that the obligations of the third basket apply to both sides:

"...the implementation of "the third basket" provisions, as well as other sections of the Final Act, will need efforts not only from our but also from the Western side, the more so, since the practice which has taken shape there creates as yet quite a number of difficulties for cooperation in the above spheres."

In this respect "Finlandization" could gladly be recommended to the West. Finnish mass media undoubtedly contain more factual information about the socialist countries than is generally the case in the West, and Finnish journalists and commentators and the owners of communications media have taken an obviously more favourable attitude toward this kind of information than in countries to the West of us (although there is naturally room for improvement in Finland, too).

In addition to efforts to observe the letter of the Final Act regarding removal of the formal obstacles to an expanded flow of information, it is quite natural that in Finland discussion about what conclusions the communications media and the journalists employed by them should make in this situation began immediately after the CSCE. Eino S. Repo concludes his article (Published in *Ulkopolitiikka* 2/1975, an issue commemorating the 75th birthday celebrations of President Kekkonen) about the mass media and foreign policy in the following way:

"But it must be realized that new standards of journalistic ethics for all communications media have been set by the Helsinki signatures. It must also be realized that this calls for a change in what has thus far been international practice."

Here one should add that, strictly speaking, the Final Act offers no new rules or even a code of

ethics concerning the content of information. However, the document as a whole — its spirit — logically points in the direction outlined by Repo. A further indication of this is that the same idea is being generated in different quarters. For example Vilho A. Koiranen recently expressed the following view (in a presentation made before the peace seminar of the UN Women's Year Committee on November 5, 1975):

"One might ask where is the impulse that would take the initiative to propose a joint conference of mass media like the CSCE and for the achievement of principles of communications and an agreement concerning them which would serve peace education not merely as a general educational goal, but guarantee peaceful development in day-to-day events as well."

In fact, this idea was introduced prior to the Helsinki summit conference by Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa in a speech before an international colloquium of journalists in Tampere on May 7, 1975. Sorsa remarked that if in conjunction with the future Security Conference, journalists from various countries wished to gather to consider their own professional problems in the spirit of that conference, Finland would gladly serve as host.

No such meeting was held in the summer of 1975, although the challenge of the Security Conference to the journalists of Europe did germinate. For instance, it was seriously discussed in a meeting of Finnish and Soviet journalists convened immediately after the summit conference on August 2 by journalistic organizations representing different political views here in Finland. The Final Act was found to confirm certain outward rules of behavior in the field of information, but also to leave many aspects regarding the conversion of the spirit of Helsinki into practical journalism open.

All efforts to limit the journalist's freedom, including a supernational code of ethics, have been traditionally shunned in Western journalistic circles. On the other hand, organizations of Nordic journalists, for example, have been prepared to accept and even to develop on their own initiative "instructions for journalists" which would specify professional ethics. The CSCE has now provided a new impulse to these voluntary efforts.

It should be kept in mind that international efforts of this kind are not new. Ethical norms for journalists were drafted by the United Nations in the 1950s, and the current Unesco program (approved in the General Conference in 1974) includes the following passage:

"(The Director General is authorized)... to prepare, with a view to strengthening international understanding and world peace, guidelines for national codes of ethics, designed to promo-

te the sense of responsibility which should accompany the full exercise of freedom of information..."

According to the Western concept of freedom of the press, only self-regulation by the mass media themselves is normally possible. Norms set by either a State or an inter-governmental, supernational body (such as Unesco) are not acceptable. That is why the mass media "cannot be forced, or it is not reasonable to force them into this kind of contract," as Koiranen states in his presentation. Instead, the initiative should come from the "media themselves."

It is understandable that in view of the CSCE process, organizations of Finnish journalists have led the way in converting the "spirit of Helsinki" into more responsible journalism and in aiming thereby to achieve an exchange of information between all countries that does a more effective job of promoting security and co-operation. Efforts of this kind form a perfect continuation to the exemplary performances which Finland can provide (also) in the area of the third basket.