September 1987

# MASS COMMUNICATION WITHOUT MASS MEDIA

by

Kusum Singh *

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From **MASS COMMUNICATION WITHOUT MASS MEDIA**

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Draft of August 1987

## 1. A LOST LEGACY

> The great changes in the social order of the world which have occurred during the past two centuries are very largely the direct or indirect result of social movements.
>
> Rudolf Heberle [1]

When one thinks of great mass movements in history, the mind goes back to the exodus of the Hebrews from Egypt, the rise of Islam, the Crusades, the Reformation and the Cromwellian, American and French revolutions. More recently, many of the greatest changes in the social order have been associated with socialist and communist movements, the fascist movements that came to power between World Wars I and II, and the anti-colonial movements that burst forth after World War II.

In the United States today many people are trying to organize effective movements on behalf of extremely important, even structural, reforms in the social order. Most of these have been rising, falling and trying to rise again. The most effective thus far have been those struggling for women's liberation, labor, civil rights, the rights of the disabled, environmental protection and the cessation of U. S. intervention in certain other countries. Many people have been actively trying to build stronger movements in the fields of peace, gay and lesbian rights, reproductive rights, the "right to life," crime prevention, victims' rights and drug addiction. An important — and thus far the least successful -- movement has aimed at upgrading the quality

of television shows for children and curtailing the excessive presentation of violence in all television shows. Among the most successful movements of recent times has been the "radical right," as documented in Sidney Blumenthal's "The Rise Of The Counter-establishment: From Conservative Ideology to Political Power." [2]

In other countries of "First World" capitalism, while similar efforts are to be found, there are stronger labor, socialist, communist and fascist or neo-fascist movements aiming at sweeping changes in the political, social, economic order. The Solidarity movement in Poland is but one example of the less open movements for social change in the communist countries of the so-called "Second World." Among the developing "Third World" countries there are movements for industrialization, usually under the banner of "development," and various "liberation movements" against existing regimes.

But what <u>is</u> a movement? How does a movement differ from a mere organization or interest (or pressure) group?

Unfortunately, the rich and growing field of communication research -- whether on mass media or political, organizational or interpersonal communication -- offers little help in answering this question. Still more surprising, those who have studied social movements directly have concentrated on specific organizations. The most important studies have concentrated on socialist or communist parties, labor unions, farm groups and religious organizations. [3] In his sweeping review of research in the field Joseph R. Gusfield makes it clear that too little work has been done on anti-colonial independence movements in Asia, the Middle East, Africa or Latin America. [4]

In the most challenging of all recent works in the field Frances Fox Piven and Richrd A. Cloward have focussed on four poor people's organizations in the United States: the Unemployed Councils during the Great Depression, the industrial unions that emerged in the 1930s, a number of civil rights organizations, and the National Welfare Rights Organization (in whose work they had actively participated). Picking up Robert Michels¶ idea that "organization implies a tendency toward oligarchy," they have documented the way in which formal organizations of the poor have degenerated by dampening the spontaneity upon which successful movements depend. [5] Their lasting contribution to the study of social movements is their emphasis upon the tendency of formal organization to undermine the power of any poor people's movement. For them, the power of a poor people's movement flows from the spontaneous eruption of the very turbulent or disruptive protest that the leaders of formal organizations tend to discourage. Yet their emphasis on this important idea apparently leads them to the conclusion that such spontaneous eruption is by itself the essence of a successful movement rather than an additional element in it. In other words, Piven and Cloward seem to have overlooked Michels' recognition of a fundamental paradox — namely, that while organization breeds oligarchy, "Democracy is impossible without organization." [6]

As I see it, the paradox presented by these two propositions of Michels helps explain a real life problems that all movement leaders must face. Thus, without minimizing the tendency of formal organization to undermine a movement's militancy, one can also acknowledge that no social movement can be successful without <u>both</u> formal organizations <u>and</u> spontaneity. As R. H. Turner points out, "A movement is a mixture of

organization and spontaneity. There is usually one or more organizations that give identity, leadership and coordination to the movement, but the boundaries of the movement are never coterminous with the organizations." [7] Let me suggest that Turner's observation also applies to rich people's movements — and particularly to both old-fashioned imperialism and what is now called "neocolonialism."

Let me emphasize the plural: organizations. Every successful movement has encompassed a cluster or coalition of organizations, rather than a single organization that attempts to do everything by itself. Moreover, the very concept of a movement, as Gusfield has pointed out, suggests "a mixture of formal association and informal diffuse behavior." [8]

But what is it that somehow or other brings together the many organizations, informal groups and individual partisans (to use Herbert Blumer's term for those who are not members of an organization)? [9] What is it that leads to or creates whatever shared values, beliefs or aims may be held by both the activists and the supporters of any movement?

In my judgement, there can be only one answer: communication. This is true even if one defines communication rather narrowly as the transmission of information. It is even more obvious if we use the broader concept of communication as "the way in which people come to accept things in common." [10]

This book concentrates on the communication processes common to the two largest mass movements in human history — the Indian and Chinese liberation movements led by Mohandas Gandhi and Mao Zedong.

In developing this focus, I am to some extent following the example of Eric Hoffer. In The True Believer: Thoughts On The Nature Of Mass Movements, Hoffer recognizes that there have been both good and bad mass movements. But he concentrates on what he sees as common elements (excluding communication processes) in all mass movements without trying to add up the pluses and minuses in each. [11] Others have rushed to judgment on both the Gandhi and the Mao movements. For some, as shown in "Can The Legacy Be Retrieved?" (Ch. 7), Gandhi's methods are an inspiration for those who are terrorized by today's precarious peace of mutually-assured nuclear violence. L. S. Stavrianos argues -- with at least partial validity -- that Gandhi's historic role was to "deradicalize India" and make "social revolution against the native establishment impossible." [12] For some, Mao is the shining light for future anti-imperialist movements in "Third World" countries. For some Chinese people today, he was the guiding figure behind the infamous "Gang of Four." For anti-communists around the world, he was simply a mass murderer. In this book I do not deal with such matters.

Today, the Gandhi legacy is usually viewed in terms of non-violent activism, a topic of everlasting importance. The Mao legacy is seen in terms of his strategies of guerilla warfare. Thus far, I fear, their innovations in the kind of communication required for successful mass movements have been ignored.

In the present era of electronic media, even ardent followers of Gandhi often fail to understand how Gandhi was able to build a mass movement without mass media. Like many "communication experts," they sometimes make the fatal error of equating the part with the whole--

that is, TV, the cinema and the press (important though they are) with the much larger totality of all human communication. In China, during the very period that Gandhi was most active, Mao avoided making this error. Although using many un-Gandhi like methods, he too succeeded in achieving mass communication without access to -- and always against the influence of -- mass media. Despite their striking differences, both Gandhi and Mao succeeded in mobilizing millions of illiterate peasants in fierce struggles against overwhelming odds. In neither country could victories have been won without mass communication. [13]

Unfortunately, the creative ideas and techniques used by Gandhi and Mao in achieving this "communication miracle" [14] seem to have slid into some deep "memory hole" of history. They are a lost legacy.

This book is a modest effort to retrieve this lost legacy. I hope it may encourage other communication researchers to study social movements. It might even stimulate more serious research by people in other disciplines on the many independence movements in "Third World" countries, particularly those that operated in the earlier years of this century. Any over-concentration on the present or on the United States and Europe can deny the people of the present useful access to the many of the rich legacies of past history.

But first a few words on the movements that developed under the Gandhi-Mao styles of leadership.

## Two Movements That Changed the World

Over 40 years ago the British empire was shaken by the non-violent "Quit India" movment led by Mohandas Gandhi, the little old man whom Winston Churchill had called "the naked fakir."

A little later when the armies of Mao took over all of China, the entire Western world was shaken.

The news spread like wildfire. "If they can do it," asked many people in other countries long dominated by the old imperial powers, "why can't we do it?"

The answers came one after another. In 1948, the people of Ceylon and Burma, India's immediate neighbors, won independence. Indonesia followed in 1949. The freedom fever then spread to Egypt (1952), the Sudan (1956) and Malaya 1957. By the 1960s it engulfed most of Africa as the people of 17 colonies displaced their colonial rulers.

In 1955, as this process was unfolding, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India and Chou En-lai, China's Foreign Minister, (supported by Yugoslavia and Indonesia) called a conference in Bandung, Indonesia, to encourage and unite all the anti-imperial movements. The historic Bandung manifesto proclaimed their search for a third way between the blocs led by the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus was born the idea of a "Third World" of non-aligned nations. Within this Third World, India and China -- with populations respectively of 800 million and 1 billion -- now include over 40 percent of the whole world's population. But alongside them are about 100 other countries that, together with India and China, represent over two thirds of the world's population. They are also a huge majority in the assembly of the United Nations.

Among many of these countries, however, particularly those controlled by military or authoritarian dictatorships, the freedom fever still rages. In the Philippines and Haiti, some successes have already been made in following the Indian example of freedom through non-violent

activism. A similar effort is being made in South Korea. But in South Africa, Chile, Central America, Poland and other countries the struggles go on. Some openly advocate non-violent activism a la Gandhi. Others seem to have given up on peaceful methods and favor what they perceive to have been Mao's way. Rarely, however, are there many who have understood a key element that was common to both Gandhi and Mao--namely, **their ability to achieve mass communication without access to mass media.**

## Plan of the Book

Just how did Gandhi and Mao do it?

The task of this book is to answer that question.

In the next chapter I offer a broad — but all too brief -- historical background on imperialism and anti-imperialism in both countries. After reviewing what appeared to be the invincible power of foreign rulers and their native supporters, I describe the slow growth of the two liberation movements that eventually achieved victories that earlier seem highly improbable, if not impossible. This review, however, is limited to the periods before and until the Congress Party and the Chinese Communist Party got into power. I leave to others the equally important task of analyzing what happened in these countries after Gandhi was assassinated and Mao was elevated to a semi-divine status.

The next three chapters deal mainly with the messsages communicated by Gandhi and Mao during the critical World War II period of 1942-44. The three-part Appendix reports on the documents analyzed, the major themes in them and the reliability of the analysis.

In "Messages of Freedom," (Ch.3) I review what Gandhi and Mao said about crisis, goal values, leadership styles and communication channels. This chapter concentrates, however, on the first two of these

subjects. The more instrumental themes of leadership and channels are left to the next two chapters.

"Leaders As the Message" (ch.4) sets forth a unique aspect of the Gandhi-Mao approach to communication: the role of many leaders as living examples of the values they espouse and want others to accept. I show that Gandhi and Mao were not charismatic in the widely accepted Weberian sense of being graced by divine or superhuman powers. Rather, they developed a non-elitist (non-Weberian) form of charisma that encouraged self-reliant and cooperative effort among the people and discouraged dependency on leaders. Some years ago, "Gandhi's name, now increasingly synonomous with ¶the Mahatma,'" wrote Erik H. Erikson, "came to the attention of a charisma-hungry world; but this would be a subject for a separate book." [15] Since then, a few separate books on charismatic leadership have been written. Of these, The Spellbinders by Ann Ruth Willner is the most fact-based and creative. [16] Perhaps the material in this chapter may provide material for the additional work that is needed on the many varieties of charisma that may help or hurt a world that still seems charisma hungry.

"Channel Enlargement" (ch.5) deals with Gandhi's and Mao's inventiveness in exploiting or creating a huge variety of channels. Many of these channels were multidirectional and bottom-sideways. Some were bottom-up. All were directed to diverse audiences, including various national elites in their own countries and their adversaries and supporters in other countries.

"Mass Line Communication" (ch.6) consolidates the materials in the previous three chapters. While still using message analysis, this chapter walks on two feet, to borrow one of Mao's metaphors. Going beyond what Gandhi and Mao said during the critical years of 1942-44,

it discusses what they did from the early 1920's to Indian independence in 1947 and the creation of the People's Republic of China in 1949. This combination of message and action during the almost three decades of their struggle -- each expressed in accordance with the unique traditions of each country -- helped awaken thousands and then millions from decades of apathy and motivated them for struggle against heavy odds.

What might be the relevance today of the Gandhi-Mao legacy ?

In the present TV era could their successes in mass communication without mass media be repeated?

In "Can The Legacy Be Used?" (ch.7) I suggest how — subject to many conditions and adaptations -- the communication theory and practice of Gandhi and Mao might become relevant in various parts of the world. With enough understanding of their communication ideas and techniques, some people may be able to invent more human approaches to communication and leadership than the elitist, oligarchic, and carefully contrived charismatic styles that are too often the product of modern communicators.

But progress along these lines is improbable unless much more attention is given -- particularly in schools and departments of communication — to the totality of communication. Over-emphasis on the mass media may tend to a form of specialization that ignores the vital importance of non-media and small media communication. It may have the unfortunate consequence of conveying the idea that the mass media -- whether controlled by the state or by profit-seeking conglomerates— are invincible. I therefore report on hopeful tendencies toward generalist approaches to communication. I conclude by offering some

suggestions for more research on how non-elitist and circular modes of communication are being attempted in various parts of the world. [17]

## Notes

1. Heberle,"Types and Functions of Social Movements," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 14, p. 444.

2. Sidney Blumenthal. The Rise Of The Counter-establishment: From Conservative Ideology to Politcal Power. Times Books, 1986. As with many other studies of right-wing and neo-fascist or fascist extremism, including Friendly Fascism (South End Press, 1982), Blumenthal does not use the concept of social movement.

3. Among the earlier and best-known studies of social movements are these: Herbert Blumer, "Collective Behavior," Joseph B. Gittler, ed. Review of Sociology: Analysis of a Decade, Wiley, 1957, p. 127-158; Hadley Cantril, The Psychology of Social Movements, Wiley, 1941; Walter Galenson, Comparative Labor Movements, Prentice-Hall, 1952; Joseph R. Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American Temperance Movement, University of Illinois Press, 1963; Rudolf Heberle, Social Movements§: An Introduction to Political Sociology, Appleton, 1951; Selig Perlman, A Theory of the Labor Movmebnt, Wiley, Kelly, 1928; Fred A. Shannon, American Farmers' Movments, Van Nostrand, 1957; and Rapph H. Turner and Lewis M. Killian, Collective Behavior, Prentice-Hall, 1957. Much of this work was influenced by Max Weber's The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (1922), Talcott Parsons, ed, Free Press, 1957.

4. Joseph A. Gusfield, "The Study of Social Movements," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 14.

5. Piven and Cloward, Poor People's Movements: Why They Succees, How They Fail, Vintage, 1979.

6. Robert Michels. Political Parties, Free Press edit., 1962.

7. R. H. Turner. "Elementary Collective Behavior," New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Macropedia, Vol. 16, p. 607-622. The desirability of "forging a unity between spontaneity and organization" was the basis of Rosa Luxemburg's critique of the undue centralism inherent in both the German Social Democratic Party and the Leninist concept of revolutionary leadership (Stephen Eric Brenner, Rosa Luxemburg: A Revolutionary For Our Times, Columbia University Press, 1987, p. 49-57). A similar call for combining democracy (and spontaneity) with organization is presented by Raya Dunayevskaya in Marxism And Freedom, Humanities Press, 1982 edition. The same idea appears at the center of modern concepts of management and planning -- more voiced than followed by corporations and public agencies -- as processes that promote organizational democracy and spontaneous action at all levels to challenge high level decisions rather than give blind, Eichmann-like

obedience.

8. Gusfield, op. cit., p. 445. Similar concepts are used in almost all other studies of collective behavior.

9. Blumer, "Collective Behavior," in Alfred M. Lee, New Outline of the Principles of Sociology, 2nd. edit. Barnes & Noble, 1951, p. 167-222.

10. This is the definition used by John Dewey after his assertion that "There is more than a verbal tie between the words common, community, and communication. Men live in a community by virtue of the things they have in common." Quoted by Ashley Montague in The Human Connection, McGraw Hill, 1979, p. ix. Building on Dewey, Montague begins his book this way: "Communication is the name we give to the countless ways that humans have of keeping in touch -- not just to words and music, to pictures and print, but also to cries and whispers, nods and becks, postures and plumages: to every move that catches someone's eye and every sound that resonates upon another ear. Human communication, as the saying goes, is a clash of symbols; and it covers a multitude of signs" (ibid.). Almost everything said above is included tacitly in such brief and formal definitions as "the interchange of information by any means" (The American Heritage Dictionary) or "the exchange of meanings between individuals through a common system of symbols" (The New Encyclopaedia Britannica).

11. Hoffer. The True Believer, Harper & Row, 1952. Writing during the civil war between Chiang Kai-Shek and Mao, Hoffer looked back on the leadership abilities of Sun Yat-Sen and pointed out that "Unlike him, Chiang Kai-shek seems to lack every essential quality of a mass movement leader" (p. 106). He concluded that China was unable to produce anyone who "could keep a genuine mass movement going long enough for drastic reforms to take root" (p. 149). If he had taken a few more years to complete his book. Hoffer would surely have caught up with the achievements of Mao.

12. Stavrianos. Global Rift: The Third World Comes Of Age, Morrow, 1981, p. 526-531.

13. Background on this is provided in Kusum Singh, "Gandhi and Mao as Mass Communicators,"Journal of Communication, Summer 1979, p.94-101;and "Mass Line Communication: Liberation Movements in China and India," in George Gerbner and Marsha Siefert, ed., **World Communications: A Handbook**, N.Y.: Longman Publishers, 1984

14. In "Communicating: The Recurring Miracle" (Organizations and Their Managing, Free Press, 1968, Ch. 22), Bertram Gross analyses the many barriers to communication resulting from the characteristics of senders, messages, symbols, channels and receivers. "As a result, there may be very little correspondence between the images in the sender's mind and those produced in the receiver's mind. . . . When we consider the seriousness of these blockages, it seem nothing short of miraculous that people sometimes understand what administrators are trying to tell them." If communication within an organization is difficult, obviously communication among organizatiions and between leaders and unorganized followers or sympathizers -- particularly when mass media are not

available — usually faces even greater barriers.

15. Erikson. Gandhi's Truth: On The Origins Of Militant BNonviolence, Norton, 1969, p. 391.

16. Willner. The Spellbinders. Yale University Press, 1984. Willner's book contains a brilliant — but all too brief — summary of Gandhi's non-violent camaigns in South Africa from 1906 to 1914 and in India from 1917 to 1930.

17. Some of this appeared earlier in Kusum Singh, "People against Charisma," Communicator, October 1981.

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## 2. The Improbable Overthrows

As the capitalist-industrial revolution rolled forward during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the European powers competed with each other for control of the non-European world. Only thus, it seemed, could they find enough raw materials to feed their voracious factories and large enough markets to absorb the growing volume of factory output. By the late 1850s, after some bloody conflicts with the Portugese, Dutch and the French, the British achieved domination over the largest of all the colonies, India.

During their efforts in India, the British also attempted imperial domination of China, an even larger country. Through control of India's foreign trade, they were able to use opium from India as payment to Chinese merchants for the Chinese tea to which the British were becoming increasingly addicted. But for the British empire builders, Chinese addiction to opium was far more important; it helped pacify the natives. When native leaders tried to ban the opium trade, the British sent in their fleet, thereby demonstrating the technical superiority of western armaments. In 1842, after two "opium wars," they forced the Chinese to cede Hong Kong to the British crown and give the British special privileges in other coastal areas. This short-term success inspired France, Russia and the United States to follow their example and win similar privileges. In short order, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain, and Belgium jumped into the fray, each seeking a piece of China. Under these circumstances the British were

unable to repeat their Indian achievement. "By the beginning of the 20th century some 90 Chinese ports had been opened to foreign control." [1]

By that time also the European powers were vying with each other in other parts of Asia and in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean. After spreading to the Pacific coast, the United States had also entered the competition -- but usually through the more cost effective methods of indirect economic control rather than through formal colonialization. By 1914 "the colonial powers, their colonies and their formal colonies extended over approximately 85 percent of the Earth's surface." [2] Indeed, after World War I, much of the treaty making revolved around a reshuffling of colonial possessions and spheres of influence. Despite the perturbations created by the Russian revolution and the high promises of the Versailles Treaty, one thing was clear: the colonies were under firm control. One great power might lose something and another may gain something. But empire itself was alive and well. This was particularly true of the British empire which -- with India as the "jewel in the crown" -- had succeeded Spain as "His Majesty's dominions, on which the sun never sets." [3]

By this time also, as Japan slowly moved toward China (by preparing to use Korea as a jumping off place into Manchuria), it seemed that China was doomed to perpetual domination by foreign imperialists. In other words, neither in India nor China was there any local force capable of competing with foreign armies and navies.

One difficulty in reviewing modern Indian and Chinese history is the enormous wealth of area studies that deal with each country separately and often ignore the context of Western imperialism. Fortunately, I have been able to benefit from the works of William H. McNeil, Stanley Chodorow et al and I. S. Stavrianos, broad-guaged

of disease, pestilence, starvation, flood, drought, brigandage and war, life was "poor, nasty, brutish and short." 6

The entry of Western forces created not only sharp culture clashes but also a tangle of long-lasting myths and misunderstandings. The European invaders and traders saw the natives of India and China (and other countries also) as "the White Man's Burden" (in Rudyard Kipling's phrase), uncivilized heathen to whom the obviously superior British and Europeans would bring the blessings of civilization. The Indian rulers and merchants, in turn, looked at the foreigners as people from inferior cultures. "Forangi" (Hindi for foreigner) became a pejorative term. Any white person was a "laalmuh bundar," a red-faced monkey. One Chinese scholar described white men as follows: "Tall beasts with deep sunken eyes and beaklike noses. . . Although undoubtedly men, they seem to possess none of the mental faculties of men. The most bestial of peasants is far more human. . . It is quite possible that they are susceptible to training and could be taught the modes of conduct proper to a human being." 7

If the imperial powers had brought with them no "blessings of civilization," it would have been much harder for them to maintain themselves for as long as they did. In both India and China, they improved harbors, ports and such urban amenities as streets, public utilities and water supply. They contributed to rising rates of literacy and provided opportunities for some people to take advantage of higher education in the West. They imposed more open and orderly systems of law, administration, adjudication and security. Some of the British visitors, missionaries or officials in India lent some support to native "back to the Vedas" reformers who "called upon the Hindus to reject the corrupting medieval excrescenses of their faith, including idolatry, the

caste system and infant marriage." [8] Many Westerners in China supported the Taiping revolutionaries and subsequent Chinese reformers who favored banning of opium, as well as tobacco and alcohol, and "measures against concubinage, footbinding, polygamy, prostitution and arranged marriages." [9] These well-intentioned steps by Westerners, however, often had the effect of fanning the flames of internal conflict in both countries and supplementing the more devious "divide and conquer" tactics of top Western officialdom.

In India, by 1900 they had constructed one of the largest and best railway systems in the world. Like the other improvements listed above, the function of the railroad system was to serve the British more than the Indians. While it left the interior regions of the country largely unconnected with each other, it promoted the movemwent of Indian raw materials and British imports back and forth between the ports. It also served military purposes, much as the Japanese railway in Korea was planned as a military road to facilitate the shipping of Korean timber to Japan and the subsequent movement of Japanese troops northward to Manchuria.

In earlier times India had been an exporter of cotton goods for centuries, to such an extent that Britain for a long period imposed stiff tariff duties to protect its domestic manufacturers from Indian competition. Yet, by the middle of the 19th century, India was receiving one-fourth of all British exports of cotton piece goods and had lost its own export markets. British colonial historian, M. Martin, testified in 1840 before a Select Committe of the House of Lords that India,s textile industry had been destroyed "by reason of the outcry for free trade on the part of England without permitting to India a free trade herself." This destruction of indigenous textiles and handicrafts impoverished a

vast number of rural people who were left with no alternative means of livelihood. Moreover, the British land policy of monetizing Indian agriculture worsened the misery of the Indian peasant while benefitting handsomely the upper strata of the new agrarian society.

The Western powers also exploited Indian and Chinese labor in a fashion that closely resembled the earlier African slave trade. For instnce, Chinese laborers from 1847 onward were shipped illegally to overseas mines, plantations and construction projects such as railways. This traffic in coolie labor, from India as well as China, grew until it surpassed even the earlier slave trade in numbers involved. Chinese contractors received a capitation fee for every person brought to the shipping depots. Theoretically, this was voluntary indentured labor (though voluntarism was a myth when illiterate coolies accepted meaningless written contracts), but abduction and kidnapping were not uncommon.

These changes were possible only because the foreigners won the cooperation of local elites whose self-interests would harmonize with their own imperial rule. Another effective instrument for control was the educational system, though in the long run it challenged as well as buttressed British rule. They introduced their language and their culture, which were adopted by the local elites, who now served as intermediaries between the masses and the foreign powers. Many English-educated young Indians, for instance, emulated their British rulers by seeking employment in the Indian Civil Service, the legal services, journalism, and education. India and China, therefore were subject to not only Western economic imperialism but also to a more subtle cultural domination. In addition to the bureaucracy and the army, the British used the Indian princes for control purposes. In china this role was

played by local or regional warlords. In both countries Christian missionaries worked hard to convert the local populations, and in the process they had some important cultural impacts.

American journalist Edgar Snow reports on the superiority feelings among Europeans living in Shanghai: "Western businessmen who lived in Shanghai when I arrived in 1928, acted as if the Settlement were real and would last forever. In their euphoria they felt that they were the continent and the four hundred million Chinese beyond were a kind of suburb put there by God for trading purposes." In India. many officials acted as if they themselves were God and the natices were p[ut there to serve them.

So far as the West was concerned, this euphoria seemed justified. The West had become the industrial heartland of the world, and its industrial productivity increased spectacularly. Yet most people of India and China experienced no corresponding improvement in their lives. For them the impact of the West was a wrenching experience, in which everything was turned upside down and inside out. Many of them themselves to believe, as has ofen happened in the long history of oppression, that they were inferior beings.

In the early 20th century therefore observers knew that imperial control of India and China was an immutable fact. Not only were the imperial forces and their native flunkies militarily powerful but they also had at their command all the then-available media of large-scale communication: the press, the radio, the schools, and the major bureaucratic organizations. Indeed, the imperial rulers themselves seem to have had confidence in their own invincibility.

## The Weakness of Earlier Movements

The amorphous Indian society obviously was more vulnerable to foreign intrusion and manipulation than the highly organized imperial structure of China. The traditional elite of native princes and absentee-landlord-cum-moneylenders, who owed their wealth and power entirely to the British, cooperated with the imperialists in maintaining so-called law and order in rural areas. The Indian caste system with its hierarchical structure, and absence of a common language or a language with many dialects created enormous divisions. Not only was there a gulf between the written language and the spoken, but knowledge itself was jealously guarded in an esoteric language by the brahmin intelligentsia in a status-conscious society. Furthermore, centuries old conflicts between the Hindus and Muslims gave the British ample opportunity to practice their divide-and-rule strategy. 10

Under these conditions it was not difficult for the British regime to play upon the existing cultural and religious diversity of Indian society to prevent any attempts at national unification. While these many gaps provided stability for the ruling regime, it created a tremendous sense of isolation and frustration on the part of those native leaders who sought radical political and social change.

It has been commonly assumed that, in contrast to China, few peasant revolts occured in India to challenge British authority. A British anthropologist, Kathleen Gough, however, concludes that "peasant revolts have in fact been common both during and since the British period, every state of present day India having experienced several over the past two hundred years." 11 Despite the frequency and scope of the Indian uprisings, the fact remains that they were not as massive and

well organized as those in China. One reason for the difference was the political, linguistic and cultural fragmentation among India's people, so that revolts tended to be uncoordinated and localized as well as lacking in leadership.

These inhibiting factors were evident during the first great outbreak against British rule, the "mutiny" of 1857-58. It began as an uprising of Hindu and Muslim soldiers against prolonged campaigning, inadequate pay and the greasing of cartridges with cow and pig fat, which was offensive to both Hindus and Muslims. Mass support for the uprising came from millions of impoverished peasants, ruined artisans, exploited plantation and factory workers, and hill tribes people antagonized by tax levies and land seizures. The British reaction to the revolt shocked the civilized people: the whole population of Delhi was driven out into the open, and thousands were killed after perfunctory trials or no trials at all.

In China there were many more rebellions. But these lacked political organization and ideological consciousness, being isolated reaction to specific local grievances with no anticipation of a new social order. Although China did escape the outright conquest and direct foreign rule that India suffered, Europe's control of China was no less intense and extensive. As a high Chinese official said in 1906, "We submitted because we must; we were not a military Power. But do you suppose our sense of justice was not outraged?"

The humiliations and disasters inflicted by the Europeans in the latter half of the nineteenth century were no less than those suffered by the Chinese people from their own imperial rulers. "Of all the nations that have attained a certain degree of civilization, the Chinese are the least revolutionary and the most rebellious." [12] T.T. Meadows,

the well-informed British consul in mid-nineteenth century China, was referring to the rise and fall of dynasties that for millennia brought not revolutions but merely changes of ruling families. Change of a dynasty would become necessary when factionalism, corruption and gentry cliques came to such a point that heavy taxation had to be squeezed out of the impoverished peasantry to support the entire imperial structure. When to this was added the inevitable crop failures and famines, the peasants in sheer desperation would rise up in revolt against landlords and government tax collectors. The transition then to yet another new dynasty was conveniently rationalized by the concept of the "mandate from Heaven," which each dynasty was believed to possess. Change of dynasty was, therefore, accepted as marking the end of one divinely ordained mandate and the beginning of another. Furthermore, the teachings of Confucius proclaiming, "Let the ruler be a ruler and the subject a subject," provided social justification for the authority and privileges of the triad of landlords, scholars and officials, who comprised the ruling class or gentry, of China.

The Taiping Rebellion (1850-64) was a peasant rebellion against the Manchu Dynasty. In contrast to other peasant rebellions, it gained control of both banks of the Yangtze, penetrated north almost to Peking, west to Szechuan and south to Kwangtung. The Taipings also attempted basic social changes: repudiation of the Manchu Dynasty, banning of opium, tobacco and alcohol, opposition to ancestor tablets and to Biddhist, Taoist and Confucianist images. Most striking was their stress on equality for women, as reflected in their measures against concubinage, footbinding, polygamy, prostitution and arranged marriages, and their insistence that women have equal access to leadership positions.

In China, as in India, social reform movements encountered the opposition of powerful Western vested interests that had much to lose if the old order were substantively restructured. How much of the foreign intervention was responsible for the final defeat of the Taipings is however a matter of dispute. But it does seem clear that Western aid did contribute substantially to the dynasty's survival, as did also serious divisions among the Taipings toward the end, and the not surprising refusal of the scholar gentry to collaborate with such threatful rebels. [13]

Nevertheless, in 1911 a revolution led by Sun Yat-sen finally toppled over the hated Manchu dynasty. The Manchus were blamed for all China's problems and it was naively assumed that their replacement by a republic somehow would solve these problems. Dr. Sun Yat-sen and his Kuomintang or National People's Party put their faith in the efficacy of constitutionalism and other Western institutions as cure-alls for their national ailments.

Similarly, many English-educated young Indians of the postmutiny period put their unflagging faith in the ultimate equity of British liberalism. And like the young Chinese, they came mostly from well-to-do families and were ignorant of the plight of the peasantry, which comprised the overwhelming majority of the total population. And like the young Chinese, they talked vaguely of social reform and equality, but had no serious plans or even intentions for meaningful social restructuring. Given this lack of roots in Chinese and Indian reality, it is understandable that several uprisings they organized within China and India all failed miserably.

Most members of the Indian National Congress (INC) founded in 1885, the Kumingtang (KMT) in 1912 and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in

1921, were no doubt anti-imperialist. But at the same time they cherished illusions about the immediate applicability and efficacy of Western institutions. They tried to set up in India and China carbon copies of what they had observed abroad, without taking into account the needs of the great peasant masses. In fact, The Indian and Chinese societies were marked by two distinct systems of communication: the villages pursuing the traditional communication network based upon personal relations, and the elite in the cities communicating through print media and radio. This situation reflected social distances of such magnitude that large sectors of the population had no contact with one another. [14]

Ironically enough, the prestige of the aspiring native leaders within their party and among their opponents depended on their capacity to identify themselves as closely as possible with the aspirations of the common people as well as with traditional values. The British looked upon the INC as a "microscopic minority" of India's diverse millions and not a representative of the majority. KMT under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, after the death of Sun Yat-sen, became autocratic and even more removed from the peasantry. The CCP, on the other hand, was in the grip of "foreign dogmatism" -- blind imitation of Soviet experience and obedience to Soviet directives.

The early stages of the Indian and the Chinese liberation movements, therefore, remained weak and disunited. It was not very difficult for the British in India and Chiang Kai-shek in China to jail or coopt the leaders of these movements, or even to exterminate them physically if they became too much of a nuisance. It was a period of awful massacres of leaders and ruthless suppression of any national awakening.

Gandhi returned to India from South Africa in January 1915 where he had initiated non-violent confrontations against discrimation experienced by the Indians. He had organized nonviolent resistance to the South African governemnt and had formed the conviction that war or revolution is always wrong and that when changes cannot be achieved by persuasion and constitutional agitation alone, nonviolent forms of direct action must be attempted. As Gandhi explained, "Non-violence does not mean meek submission to the will of the evil-doer, but it means the pitting of one's whole soul against the will of the tyrant."

So that when the British regime in India passed the anti-sedition law, the Rowlatt Act in 1918, which summarily disposed of the civil rights of convicted and suspected rebels, Gandhi pledged satyagraha (soul force or truth force) against the "Black Act," as it came to be known. [15] "The Rowlatt Act was the parent of Non-cooperation Movement," said Sir Surendranath Bannerjea, one of the national leaders. Gandhi called upon the whole country to observe hartal (that is, a closing down of all places of business and work) and "observe the day as one of fasting and prayer." The hartal was to announce a future disobedience to the Rowlatt Bill only. But an action committee had the power to select other minor laws to be disobeyed immediately, such as the salt tax law and, most of all, ordinances against proscribed literature. A newspaper called Satyarahi was to be published by Gandhi without a license. Books were to be sold illicitly on street corners; they included Gandhi's adaptation of Ruskin's Unto This Last, as well as The Story of a Satyagrahi (Gandhi's paraphrase of Plato's Death of Socrates), and extensive extracts from The Duty of Civil Disobedience by Thoreau.

The British reacted again with naked force. On April 13, 1919, General Dyer forbade the citizens of Amritsar, the Sikh holy city in

the Punjab, to gather in public assembly. A few thousand, many without knowledge of the ordinance, had gathered unarmed, as previously planned, in the ruins of a public garden named Jallianwalla Bagh, which was surrounded by high walls permitting access and exit only through a few narrow gates. Dyer marched 50 armed soldiers into the Bagh and ordered them to open fire on over 10,000 entirely unarmed men, women, and children. "In ten minutes of tensest history", wrote Erik Erickson," he (Dyer) established a model for cold military murder which would show up colonialism at its most brutal." [16] Dyer kept his troops firing until they had shot 1,650 rounds of ammunition into the terror-stricken people, killing about 400 civilians and wounding 1,137. They were left without medical attention by Dyer, who hastily removed his troops to the camp. Dyer then returned to England as a hero to many British admirers, who presented him with thousands of pounds and a jewelled sword inscribed "Saviour of the Punjab."

But Gandhi understood that "Great Britain would defend her Indian commerce and interests by all the forces at her command. India must consequently evolve force enough to free herself from the embrace of death." [17] Severe repression against nonviolent people was, however, bound to alienate still more Indians from British rule and hopefully create dissent and opposition in Britain and in other countries.

China during these years suffered from the ravages of three concurrent wars. One was the recurring struggle between Chiang Kai-shek in Nanking and the warlords entrenched in certain provinces. The second was the civil war between the Kuomintang led by Chiang and the Communist Party led by Mao. The third was the war against the Japanese, who invaded Manchuria in 1931 and thence fanned out through North China.

Chiang, however, was more concerned with exterminating the

Communists than fighting the Japanese. He believed, and with some justification that "The Japanese are a disease of the skin. The Communists are a disease of the heart." This seriously weakened the war against the Japanese and threw the country into serious confusion. C.P. Fitzgerald points out how in China the disintegration of all central control into warlordism discredited the ideals of republican government, "the Chinese became completely disillusioned with the false Gods of the West. They turned restlessly to some other solution." [18] Therefore, the new doctrine of the Bolshevik Revolution could not fail to attract.

Chiang had pursued his anti-Communist strategy for many years prior to the Second World War. When Mao established his rural soviets in Kiangsi in the late 1920s, Chiang launched a series of campaigns against what he called "bandits." Eventually he succeeded in driving them out six thousand miles westward across southern China, and then northward to the province of Shensi. There Mao found a small and isolated Communist base, which he transformed into his headquarters, centered in Yenan. In that small, drab provincial town, Mao developed a revolutionary strategy and trained revolutionary cadres that in fifteen years were to bring victory to the communists.

During the 1930s Mao gradually broke with the official Chinese Communist Party line, as dictated from Moscow. His emergence as the ackowledged leader of the party resulted from the eventual success of what he had called in October 1938 the "Sinification" of Marxism. He maintained that Chinese conditions and cultural traditions differed significantly from Soviet conditions, and therefore required solutions based upon the pragmatic study of Chinese problems.

Clearly, before the imperialists could be challenged with any possibility of success, the habits of thinking and doings of the leaders

had to be radically restructured. It took quite a few years of trial and error effort before Gandhi and Mao could adjust even their own thinking (discussed in chapter 4, "Leaders as the Message"). For Mao it was not too difficult since he began life as a peasant and had a natural empathy for the peasant masses of his country. Besides, he was not steeped in Marxist doctrines from childhood, as were most of the Bolshevik intellectuals. He was able to challenge, and, when necessary, to discard the most sacrosanct of Marxist dogma. Gandhi, on the other hand, came from a well-to-do middle class family who sent him to study law in London at the age of 18 years. He remained there for more than three years and learnt the intricacies of a well-groomed Englishman. While trying to reducate himself, he lamented, "Every time I am obliged to speak in the English language before an audience of my countrymen, I feel humiliated and ashamed." 19 Gandhi also had to face up to the equally difficult task of converting his key associates, most of whom were products of feudal families accustomed to riding on the backs of the peasantry and had little respect for the so-called uneducated masses.

For Mao the elitism of Chinese tradition and the extreme bookishness of Chinese education were major obstacles to the development of a mass movement. He launched a broad three-front attack on errors in the Party's style of work and thought. He criticized subjectivism in thought, sectarianism (separation from the masses) in Party relations, and formalism in literature and art. His harshest comments were reserved for those who study Marxism in the abstract and do not inquire about their connection with the Chinese revolution,

> In speech they can appear more Marxist than anyone else . . . they invariably base their actions on books, on set phrases of Marx, Engels, Lenin, or Stalin . . . Their decisions are from

> book formulas, historical comparisons, or from similar events in Russia and the countries of Western Europe. [20]

Gandhi and Mao, therefore, came to the idea of building a masss movement by viewing the inadequacy of the elitist parties that had dominated nationalist or anti-imperialist efforts up until the 1920s. Gandhi broke with the urban-centred traditions of the Indian Congress Party and completely transformed the structure of the Congress party.

### From Weakness To Strength

> What gave the Congress its present strength was its conversion from a movement of the intelligentsia into a movement of the people; and that was Mr. Gandhi's doing, almost single-handed.
>
> Sir Reginald Coupland. [21]

> It was only because a large proportion of China's hundreds of millions of peasant sympahized with and supported this effort that Mao Tse Tung was able to. . .gain control of the country
>
> S. R. S. [22]

In political as in military action and in business, "success comes to the innovator." Gandhi and Mao were innovators in the sense that they did not play according to the rules expected by their antagonists at home and abroad. Their message was simple: it was not enemy guns but imperfections of people and leaders themselves that kept their countries in bondage. Gandhi confronted the world with a new political instrument of non-violence, endowed with a new kind of religious fervor; Mao presented a profound challenge to both the Western and Soviet worlds, as well as an increasingly influential model for some Third World movements.

Gandhi's and Mao's liberation strategy can be comprehended within the framework of these questions:

(a) What is the correct style to achieve a synthesis of Party leadership and mass action?

(b) How can this activity best support national goals?

(c) What will encourage the widest possible mass participation in liberation movement?

Both Gandhi and Mao, needed many leaders to activate the potential of the great mass force, but both claimed that the leaders were not superior to the masses and that they must remain in close contact with the masses to gain understanding and knowledge. This meant a difficult process of educating the educated to look less at themselves in self-admiration and more at the masses of the people, their problems and their potentialities. In doing this, a steady flow of communication through small-circulation newspapers provided an indispensable communication link among the formal and informal leaders of the party groupings and non-party organizations that finally became rooted in the masses (discussed in chapter 5, "Enlargement of Channels").

They both turned toward the peasantry as the source of mass movements that could overthrow the apparently invincible power of the British in India and in China of Western imperialists, the Japanese and Chiang Kai-Chek. In countries like China and India, where the vast majority of the population come from the peasant class, an aggressive land reform policy is sure to elicit popular support. It is of significance, therefore, that Gandhi and Mao chose peasant grievances for their initial campaigns in their respective countries.

Gandhi's Champaran campaign in 1917 was on behalf of the indigo-growing peasants in the Himalayan foothills who suffered under the "tinkathia" system in Bihar by which the farmers were bound by law to plant "three of every twenty parts" of their best land with indigo, to

be delivered at fixed prices to their landlords. This was only the core of a whole system of grievances. Gandhi soon sat down with some of the farmers to ascertain the facts while local government and the planters tried to use local ordinances to make him leave on threat of arrest and imprisonment. As Gandhi explained, "I might have legally resisted the notices served on me. Instead I accepted them all, and my conduct towards the officials was correct. They thus saw that I did not not want to offend them personally, but that I wanted to offer civil resistance to their orders." [23] Not only was the case against Gandhi withdrawn, but full governmental support was promised for the inquiry into the grievances of the farmers. Thus Champaran became an object lesson in the way in which a local civil disobedience campaign might serve as an opening wedge into national issues.

Mao, on the other hand, concluded from his firsthand observations that the "revolutionary vanguard" could only be the poor peasants:

> Within a short time, hundreds of millions of peasants will rise in Central, South, and North China, with the fury of a hurricane; no power, however strong, can restrain them. They will break all the shackles that bind them and rush towards the road of liberation. All imperialists, warlords, corrupt officials, and bad gentry will meet their doom at the hands of the peasants. All revolutionary parties and comrades will be judged by them. [24]

The difference, of course, is that the Chinese Communist Party never regarded agrarian reforms as anything more than a phase in the building of a mass base, a stage enabling them to develop the revolutionary struggle toward the conquest of power and the ultimate realization of socialist changes. Gandhi, on the other hand, was looking for moral victory against injustice, that is, to bear out his belief that a few people (or even one man) with truth on their side could wield immense moral power. He chose satya ("truth") and ahimsa

("nonviolence" or love) as his political weapon to bring the mightiest empire known to history to its knees.

What is important, however, is that by bringing peasants into their concept of the national struggle, Gandhi and Mao unleashed the enormous creative power of the masses. In trying to mobilize the peasantry, they both developed -- Mao more explicitly, Gandhi more tacitly -- a form of non-elitist leadership based on circular and bottom-sideway communication among leaders and led (as set forth in chapter 6). While the intellectuals discussed and wrote papers and articles about how to approach problems and organize mass organizations, Gandhi and Mao were out among the people creating genuine mass movements. While the majority of the party members catered to the interests of the middle class, Gandhi and Mao were out campaigning on behalf of the depressed peasants, and thus, mobilizing people's support that the Congress party of India and the Chinese Communist party previously lacked.

By the late 1930s the liberation movements in India and China led by the Chinese Communist Party and the Congress Party gradually became mass organizations. National awakening had not only penetrated to the people at large, but also made them active participants in the struggle for freedom. As Jawaharlal Nehru said about the Congress Party,

> "He (Gandhi) made it democratic and a mass organization. Democratic it had been previously also, but it had so far been limited in franchise and restricted to the upper classes. Now the peasants rolled in, and in its new garb it began to assume the look of a vast agrarian organization with a strong sprinkling of the middle classes. This agrarian character was to grow. Industrial workers also came in, but as individuals and not in their separate, organized capacity." 25

Gandhi and Mao promoted three main criteria in the organization of their parties:

(1) The party must represent the interest of the masses;

(2) The masses must be treated as equals;

(3) The masses must be aroused and educated and led by the correct methods.

These three criteria were addressed to the party workers, because the responsibility for articulating and maintaining the communication link belonged to the leaders, not the led. More important, mass movements require intuitive understanding and empathy on the part of leaders; no less to the needs of the movement than to the conflicting interests of diverse audiences speaking different languages.

During this period of struggle, the public pronouncements of Gandhi and Mao always included emotional and nationalistic appeals to create a united front against the foreign enemy. The nationalistic orientation placed mass participation in the service of a cause that transcended group interests and the class struggle. Both developed techniques of encouraging and even manipulating colleagues and supporters to give their best to the movement. Groups of people who had little contact or who distrusted one another found themselves working together, whether nationalists or socialists or capitalists. Both movements had links between the national revolution and the social revolution, but at each stage when a conflict arose, higher priority was given to the national revolution than to the social revolution. This required building broad united fronts with forces and classes which were ultimately to be eliminated or won over.

There were, nevertheless, significant differences between the two movements as led by Gandhi and Mao. These are briefly highlighted in Figure 2, "Two Liberation Movements: India and China", which shows some of the more essential similarities and differences.

2. Two Liberation Movements: India and China

| | India | China |
|---|---|---|
| Socio-political situation in country | Direct colony; large; illiterate economic under-development | Indirect colony; large; illiterate; economic under-development |
| Aims of movement | Independence from British rule | Socialist revolution |
| Forms of struggle | Nationalist; active-nonviolence Satyagraha; non-cooperation; civil disobedience | nationalist; Socialist; non-pacifist Agrarian reforms; warfare |
| Base | All classes (land-lords, business professionals, peasants and workers); urban-rural based | Peasants, workers, soldiers, temporary alliances with national bourgeoisie; rural-urban based |

Gandhi was an active pacifist whose movement took the form of social and moral reform. He built a political movement based on "soul-force" rather than "physical force", concerned with reaching the heart and the conscience of his opponent through his own personal suffering. Mao was a militant revolutionary who sought radical restructuring of the system and was determined to overthrow not only imperialism but capitalism as well.

Gandhi's and Mao's leadership of their parties was also significantly different. Although Gandhi was a decisive influence in Congress, he never held any official position in its hierarchy. It was a leadership style peculiarly Indian and surely unique in the history of revolutions. Mao had not only official position in the hierarchy of his party but also had an extra party leadership element because of his intensely personal style. Gandhi and Mao were both, however, important

links between the party and the people; they could speak to the common people as well as the elites.

The deliberate transformation of an elite struggle into an open popular movement of such scope is probably without parallel in the history of national movements. Enormous obstacles were overcome and highly controversial messages were successfully communicated to huge masses of the people dispersed over vast areas before the era of radio and television (as did every other successful leader before mass media were invented). Indeed, it raises interesting questions as to how they did it.

## The Miraculous Victories

A fundamental element common to India and China was the two World Wars which were decisive factors in the emergence of revolutionary situations in both countries. The wars caused general upheavals and economic and political pressures, creating climates conducive to national demand for radical change. And yet a "revolutionary situation" by itself does not guarantee a national movement unless there are leaders capable of seizing the opportunity for decisive action.

The setbacks suffered by the Western powers during World War I somewhat cracked the armor of invincibility of the British empire.[26] Then came two great events. The first was the Russian Revolution of 1917, beginning as a hopeful liberation movement against the greatest of the surviving despotisms. The second event was American intervention in the war in 1917, which led on to President Wilson's enunciation of his Fourteen Points supporting national freedom and self-determination of peoples.

If the course of the war disillusioned Indians and Chinese about Western civilization, these two events nonetheless emboldened them to demand self-government in the name of fundamental principles accepted by the Allied Powers. The war, in other words, brought about a mental revolution in both countries and created a climate for genuine national movements.

**India**

During World War I Britain needed the men and wealth of her colonies, and although India supplied both, antagonism continued to increase. Gandhi's strategy for bringing the gigantic machine of British rule to a halt was to call upon his people to start a multiple boycott campaign in 1920, boycotting British-made goods, British schools and colleges, British courts of law, British titles and honors, British elections and elective offices, and, should the need arise if all other boycotts failed, British tax collectors as well. The total withdrawal of Indian support would thus stop the machine, and nonviolent noncooperation would achieve the national goal of swaraj (independence).

The British were forced to admit the nationalist character of the movement. In a statement submitted to the British Parliament, the colonial regime made the following observations regarding the general results of the movement in the 1920's:

> Mr. Gandhi's intensive movement during the years 1921 and 1922 has diffused far and wide, among classes previously oblivious to political considerations, a strong negative patriotism born of race hatred of the foreigner. The less prosperous classes both in town and the countryside have become aroused to certain aspects-- even though these be mischievous, exaggerated and false -- of the existing political situation. On the whole, this must be pronounced, up to the present, the most formidable achievement of the noncooperation movement. That it has certain potentialities for good will be maintained by many; that it will immensely increase the dangers and difficulties of the next few years can be denied by few. 27

Moreover, the myth of British justice and fair play was being increasingly eroded as the regime exploited Indian resources for imperialist ends. So that when the British raised the tax salt which Indians were no longer allowed to make, Gandhi launched in March 1930 the satyagraha against the tax on salt, which affected the poorest section of the community. One of the most spectacular and successful campaigns in Gandhi's nonviolent war against the British regime, it resulted in the imprisonment of more than 60,000 persons. Winston Churchill however waged an unceasing struggle against Gandhi, declaring "Gandhism and all it stands for must ultimately be grappled with and finally crushed." 28

With World War 11, the British continued to offend those whose support they needed. They declared war for India against Germany and Japan wihtout consulting the Indian leadership. Furthermore, the British Parliament passed an act which suspended the rights granted in the Government of India Act of 1935, and Winston Churchill declared that the statement of war aims contained in the Atlantic Charter (which among other things respected "the rights of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live") did not apply to India, but only to those countries overrun by the Axis powers.

By 1942, the Japanese had swept swiftly through South-East Asia to the borders of India. Gandhi's Congress Party affirmed in a manifesto that India "will gladly associate herself with free nations for mutual defence against aggression and for economic co-operation..." But only as a free nation, he insisted, could India be effective. The British government headed by he had no intention whatsoever of giving India freedom or even lesser rights. As Churchill said on November 10, 1942, "I have not become the King's First Minister in order to preside at the

liquidation of the British Empire." The result was a growing anger and frustration throughout India made worse by the economic effects of the war culminating in the awesome 1943 famine in Bengal, which killed millions of people.

In order to enlist necessary support from India during the difficult war years, the British government sent Sir Stafford Cripps to India in 1942 with an offer of independence at the end of the war. Until this time, there had been no recognition by Britain that independence was a legitimate Indian goal.

The Cripps Mission ended in a fiasco because of Britain's unwillingness to accede to India's minimum demands. [29] The deep-seated distrust between the British and the Indian leaders was finally responsible for the mission's complete failure. The refusal of the government to declare its war aims, the Atlantic Charter statement of Churchill, and the past record of British policy towards the Congress all made the Congress suspect that Cripps was a tool of the arch-imperialist Churchill. 30

The failure of the Cripps Mission brought about a dramatic change in Gandhi's strategy. By April 1942 he had already evolved the demand that "the Britsh should leave India now in an orderly manner," and in June he told an American journalist, "I am not interested in independence after the war. I want independence now. That will help Britain win the war." This demand developed into a call for a "short and swift open rebellion" in which all patriots, including the soldiery, would participate. He was faced, he said, with "a drastc situation requiring a drastic remedy." 31

The writings of this period reflect new anti-war, anti-British sentiments, very different from the earlier stress on accommodation and cooperation between the people and the colonial regime. A systematic

message analysis of the period before 1942 might reveal different findings from the 1942-1944 period. My study shows that from 1942 onwards, Gandhi acted with new urgency. For instance, he spoke of nonviolence for the first time in a different tone:

> I have decided that even at certain risks, which are obviously involved, I must ask the people to resist the slavery . . . . There is ordered anarchy all round and about us. I am sure that the anarchy that may result, because of the British withdrawal or their refusal to listen to us and our decision to defy their authority will in no way be worse than the present anarchy. After all, those who are unarmed cannot produce a frightful amount of violence or anarchy, and I have a faith that out of this anarchy may arise pure nonviolence. But to be a passive witness of the terrible violence that is going on, in the name of resisting a possible foreign aggression, is a thing I can't stand. It is a thing that would make me ashamed of my ahimsa (nonviolence) 32

It was about this time that Gandhi began to popularize his dramatic slogan "Quit India." 33 Early in May, 1942, he said in the course of an interview:

> From the frustration of every effort made to bring about unity by me among others, has arisen this logical step for me that not until British power is wholly withdrawn from India, can there be any real unity, because all parties will be looking to the foreign power . . . . Therefore, I have come to the conclusion that real heart unity, genuine unity, is almost an impossibility unless British power is withdrawn and no other power takes its place. 34

He then sponsored a Congress resolution urging struggle for freedom "with all the armed as well as other forces at her (India's) command." 35

The British strategy, on the other hand, was to postpone the constitutional issue to the end of war, and in the meanwhile, to penalize any revolt and to prepare Indian and world opinion against the Congress, by propaganda. It was "a policy of three P's--postponement, penalization and propaganda." 36

Matters now came quickly to a crisis. Congress, under Gandhi's guidance, declared nonviolent resistance demanding that the British

"Quit India." The demand for mass civil disobedience gathered in one rush of feeling all the humiliations and resentments in the country of the last many years. To the traditional slogans like "Long Live Revolution," "Victory to Gandhiji," "Victory to Mother India," "Long Live Free India," Gandhi added new ones like "We shall do or die," and "Quit India." The new slogans demanded complete withdrawal and expressed determination to die in the fight for freedom.

The aims and objects of the movement were stated in a Congress Working Committee resolution passed at Wardha on July 14, 1942, and adopted at the meeting of the All India Congress Committee at Bombay on August 8. Nehru stated that the resolution was sponsored by Gandhi himself and into it went all his beliefs and ideas. [37] Three objects were stated in the Wardha resolution and three more were added in the Bombay resolution. These were as follows:

(1) To overthrow foreign domination of India;

(2) To build up a spirit of resistance to aggression among the people and to release that energy and enthusiasm to defend India;

(3) To achieve communal unity at the withdrawal of the British.

The Bombay resolution added three more:

(1) To throw all India's resources against Nazism and Fascism to win moral support of all oppressed humanity;

(2) To help Asiatic nations fighting colonialism regain their freedom;

(3) To bring about a world federation which would ensure disarmament and pooling of the world's resources for humane purposes.

The Resolution had the overwhelming support of the Congressmen and was passed with only 13 opposing it out of 300 members of the Congress Committee that were present. [38]

The Resolution called for a mass civil-disobedience campaign. "After all," said Gandhi, "this is open rebellion;" it looked as though the peak of the crisis was coming October. At this point the British struck hard. The whole Congress was declared an illegal organization. There followed a short but sharp outbreak of violence which caused widespread dislocation, especially in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Bengal. Official figures reckoned over 1,000 killed and 3,000 injured by the end of the year, while more than 60,000 were arrested. The British described it as the Congress Rebellion and tried to connect Congress leaders with it; Congress ascribed the violence to the intolerable strain imposed by British intransigence on popular feeling. It was clear to both, however, that Gandhi had succeeded in shaking India out of her lethargy and the torpor of centuries. It seemed as though the British had triumphed, but it was not very difficult to perceive that the tremendous underground reservoir of national feeling was awaiting a release by war pressure in order to come to the surface.

In 1945, however, the British Labor Party, which was pledged to Indian self-government, swept into control of Parliament. Two years later independence within the Commonwealth was granted to India and the Muslim state of Pakistan — despite bitter opposition from Gandhi who had always worked for a unified, independent India. In any case, the British overthrow in India was the first step in the liquidation of the Britsh empire on the continents of Asia and Africa.

China

After the initial Communist failures in the cities and in the southern countryside, the vast area and population of China provided a base sufficiently broad for maneuvering and for fresh starts. Also, the decades of wracking civil war followed by brutal Japanese invasion

produced a degree of mass misery and social unraveling that constituted a favorable milieu for Communist insurgency.

In the early 1930s Chiang's troops had tightened their blockade around Communist areas south of the Yangtze. By 1934 the pressure on the Communists had grown too great. Bursting out of Chiang's blockade line, they marched from Southern China to re-establish themselves in Yenan in the Northwest. The winding route of the main column of thirty thousand was over six thousand miles long. The sufferings endured and the iron determination with which they were mastered were enormous. This is one of the reasons why the savage ordeal of the Long March has stood out as a deeply symbolic peak in Chinese history.

Mao felt that his forced abandonment of Kiangsi base was due to lack of sufficient support from the local population. He decided to rectify this error by adopting a "New Democracy" program based on a broad anti-Japanese united front, and by evolving what came to be called the Yenan Way--a strategy for mobilizing the peasants behind the Communist Party and its People's Liberation Army. The slogans that were popularized stressed patriotism and self-sacrifice for nation rather than for class: "Everything subordinate to the war."

In 1938, Mao compared the difference between a style of approach which would gain popular support and one which would turn away such support. He argued that "such things as selfishness and self-interest, inactiveness and negligence in work, corruption, degeneration and vain glory are most contemptible; while the spirit of impartiality, of active and hard work, of self-denial in the interest of the public and of complete absorption in arduous work, commands respect." 39 The most effective style, therefore, to mobilize the masses and create an

atmosphere of popular commitment is the non-elitist style reflecting service, responsibility, consultation, and common sacrifice.

The central task, said Mao, is to mobilize the masses so as to overthrow imperialism. But mobilizing the masses alone is not sufficient. The Party must also attend to the living conditions of the masses to make them realize that "we represent their interests, that our life and theirs are intimately interwoven." 40

If the Yenan Way is contrasted with what the Japanese and the Kuomintang had to offer to the peasants, then the reason for the Communist victory becomes clear. The Japanese army operated on the basis of its "three-all" policy--"burn all, kill all, loot all." The Kuomintang with its pervasive corruption and runaway inflation, did not present a persuasive alternative to the Japanese.

The party was further to "educate" the masses and "penetrate" into the workers' and peasants' groups and exercise direct political leadership over them:

> Do we want to win the support of the masses? Do we want to devote all their efforts to the war front? If we do, we must go among the masses; arouse them to activity; concern ourselves with their weal and woe; and work earnestly and sincerely in their interests and solve their problems of salt, rice, shelter, clothing and childbirth, in short, all their problems. If we do so, the broad masses will certainly give us support and regard the revolution as their very life and their most glorious banner . . . . The masses, the millions upon millions of the masses who sincerely and earnestly support the revolution . . . are a wall of bronze and iron which no force can ever break, absolutely none. The counter-revolutionary forces can never break us, but we shall break them. By rallying millions upon millions of the masses round the revolutionary government and by expanding the revolutionary war, we shall be able to wipe out any counter-revolution and take over the whole of China. 41

Marxism-Leninism was therefore to provide China with a consistent ideology of national political power based (until 1949 at least) on a thorough-going, reciprocal relationship between leaders and led. His

insistence that Marxism-Leninism be fused with specific historical conditions and given "a definite national form" before it is put into practice led to three fundamental changes in conducting the Chinese liberation movement:

(1) Peasantry-based Party. This was necessitated by Chiang Kai-shek's break with the Communists in 1927 when the latter were driven from the cities and confined to the inland hills. Land-locked and constantly under siege from without, the Communists had no choice but to turn to the peasant for support. 42

It was from the ranks of the common peasants that Mao built the first Red Army. During the years of struggle in Chingkang-shan and afterward, Mao had openly recognized a common bond between revolutionaries and secret societies and other armed outlaw organizations. He had consistently solicited the support of such groups despite criticisms from the party hierarchy. This reflected in part his identification with the ancient tradition of hero banditry, in part his populist sense of their revolutionary potential. Mao asserted that their character could be changed by intensive political education once they had joined the Red Army. Peasants, soldiers, and even the bourgeoisie could transcend their class background through education and revolutionary process. Democracy in the army, Mao believed, was an "important weapon" for ensuring loyalty to the communist cause, as it gave the soldiers a sense of "spiritual liberation" that was absent in the Kuomintang armies. 43

(2) Alliances. In China the urban proletariat class was exceedingly small; Mao put it at a mere two million people as late as 1926. 44 Therefore, the proletariat could not lead a liberation movement on its own strength alone; it had to rely on all other

classes, forces, and groups that might, for whatever reason, support its cause. The transition to a united front policy was a complex and challenging task for Mao. Throughout 1936, conflicting policy lines coexisted within the Chinese Communist Party. Eventually, under Mao's leadership the party emerged as the most effective spokesman for patriotic sentiment at a time of mounting concern about Japanese incursions in China. This led to a military detente with the warlord and Kuomintang armies which had been directly threatening the rural base areas of the communists; and prompted significant support among middle school and college students, thousands of whom flocked to Yenan. Communist appeals provided a focus for nationwide pressure to end the Civil War, and paved the way for the Second United Front under Mao's leadership. From this time on, the public pronouncements of the Chinese Communist Party always included emotional and nationalistic appeals for total mobilization against Japan.

(3) Protracted warfare. Mao maintained that since the enemy is superior in power, the war would be protracted, undergoing (from the standpoint of the revolutionaries) three stages of development: "strategic defense," "strategic stalemate," and "strategic counter-offensive." Because the revolutionaries were weak, Mao said, they were bound to lose ground in the initial phases of the conflict. Meanwhile, it was necessary to develop over a vast territory a war of maneuver to harass the enemy and undermine his effectiveness and morale. This required mass political mobilization, a united front of "the whole people," and the development of peasant guerrilla warfare on a national scale. Having attained sufficient strength, the revolutionaries would then launch a counter-offensive to destroy the enemy. The overall strategy was summed up in the following terms:

> ... we should resolutely fight a decisive engagement in every campaign or battle in which we are sure of victory; we should avoid a decisive engagement in every campaign or battle in which we are not sure of victory; and we should absolutely avoid a strategically decisive engagement on which the fate of the whole nation is staked. [45]

Furthermore, Mao maintained that there could be no delimitation, no partition between various forms of struggle like military action, political and economic agrarian policies in the Chinese liberation movement. In other words, the aim of the Chinese Communist Party was not only to win a war of liberation against Japan, but also to promote social and political movement on a country-wide scale, and above all, to take power. To keep the geographical sprawl united through ideology and organization, mass struggle on all fronts and in various forms had to be carried out.

Building the Party organization on a mass base was a task fundamental to the national struggle. This was accomplished by fusing the Party and Red Army into a twin synthesis, but with the Party in ideological control. It was through the Red Army, carrying out the policies of the Party, that the agrarian revolution, essential for the support of the masses, could develop. This complex triple relationship of masses-Party-Army was the basis of Mao's forms of struggle at that time.

Mao maintained that the Red Army was not only a military instrument but, above all, a political form of propaganda, agitation, promoting land reform and peasant struggle, educating the people and leading them to establish their own associations, to take power from the landlords. The Red Army, therefore, was the best training ground

for Party cadres, since armed struggle was the dominant mode of the liberation movement.

Basically, the forms of struggle were broadly divided among four types of organizations. These were the government ("soviets"), the Chinese Communist Party, the army, and the mass organizations. Their struggles were coordinated through formal and informal channels of communication that included joint meetings, mutual campaigns and interlocking leadership.

The mode of struggle had two key elements: one, struggle toward rationalized hierarchy and centralized organization, the other toward reliance on the force generated by an aroused peasantry through land revolution and guerrilla warfare. In 1942, for the first time, economic development and social change in the base areas became the key mode of struggle. The assumption was that the "vanguard" cannot have interests differing from those of the masses.

It was not until 1945 that the Japanese occupation army surrendered and left Chinese soil, but their departure did not resolve China's internal conflict. No sooner had they laid down their arms that the smoldering rivalry between the Communists and the Nationalists erupted with renewed fury, plunging the war-weary Chinese people into five more years of destruction and deprivation. It was Chiang Kai-shek, not Mao, who led the recognized Chinese government after the Japanese defeat by the American forces. On the world scene, Chiang rose to conspicuous prominence as China became one of the five permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations. And the victorious American forces gave full support — both military and economic — to Chiang Kai-shek. The United States government was totally committed to Chiang's Nationalist regime, but as the Civil War raged on, it became

increasingly obvious which side had people's support. And when the Communist takeover of China finally took place in 1949 after the collapse of Chiang's regime, the question asked in the United States was, "How did we lose China?" Some even charged "treachery in the White House itself." Obviously, it was not treachery or White House weakness but rather the strength of those same mass movements and people's struggle that most American political leaders (not heeding the reports of the Foreign Service experts who were hounded out of political life for telling the truth) failed to understand.

Ironically, Mao's Chinese Communist Party did not enjoy much support from the Soviet Union, which American demonologists saw as the inspiration behind Chinese communism. Thus, when the People's Liberation Army took Nanking in April 1949, the Soviet ambassador was the only foreign diplomat to accompany the retreating Chiang's Nationalist regime to Canton. Mao himself often pointed out that Stalin did not believe in the capacity of the Chinese Communists to achieve a clear-cut victory. Besides, Mao hinted, Stalin thought they would be a nuisance if they did. Did Stalin fear thought that a Chinese victory might add Mao's name to the great Marx-Lenin-Stalin triumphirate, thereby undermining Stalin's preeminence as the one living expositor of the holy doctrine? My interpretation would be that probably the success of grassroot mobilization in China tended to encourage a relationship between leaders and the led that was very different from the top-down style of Stalin. Besides, "mass line" communication was far beyond the comprehension of the Stalinists, as it probably is today to anyone suffering from authoritarian approaches to communication.

I would like to think that the following chapters might help

explain "mass line" communication to anyone as a liberating force in human life.

NOTES

1. Harry Magdoff, "Colonialism," Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th edition, 1974.

2. Magdoff, ibid.

3. Although this phrase has long been associated with the British empire, it was originally applied to Britain's imperial predecessor, Spain. Captain John Smith first claimed it for the English King James I, saying that he saw no reason why the Spanish soldiers should brag. Bergen-Evans, Dictionary of Quotations, Delacorte Press, 1968, p. 196.

4. William H. McNeill, A World History, 3rd. edit. Oxford University Press, 1979; Stanley Chiodorow et al, A History of the World, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986; and I. S.Stavrianos. Global Rift: The Third World Comes Of Age, Murrow, 1981.

5. Stavrianos. Global Rift: The Third World Comes Of Age, Murrow, 1981, p. 230.

6. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan I.

7. Quoted by Richard Lapiere and Paul R. Farnsworth, Social Psychology, McGraw Hill, 1936, p. 261.

8. "India," The New Encyclopaedia Brittanica, Macropaedia, Vol. 21, p. 97.

9. Stavrianos, op. cit., p. 321.

10. R.C. Majumdar,ed., The History and Culture of the Indian People. Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1951, p. 149.

11. K. Gough, "Indian Peasant Uprisings," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars (July-Sept. 1976):3.

12. As quoted by L.S. Stavrianos in Global Rift: The Third World Comes of Age. Morrow and Company, 1981, p. 313

13. Stavrianos, op. cit., p.320

14. A.R. Desai, Social Background of Indian Nationalism. Bombay: Popular Book Depot, 1959, p. 201-211; and Alan P.L. Liu, Communications and National Integration in Communist China. University of California Press, 1971, p. ix-xvi.

15. Probably Gandhi would never have had a chance against a totalitarian

state such as that of the Nazis. It is dubious whether under those circumstances the idea of nonviolent resistance would even have occured to Gandhi. He believed in "arousing the world," which is only possible if the world gets a chance to hear what you are doing.

16. Erik Erikson, Gandhi's Truth: On the Origins of Militant Nonviolence. Norton and Company, 1969, p.390.

17. In Gandhi's newspaper, Young India, April 1920

18. C.P. Fitzgerald, The Birth of Communist China. Penguin Books, 1964, p. 43-54.

19. Young India, January 1927

20. Liu Shao-ch'i, "Liquidation of Menshevik Thought in the Party," in Boyd Compton's Mao's China, Party Reform Documents, 1942-44. University of Washington Press, 1952, p. 255. In a more rustic vein, Mao reminded Party intellectuals, "Your dogma is less useful than excrement. We see that dog excrement can fertilize the fields and man's can feed the dog. And dogma? They can't fertilize the fields, nor can they feed a dog. Of what use are they?" Cited by L. Bianco, Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915-1929. Stanford University Press, 1971, p. 79

21. Sir Reginald Coupland, The Indian Problem. 3 vols. in one. Oxford University, 1944, p.92

22. S. R. S. "Mao Tse Tung," The New Encyclopaedia Britasnnica, Vol. 23.

23. As described by Gandhi in his autobiography, The Story of My Experiments with Truth. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1960

24. "Report of an Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan," Selected Workks of Mao Tse-tung. Vol. 1, March 1927, p. 21-59.

25. Jawarharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India. N.Y.: John Day, 1948, p.23

26. Perceival Spear, India. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1961, p. 364. Also the Japanese victory over Russia in 1905 had impact on both India and China.

27. "Accounts and Papers," Parliamentary Papers. Vol. XVI, 1922, p.108.

28. Louis Fischer, Gandhi: His Life and Message for the World. A Signit Key Book, 1954, p.135

29. Hiren Mukerji, Gandhiji: A Study. Calcutta: National Book Agency, 1958, p. 140.

30. Nehru, op. cit., p.472.

31. Young India, May, 1942

32. Quoted in Mukerji, op. cit., p.145

33. "The original idea of asking the British to go," Gandhi said to Louis Fischer in June, 1942, "burst upon me suddenly. It was the Cripps fiasco that inspired the idea." Mahatma Gandhi, The Last Phase. p. 130.

34. Gandhi's newspaper, Harijan. May 3, 1942.

35. Nehru, op. cit., p. 480-85

36. Amba Prasad, The Indian Revolt of 1942. Delhi: S. Chand & Company, 1958, p.83

37. Nehru, op. cit., p. 484

38. Indian Annual Register. Vol. II, P. 244

39. "The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War," Selected Works, 11, p. 247.

40. "Take Care of the Living Conditions of the Masses and Attend to the Methods of Work," Selected Works. Vol. 1, p. 149.

41. "Care of Living Conditions of the Masses," Selected Works. Vol. 1, p. 150

42. Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell, Republican China. New York: Vintage Books, 1967, p. 173-174. Other important books dealing with aspects of Mao's rise to power are Benjamin Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (1951, reissued 1979), dealing primarily with the late 1920s and early °30s; Chalmers Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China 1937-1945 (1962); Raymond Wylie, The Emergence of Maoism (1980), an account of the rise of his reputation as a political thinker.

43. "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains," Selected Works.Vol. 1, p. 83

44. "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society," Selected Works. Vol. 1, p. 13-20.

45. "On Protracted War," Selected Works. II, p. 180.

From **MASS COMMUNICATION WITHOUT MASS MEDIA**
by Kusum Singh

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## 3. MESSAGES OF FREEDOM

The previous chapter has provided the broader context of the Indian and Chinese liberation movements, with special emphasis on the three decades from the early 1920's to their "success" in 1947 and 1949, respectively.

But a critical turning point came during 1942-1944, the hardest fought period of World War 11. These were the years of Gandhi's "Quit India" campaign and Mao's "Rectification" campaign. In this chapter and the following two chapters I concentrate on the contents of what the two leaders said during 1942-44. Then, in chapter 6, I combine what they said with what they did as the basis of highlighting the communication theory that emerged from -- and guided -- their practice during the entire three decades.

The interconnection between the analysis of what they said and what they did becomes essential when one considers the unintended and even unrecognized consequences of some actions which may perform significant functions. [1] Thus, many actions that are not recorded in formal communications may have a latent communication function just as important, or even more important, than the manifest content of formal communications. For instance, Gandhi's prayer meetings may perform the "latent" function of reinforcing national identity, just as Mao's rent reduction campaign against the landlords performed the "latent" functions of establishing peasants' identification with the Chinese Communist Party.

## Message Analysis

Message analysis is a process of summarizing the contents of messages in such a way that an analyst may make useful inferences from the summary. Its first stage involves transforming raw data into units which permit systematic and objective description of the meaning of messages. Krippendorff points out that,

> One of the most distinctive features of messages is that they provide indirect (vicarious) information to a receiver, that is, information about events that take place at a distant location; about objects that have existed far in the past, and about ideas in other people's minds . . . the ability of a message receiver to regard sensory data as indirectly informative about a source is what content analysis must cope with explicitly. 2

It is essential, however, in this kind of study to supplement (or complement) message analysis with other analytical methods dealing with the broader historical context within which the messages have appeared or with the individual characteristics of the source. Perhaps no single method by itself is sufficient to give us the knowledge, insight, and wisdom necessary to understand complex communication processes.

Choice of sample

For analysis of messages, the entire set of recorded messages by Gandhi and Mao have been used covering a three-year period from the beginning of 1942 to the end of 1944. In dealing with this period, the study relied mainly on the following volumes:

Mahatma: Life of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi. Vol. VI by D. G. Tendulkar, published by the Government of India, 1955.

The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Vol. IV English edition based on the Chinese edition, People's Publishing, Peking, July, 1952 (Lawrence & Wishart Ltd., London, 1954).

There are many reasons for using all messages of this period, rather than some random set of messages over a much longer period. The analysis is more meaningful if not wrenched from the context of a specific historical period. The period chosen (the most critical years of World War II) happens to have represented a decisive turning point in the liberation movements in both countries and a major challenge to the mobilization and communications efforts of Gandhi, Mao and their associates.

Gandhi's own writings have been more extensively published than Mao's, but there is no one text of Gandhi's writings fully comparable to Mao's Selected Works. The historical record as published by the Government of India, Mahatma: Life of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, in 1953 is the closest approximation. This consists of Gandhi's own writings in Young India and Harijan (newspapers), statements and interviews to the national and international press, and his correspondence with the British Government and other heads of states and influential friends and sympathizers.

However, it should be pointed out that Vol. IV of Mao's works is by no means a complete collection of his works of this period. It represent a selection of what Mao and his editors thought to be important texts for study in the period after 1949. Unfortunately, all of the texts were edited, Mao's rich language was toned down and some changes were made in meaning.

As shown in Figure 1, "Gandhi-Mao Messages, by Type of Documents, 1942-44," the record shows 58 messages for Gandhi during this period and only 16 for Mao. The average Mao message, however, was much longer; the total number of words for Mao's 16 documents adds up to over 57,000 as contrasted with about 50,000 of Gandhi's 58 documents.

1. Gandhi-Mao Messages, By Type of Documents, 1942-44

| Number of Documents (by type) | Gandhi | Mao |
|---|---|---|
| Speeches | 4 | 7 |
| Editorials | 3 | 5 |
| Articles | 16 | 2 |
| Directives or Resolutions | 1 | 2 |
| Interviews or Press Conferences | 15 | 0 |
| Letters | 19 | 0 |
| TOTAL | 58 | 16 |
| Number of words | 50,077 | 57,600 |
| Number of pages | 158 | 111 |

SOURCES: Gandhi: Mahatma: Life of Mahandas Karamchand Gandhi (8 vols., 1951-54) by D. G. Tendulkar, Vol. VI, published by the Government of India, 1953

Not included: "Death of Kasturba" (his wife)
pp. 293-309: (purely personal)
"Gandhi Jinnah Talks" and some letters,
pp.338-356: (purely communal)

Mao: English edition of The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. IV, based on the Chinese edition, People's Publishing House, Peking, July 1952 (Lawrence & Wishart Ltd., London 1954)

Not included: "Appendix: Resolution on some Questions in the history of our Party." Probably drafted by Mao and adopted in 1945 (purely party document)

NOTE: For details see Appendix "A."

Greater variation, however, is found in the type of message. Most of Mao's came in the form of speeches and editorials in the party press. Most of Gandhi's came in the form of articles, interviews, press conferences and letters. It is interesting to note that Mao's letters are not available, neither are there any records of press conferences or preserved in his selected works for this period.

Gandhi's writings are originally in three languages: Gujrati, Hindi and English. Most of the major Gujrati publications have been translated into Hindi and English, the two languages in which I am proficient. Also I had an opportunity to listen to the original disk recordings available at the national archives in New Delhi, which reflect Gandhi's direct humor combined with a relentless skill in challenging his audience. Needless to say, much of this intimacy that Gandhi had with his audience is lost in the English translations of his speeches. Also lost is the religious and philosophic overtones of some of the Sanskrit terms, such as Gandhi's most characteristic doctrine, nonviolence or ahimsa, and satyagraha, more literally "truth force," discussed in the book.

This must be particularly so in the case of Mao's writings where the study has had to rely solely on English translations. 3 The official translations may often seem curiously shrill in tone and purely ideological, especially to Westerners because of their own cultural and political bias. For instance, "imperialism" may appear as an incendiary and extreme term, but to someone living in a colonial or semicolonial country it is a natural statement of fact. In other words, the English translations have to cope not only with the Chinese language but also with Mao's version of Marxism-Leninism in the Chinese context. This means two language barriers, the Chinese barrier and the Communist barrier. Mao's available writings, in any case, are far from adequate, as the archives of revolutionary literature were either destroyed deliberately by the Kuomintang or dispersed or lost during the years of war, 4 or simply never reissued in print.

A simple count of words and symbols seems inadequate since my concern is really with the underlying concepts. One promising approach is to

study themes that are manifest in a cluster of words, and therefore the theme was selected as the unit of analysis and the entire document as the context of unit. In its most simple form, a theme is a statement about a subject matter; it takes the form in which issues are usually discussed. I selected all major themes from each document: this brought a total number of 301 themes (see appendix B).

The analytical measure of attention indicated the presence and frequency of the subject matter in the messages. According to Gerbner,

> The significance of attention as an aspect of the process of message-production and image-formation is that it stems from, and, in turn cultivates, assumptions about existence; it provides common conceptions about what "is." 5

The common awareness of public issues forms a basis for social interaction. In other words, the assumption is that leaders want to seek contact with masses, and assuming that their behavior is motivated by this, the frequencies are interpreted with which a leader chooses to talk about or make references to a phenomenon as a measure of attention.

The rationale for this assumption is that before a movement takes national dimension the leader must begin with attention appeals to particular values in order to make contact with a mass public. In other words, before leaders can expect the masses to understand the "whole message" or its "purpose," they have to secure their attention. The means of securing attention in a national struggle are not technical ones, but are instead values from the ideology whose dissemination is the leader's main concern. These means for gaining attention have been characterized as goal values--that is, demands of the particular community. The function of these ideological appeals is to accomplish psychological softening or hardening of the mass public

before the real purpose of the message is achieved. These fundamental values are closely related to beliefs and sentiments people admire in their community.

The measure of attention, therefore, indicates the presence and frequency of relatively simple concepts and symbols in a leader's messages making public appeals for identification and demands. At this stage, there is less concern for factual discussion of complex or controversial issues as the focus is on appeal to general community values so as to achieve national support. The attention measure therefore conceals many conflicting interests which may come to the fore after the movement has developed to a later stage.

One method of testing replicability in message analysis research is by giving a reliability test to independent coders, and then calculating agreement coefficients. If one reaches a high degree of intercoder agreements, reliability of the procedure is established. Problems may arise for the simple reason that on the one hand training coders is necessary for significant reliability, on the other hand such training may influence them to the idiosyncrasies of the research design. As Krippendorff observes,

> If the observers are independent, then such measures assess the extent to which the recording instructions are uniformly interpreted and operationalized across individuals. But since observers can agree on describing an event in wrong terms--for example, because of implicit experiences that are not shared with the research designer--replicability cannot assess whether an instruction is applied as intended. 6

It seems difficult to achieve perfect agreement above the .9 level--and the reliability of research would be doubtful if the level is very low. The purpose of any quantitative research, however, is to derive meaningful inferences which are of a qualitative nature.

Alexander George maintains that the relationship between the two is a circular one, each providing new insights for the ongoing analysis. 7 The agreement coefficient achieved in this study was .8227 and, therefore, we can safely assume that a high degree of reliability was demonstrated (for further details see appendix C).

The many themes appearing in the written documents of 1942-44 period have been classified into four broad categories dealing with conditions of crisis, desirable goal values, leadership style, and channels of communication. These categories reflect an attempt to reach a "balance between reliability of the procedures on the one hand and the meaningfulness of the categories on the other." 8 In other words, the attempt is to describe with a maximum of objectivity and at the same time with a maximum of relevance to the underlying communication dynamics as revealed in Gandhi-Mao statements of this period. The set of categories are mutually exclusive and exhaustive.

To begin with there were significant differences as suggested by their allocation of attention to certain themes in the Figure 5, "Unique and Common Themes."

One of the obvious differences that have been brought out is that Gandhi focused on the press while Mao paid greater attention to party and mass organizations. Themes on the press and organizations will be discussed in some detail in chapter 5, "Channel Enlargement."

General classification is the basis of Figure 6, "Frequency of Themes," which summarizes the findings and gives percentages referring to proportions of frequency, as well as the rank order of major themes indicated by the frequency. Figures 7 and 8 present the findings of the most frequent themes by subcategories and rank order. As shown in Figure 6, leadership style was the most frequent theme for both Gandhi

and Mao. It accounted for 46 percent of the total themes used by the two leaders. One may well ask "why do leaders talk of leadership style?" An interesting question that I explore in the next chapter.

5. Unique and Common Themes

**Unique Themes of Gandhi**

CRISIS
Social: Violence; immorality; exploitation; passivity

GOAL VALUES
Morality

LEADERSHIP STYLES
Non-violence; trusteeship; civil disobedience non-cooperation; anarchy

COMMUNICATION CHANNELS
Mass media

**Common to Both**

CRISIS
Political: Imperialism
Social: False propaganda; poverty

GOAL VALUES
Nationalism; power; material well-being

LEADERSHIP STYLES
Personal example; self-reliance; sacrifice; service; uniqueness; truthfulness

COMMUNICATION CHANNELS
Personal contact; education

**Unique Themes of Mao**

CRISIS
Party: Bureaucracy, sectarianism; intellectualism; subjectivism; warlordism

LEADERSHIP STYLES
Confidence; theory-practice; toleration; war

COMMUNICATION CHANNELS
Party organization; mass organization; arts and literature

1942-1944, a relatively late date in the two liberation movements, the conditions of crisis and the goal values were probably so well known and appreciated that over-emphasis upon them would not contribute enough to the process of liberation. On the other hand, there was also a difference with respect to channels of communication. For Mao, this subject ranked second in frequency, as contrasted with last place for Gandhi. This might perhaps be explained by the fact that Mao had less access to the established channels of communication than did Gandhi and, therefore, had to give this subject much more attention.

6. Frequency of Themes

| Themes | Gandhi | | | Mao | | | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | No. | % | Rank | No. | % | Rank | No. | % |
| 1. Conditions of crisis | 31 | 18.5 | 3 | 26 | 19.9 | 3 | 57 | 19.0 |
| 2. Goal values | 47 | 28.1 | 2 | 15 | 11.2 | 4 | 62 | 20.6 |
| 3. Leadership style | 74 | 44.3 | 1 | 65 | 48.8 | 1 | 139 | 46.3 |
| 4. Channels of communication | 16 | 18.9 | 4 | 27 | 20.3 | 2 | 43 | 14.0 |
| TOTAL | 168 | 100 | | 133 | 100 | | 301 | 100 |

The first two of these categories, crisis and goal values, heightened the sense of national identity and focused on the people's needs and demands. They are therefore dealt with in this chapter. Leadership styles and channels of communication, each more instrumental in nature, are presented separately in the following two chapters.

**What They Said**

A leader's ability to articulate and then to communicate and share with the people his perceptions of the crisis and his strategy of

resolving it, is crucial to the success of any liberation movement. My analysis, therefore, focuses on how Gandhi and Mao defined the conditions of crisis confronting their nations and help establish certain goal values which could be realized through improved leadership style and enlargement of available coommunication channels.

**Crisis.**

Perception of crisis deals with a situation in which severe deprivation, oppression, violence are inflicted or threatened. It is a statement of expectation or fact about the enemy and the context of the conflict. The subheadings are as follows:

1. Political: conditions of crisis in the political scene were coded as themes on:

(a) imperialism
(b) fascism
(c) feudalism
(d) capitalism
(e) communism

2. Social: the following subheadings reflect conditions of crisis in the social scene:

(a) civil war
(b) violence, repression, oppression
(c) illegality
(d) immorality
(e) incompetence
(f) illiteracy
(g) poverty
(h) exploitation
(i) passivity
(j) false propaganda

3. Party: the conditions of crisis within the Congress Party of India and the Chinese Communist Party as perceived by Gandhi and Mao were coded under the following headings:

(a) bureaucracy
(b) intellectualism
(c) sectarianism
(d) subjectivism
(e) warlordism

In Chinese the word "crisis" is written with two characters, one signifying "danger," the other "opportunity." In the history of liberation movements this two-sided aspect of crisis is obvious. History proves that not all revolutionary crises end in freedom from oppression; in fact, they may lead to greater tyranny of the governing class or they may merely replace one despotism by another. On the other hand, crises may give the best opportunities to leaders to introduce radical changes. A national crisis, therefore, helps leaders to prepare the grounds for mass movements by discrediting prevailing creeds and institutions and detaching from them the allegiance of the people and making it possible to take action against powerful groups which are normally well-entrenched and invulnerable.

Gerbner, in his study of cultural indicators, points out that "most critical public consequence of mass communications are in defining and ordering issues." 9 This study indicates that Gandhi and Mao defined the crisis as a struggle for survival; they linked the struggle for independence to the improvement of the condition of the common man and woman. Gandhi's most potent slogan was "Do or Die," which freed the people from fear of death itself. People became susceptible to the appeals of social movements only after Gandhi and Mao succeeded in making them not only aware of the crisis but also to make them believe that change was possible. For instance, in India and China people had to be made aware of pervasive social injustice and exploitation and they had to be convinced that the mighty power of the British and the Kuomintang could be challenged and overthrown.

The articulation of nationalistic themes by Gandhi and Mao evidently strengthened pre-existing desires for political independence and at the same time it inspired quite a new set of political

expectations among the people of India and China. The imposition of alien authority generated tremendous traditional resistance that Gandhi and Mao subsequently transformed into nationalist rebellion. Natural disasters, such as famine and wars, inflicted abnormal hardships on the people making them susceptible to their messages of crises.

If we look at Figure 7, "Themes on Conditions of Crisis" we will find that imperialism is seen as one of the major conditions leading to a political crisis. Both Gandhi and Mao give this equal amounts of attention, and here we may only infer their concern by their frequent reference to it. The themes, however, indicate that they both do not talk of imperialism in the same way. This will become clear as the analysis proceeds.

Gandhi's conception of imperialism was really the logical extension of a line of thinking that had begun in the 1920's:

> I said to myself, there is not State run by Nero or Mussolini which has not good points about it, but we have to reject the whole, once we decide to non-cooperate with the system. "There are in our country grand public roads, and palatial educational institutions," I said to myself, "but they are part of a system which crushes the nation. I should not have anything to do with them. They are like the fabled snake with a brilliant jewel on its head, but which has fangs full of poison." So, I came to the conclusion that British rule in India had crushed the spirit of the nation and stunted its growth, and so I decided to deny myself all the privileges, services, courts, titles. The policy would vary with different countries but sacrifice and self-denial are the essential points. 10

In the 1930's Gandhi concluded:

> The British people must realize that the Empire is to come to an end. This they will not realize unless we in India have generated power within to enforce our will. 11

By the 1940's Gandhi declared imperialism to be so "satanic" that it threatened to explode in hatred toward the British:

> Imperialism is the greatest of evils.
>
> -Document 22, Theme 62

We must fight imperialism and not the British people.
-Document 41, Theme 115

Imperialism is the enemy facing our country.
-Document 1, Theme 3

7. Themes on Conditions of Crisis

| Themes | Gandhi | | | Mao | | | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | No. | % | Rank | No. | % | Rank | | % |
| 1. Political | | | | | | | | |
| (a) imperialism | 7 | 22.6 | 2 | 6 | 23.0 | 1 | 13 | 22.8 |
| (b) fascism | - | - | - | 2 | 7.8 | 3 | 2 | 3.5 |
| (c) feudalism | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| (d) capitalism | - | - | - | 2 | 7.8 | 3 | 2 | 3.5 |
| (e) communism | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| (f) socialism | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 2. Social | | | | | | | | |
| (a) civil war | - | - | - | 2 | 7.8 | 3 | 2 | 3.5 |
| (b) violence | 12 | 38.7 | 1 | 1 | 3.8 | 4 | 13 | 22.8 |
| (c) illegality | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| (d) immorality | 4 | 12.9 | 3 | - | - | - | 4 | 7.0 |
| (e) incompetence | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| (f) illiteracy | - | - | - | 1 | 3.8 | 4 | 3 | 1.7 |
| (g) poverty | 2 | 6.5 | 5 | 1 | 3.8 | 4 | 3 | 5.2 |
| (h) exploitation | 3 | 9.6 | 4 | - | - | - | 3 | 5.2 |
| (i) passivity | 1 | 3.2 | 6 | - | - | - | 1 | 1.7 |
| (j) false propaganda | 2 | 6.5 | 5 | 2 | 7.8 | 3 | 4 | 7.0 |
| 3. Party | | | | | | | | |
| (a) bureaucracy | - | - | - | 4 | 15.3 | 2 | 4 | 7.0 |
| (b) intellectualism | - | - | - | 1 | 3.8 | 4 | 1 | 1.7 |
| (c) sectarianism | - | - | - | 2 | 7.8 | 3 | 2 | 3.5 |
| (d) subjectivism | - | - | - | 1 | 3.8 | 4 | 1 | 1.7 |
| (e) warlordism | - | - | - | 1 | 3.8 | 4 | 1 | 1.7 |
| TOTAL | 31 | 100 | | 26 | 100 | | 57 | 100 |

Furthermore, Gandhi made imperialism a moral issue:

> I have said more than once in these columns that the Nazi power had risen as a nemesis to punish Britain for her sins of exploitation and enslavement of the Asiatic and African races.
> -Document 17

> Britain is morally indefensible, while she rules India.
> -Document 18, Theme 50

> It is not right for any nation to hold another in bondage. India has ancient culture, ancient civilization, such variety and richness of languages. Britain should be ashamed of holding these people as slaves.
> -Document 25

> Britain cannot win the war as long as she holds India in slavery.
> -Document 24

With this subversive image of the opponent Gandhi sought to justify cutting off important sources of the British power by withdrawing cooperation and obedience of the Indian People:

> A Government is an instrument of service only insofar as it is based upon the will and consent of the people. It is an instrument of oppression where it enforces submission at the point of the bayonet. Oppression, therefore, ceases when people cease to fear the bayonet. 12

Gandhi's satyagraha (truth force) was, therefore, a well- conceived communication technique to fight against political and economic domination and injustice.

Mao's conception of imperialism is somewhat different. He explicitly identifies imperialism as the chief instigator of revolutionary movements in colonial and semi-colonial countries. A chief characteristic of the imperialist penetration of China, Mao maintains, was "the collusion of imperialism with the feudal forces to arrest the development of Chinese capitalism." 13 The image of the opponent thus includes not only the imperialist forces, but also the feudal elements.

Japanese imperialism is daily menacing China.

-Document 15, Theme 113

The Kuomintang is collaborating with the Japanese Imperialists.

-Document 9, Theme 61

Mao's political themes, therefore, call attention to the consequences of imperialism:

> Under the two-fold oppression of imperialism and feudalism, and especially as a result of the large-scale invasion of Japanese imperialism, the Chinese people, and particularly the peasants, have become more and more impoverished and have even been pauperized in large numbers, living in hunger and cold and without any political rights. The poverty and lack of freedom among the Chinese people are on a scale seldom found elsewhere. 14

The power of imperialism is, however, seen as transient which will soon collapse, although from the short-term perspective, it is still powerful and in possession of the mechanical means of mass destruction:

> Japanese imperialism is mustering up all its strength for a dying kick.
>
> -Document 16, Theme 120

Therefore, Mao argues, war is an inescapable consequence of the imperialist policy:

> War is our first priority in our struggle.
>
> -Document 16, Theme 121

Liberation wars are differentiated into those waged against imperialism (national liberation wars) and those waged against domestic reaction (civil or class liberation struggle). The basic distinction between a people's war and a counter-revolution war, says Mao, is that the former is rooted in, and waged by, the broad masses of the people. The decisive role of the people in determining the character and outcome of war, Mao believes, stands in direct contrast to the false imperialist theory that "weapons decide everything." Mao's faith in

the ultimate victory of the national liberation movement is therefore based on the power of the masses.

We will overcome obstacles and crush the Japanese imperialists.

-Document 12, Theme 82

We shall finally defeat the enemy.

-Document 4, Theme 33

The world will enter a great age of liberation.

-Document 11, Theme 75

The dawn of victory is in sight.

-Document 6, Theme 41

Imperialism is doomed, according to Mao, because it is decadent and retrogressive. Its fundamental weakness is that it is separated from its "people." The "logic" of imperialism, that is, aggression, oppression, and exploitation, is incompatible with that of the masses. It is "riddled with insuperable contradictions;" it is "sitting on a volcano" and it is its own "gravedigger."

Mao, therefore, developed an adapted version of Marxist-Leninist theory to apply to the "colonial, semi-colonial, and semi-feudal" China and developed broad forms of struggle to fight his opponent.

Figure 7, "Themes on Conditions of Crisis," also shows that for Gandhi another crisis that looms large is violence embedded in the prevalent social conditions due to foreign control, while 35 percent of Mao's themes on conditions of crisis refer to the crisis within the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. This is not unexpected as we know that Mao's Rectification movement aimed to create an environment of struggle in which fundamental values and perceptions could be re-examined and challenged by revolutionary ideals. Mao insisted that the tendency of some Party members to look down or ignore

non-Party elements was a form of "sectarianism" which led to isolation of the Communists from the total Chinese population. 15 His focus therefore, was on organizational and educational methods to overcome these communication barriers between leaders and masses. The serious barriers, according to Mao, were bureaucracy, intellectualism, warlordism, and sectarianism:

> Bureaucracy leads to communication barriers with the masses.
>
> -Document 12, Theme 89
>
> Warlordism is the result of isolation from masses.
>
> -Document 12, Theme 90
>
> Formalism has no content.
>
> -Document 2, Theme 16

Mao's barbs against Party formalism were directed primarily against his Moscow-trained rivals in the Russians Returned Student group whose power was curbed by the Sixth Plenum. The 1942 Rectification movement, therefore, focused on intensive education, small-group study, criticism and self-criticism to bring the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party closer to the Chinese population. The movement represented a final stage in Mao's consolidation of leadership.

Gandhi's frequent reference to violence can be explained by the fact that as the government became more repressive the people responded with increasing militancy. What is interesting, however, is that despite Gandhi's insistence on non-violence, there is a change in his attitude toward the people resorting to violence.

Violence appalled Gandhi to the extent that whenever it occurred in the 1920's or even 1930's he was "actually and literally praying for a disastrous defeat (of the liberation movement)." In other words, non-violence above everything else— even above the independence of

India, so it seemed. He sought to harness the potential force of the masses into peaceful channels, "I know that the only thing that the Government dreads is this huge majority I seem to command. They little know that I dread it even more than they." In 1934, while explaining his view of the reasons for the failure of non-violent movements, Gandhi stated quite explicitly an important element of communication theory:

> I feel that the masses have not yet received the message of satyagraha owing to its adulteration in the process of transmission. It has become clear to me that spiritual instruments suffer in their potency when their use is taught through non-spiritual media . . . . The indifferent civil resistance of many . . . has not touched the hearts of the rulers. 16

Furthermore, in his effort to touch the heart of the rulers Gandhi went to the extent of transforming mass civil disobedience to individual civil disobedience in 1940:

> Satyagraha needs to be confined to one qualified person at a time. In the present circumstances only one, and that myself, should for the time being bear the responsibility of civil disobedience. 17

In other words, it was a symbolical battle, calling the attention and sympathy of the whole nation, and permitting participation in spirit of millions upon millions, resulting in resurgence of moral strength. This would have dissipated in a series of sporadic actions (inviting ruthless repression of helpless people) all over the country if people had taken to the streets. It is not the number that counts but the quality, Gandhi maintained, "more so when the forces of violence are uppermost." 18

On August 8, 1942, however, while launching the "Quit India" movement, Gandhi crystallized the prevailing mood of the people in these words, "there was a desperateness in it, an emotional urge which gave second place to logic and reason or a calm consideration of the

consequences of action." And he went on to state in a mood of near frenzy,

> I want freedom immediately this very night, before dawn, if it can be had. Freedom cannot now wait for the achievement of communal unit . . . . Fraud and untruth today are stalking the world. I cannot be a helpless witness to such a situation. I have traveled all over India as perhaps nobody in the present age has. The voiceless millions of the land saw in me their friend and representative, and I identified myself with them to an extent it was possible for a human being to do. I saw trust in their eyes, which I now want to turn to good account in fighting this empire upheld on untruth and violence. However gigantic the preparations that the empire has made we must get out of its clutches . . . . Here is a mantra, a short one, that I give you. You may imprint it on your hearts and let every breath of yours give expression to it. The mantra is: "Do or die." We shall either see free India or die in the attempt; we shall not live to see the perpetuation of our slavery . . . .

Gandhi's perception of conditions of crisis in 1942-1944 was serious enough to include the possibility of violence. He squarely held the British responsible for any eruption of violence in the country:

> Britain practices the most organized and successful violence in India the world has seen.
>
> -Document 31, Theme 87

> The Government repression is breeding discontent.
>
> -Document 44, Theme 122

> The Government encourages violence when the people want to proceed peacefully.
>
> -Document 49, Theme 136

Gandhi was responding to a very wide mass-awakening all over the country, the extent and intensity of which was a revelation, both to the Indian leaders and to the government.

**Goal values.**

Themes on desirable values deal with the substantive demands that the leader is making on behalf of the liberation movement under the following subheadings:

1. Nationalism (united front, harmony, solidarity, etc.)
2. Power (political, ideological, etc.)
3. Material well-being (economic, safety, etc.)
4. Morality (concern with ends and means, spiritual, etc.)

Every society has its own value system. The communication system of a given society, therefore, is part of its total culture and can be understood in that context. Culture provides people with symbols, myths, values and information, and forms their general attitudes towards what is desirable or undesirable.

In a struggle of national dimensions, leaders set standards of high morality to meet the public need of a picture of its own ideal self. Lasswell defines value as "The word we use to indicate that there are some impulses with which we associate our ego symbol at a given time." 19 The leader must also simplify communication by the use of fundamental values in times of great stress when a nation is fighting for liberation and needs the support of the whole population.

The daily experience both for the leader himself and for his people is the struggle for existence; not only a struggle for material well-being but for human dignity and spiritual well-being as well. These two goals comprehend, in fact, all other values demanded. This study shows that Gandhi and Mao repeat this theme in various forms when referring to nationalism, political power, material well-being or morality. Many of the themes appear in slogan form: let us unite for action, liberation will end poverty. The slogan itself is not literally mentioned in the text, but it is involved in the message by synonymous references, repeated over and over again in varying ways, identical in function, and dominant because of its frequent appearance.

In countries like India and China, largely populated by illiterate masses, it is far easier to capture, communicate, and popularize the essence of a struggle in a slogan than to try to explain its intricacies in a jargon style. The masses are more receptive to language they easily understand and their sense of commitment is more easily touched. The use of slogans is also consistent with traditional Indian and Chinese practice, wherein the ancient rulers communicated their orders in similar, easily understandable terms. A slogan has been defined as follows:

> Comprehension of a current public demand referring to the community value. This characterization of a slogan explains its great suggestive effect on the public mind, since the demand is the fundamental condition for establishing the community mind. 20

The differences in social and linguistic background and in circumstance due to the wide geographical dispersion of India and China were, in fact, obstacles that made the appeals to the national goal values still more necessary for attention to the actual message. It is not possible to appeal to a mass audience without starting with the well-known values of the people and then link them to what the leader wants them to do. Gandhi and Mao sought to narrow down conflicting interests within groups, classes and castes by focusing on common values. They used the facts of poverty and want as a means of identification for common action. The demand for freedom from poverty was transformed to demand for national freedom. Whether independence might relieve the poverty in the country was still an unsolved problem, since a skillful communicator leaves the verification of his message to public experience.

As shown by Figure 7, "Themes on Goal Values," Gandhi gave most frequent attention to morality and Mao most frequent attention to

nationalism. Another difference is that, as one might expect, Mao gave much more attention to material well-being than did Gandhi. Nonetheless, each of these four themes on goal values were highly important.

% Themes on Goal Values

| Themes | Gandhi | | | Mao | | | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | No. | % | Rank | No. | % | Rank | No. | % |
| 1. Nationalism | 11 | 23.4 | 2 | 7 | 47.8 | 1 | 18 | 29.1 |
| 2. Power | 9 | 18.2 | 4 | 2 | 12.2 | 3 | 11 | 17.7 |
| 3. Material well-being | 10 | 21.2 | 3 | 5 | 32.2 | 2 | 15 | 24.1 |
| 4. Morality | 17 | 37.2 | 1 | 1 | 7.8 | 4 | 18 | 29.1 |
| TOTAL | 47 | 100 | | 15 | 100 | | 62 | 100 |

Nationalism. Here are some of the nationalistic themes common to both Gandhi and Mao:

> We must be united to achieve independence.
>
> -Gandhi, Document 20, Theme 58
>
> National unity will end communal disharmony.
>
> -Gandhi, Document 39, Theme 111
>
> All patriotic forces must unite and save China.
>
> -Mao, Document 11, Theme 78
>
> The first principle of the united front is disciplined unity.
>
> -Mao, Document 16, Theme 127

The various sectors of the Indian and Chinese population which supported the Congress Party and the Chinese Communist Party had their own special interests, peculiar grievances, differing objectives,

and unique ideologies. But so long as India and China remained dependent, the various interests could submerge their differences because the winning of independence was the critical factor in solving all the other problems. This may explain the speedy diffusion of nationalism and receptivity of the elite to the elaborated symbols of identification with the common people of India and China. For instance, Gandhi and Mao insisted on "language of the masses" or service as modes of behavior.

Briefly Gandhi and Mao stressed the importance of maintaining a dialectical relationship between unity and social and economic change. The primary focus of their activity consisted in mobilizing the masses and seeking an alliance with the intellectual elite and other groups as a move to oust foreign domination. They both succeeded in solving the triple problem of national identity, independence, and legitimacy, but while Gandhi failed to achieve a decisive revolutionary break from an imperialist past, Mao succeeded in bring about a real socio-economic revolution.

This was the major difference between Gandhi's and Mao's nationalism. The nationalist movement in India was essentially a bourgeois movement and Gandhi was the representative functioning inevitably within the nationalist ideology. Mao's nationalist movement was operating within the Marxist-Leninist ideology which sought to effect a total revolution by overthrowing domestic landlords, warlords, and native capitalists.

Power. Here is a sample of their themes:

Power must belong to the people.

-Gandhi, Document 41, Theme 117

We must have political power to decide our own future.

-Gandhi, Document 4, Theme 15

Power means to unite the Party, the government and the army with the people.

-Mao, Document 10, Theme 70

Patriotic forces must work toward democracy and freedom.

-Mao, Document, 11, Theme 79

Gandhi's concept of power is peculiarly his own and basically very different from that of Mao's. Apart from the fact that at different times Gandhi narrowed and broadened his political approach, there was also an ambivalence in regard to political power. Nehru remarked:

> In spite of the closest association with him (Gandhi) for many years, I am not clear in my own mind about his objectives. I doubt if he is clear himself. One step is enough for me, he says; and he does not try to peep into (the) future or to have a clearly conceived end before him. 21

This was because Gandhi always looked at politics more from the standpoint of the rebel than of the ruler, of freedom than of authority, of the individual than of the State. 22 He believed that true power resides in the people and not in governments or legislatures, 23 and he hoped that political power, in the ordinary sense, would not enter Indian villages. "Power is of two kinds. One is obtained by the fear of punishment and the other by acts of love." 20 Gandhi was, in fact, really trying to challenge the very notion of power as practiced over the lives of the people through government and legislatures. He was anxious to increase the participation of the people in the government and cut down the increasing power of bureaucracy.

Material -well-being. Here are some of the themes on material well-being common to both Gandhi and Mao:

Only national government can relieve misery of poverty.

-Gandhi, Document 46, Theme 128

Economic well-being is possible only with political freedom.

-Gandhi, Document 17, Theme 47

After victory people will be better off economically.

-Mao, Document 7, Theme 48

Collective mutual-aid organizations will bring economic well-being.

-Mao, Document 12, Theme 87

Both perceived impoverishment of their countries as the result of systematic "exploitation." Once the shackles of imperialism were removed, Gandhi and Mao believed, rapid social and economic development would ensue. However, a major difference between Gandhi and Mao emerges in their means of achieving this goal. Gandhi calls his approach to economic equality "non-violent socialism," 24 which means cooperative or social approach in contrast to individualism. For Mao, the word socialism means a system of nationalized ownership of the means of production. To put it differently, Gandhi demanded moral revolution to accomplish the material well-being of the people; Mao sought radical structural change to achieve social revolution. Gandhi was concerned with means of attaining egalitarianism, Mao with the goal itself.

Briefly, then, national liberation is a goal value which provides material well-being for the poverty-stricken people. And political power is necessary to ensure security of the nation and provide protection from imperialism and exploitation.

Morality. Both Gandhi and Mao sought to apply moral values in the difficult domain of political and social actin. They maintained that a national liberation movement is a just struggle against exploitation.

A just cause provides in itself a moral superiority. A people with justice on their side will arouse world public opinion in support of their cause. Here is a sample from their themes on morality:

> Our demand is based on justice.
>
> -Gandhi, Document 32, Theme 89

> Justice demands that Britain free India.
>
> -Gandhi, Document 38, Theme 106

> We have been waging a just war against the imperialist Japanese for more than five years.
>
> -Mao, Document 6, Theme 39

> We consider our war entirely just.
>
> -Mao, Document 9, Theme 64

Gandhi, however, focused on harmony and Mao on conflict as the integral part of struggle. Gandhi defined morality as promoting harmony in all human relationships through individual effort. Mao sought to define it in terms of promoting proletarian unity through submerging of the individual in the collectivity of the working masses. Nonetheless, both their thinking was governed by a total value judgment. For Gandhi, the enemy is the greed of materialism, the judge is the individual who frees himself from selfishness, and the executioner is the moral law. For Mao, the enemy is the capitalist system, history the judge and its executioner the masses. Therefore, with Mao national struggle inevitably involves class conflict; with Gandhi it is any situation of human conflict, even a conflict within the individual in making the right choice.

Briefly, the morality for both Gandhi and Mao lay in the meeting of needs and expectations of the masses. But whereas Mao accepted Marxist-Leninist theory, which defined the content of these needs and

indicated long-range approaches to their satisfaction, Gandhi was content in developing a step-by-step approach which could meet the needs of the people as and when the situation arose.

We now turn in the next chapter to what leaders can do to help people confront the situations that arose.

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