Children and the Faces of Television

Teaching, Violence, Selling

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Contents

17

18

19

20

21

10

The Violent Face of Television and Its Lessons[1]

GEORGE GERBNER
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What children and other viewers learn about violence from television is not necessarily learned from just seeing acts of violence. To understand the full scope of its lessons we need to look at television as a social institution. Once we have done that, we shall sketch some features of the world of television, of the role of violence in that world, and of public concerns about the depiction of violence as the context within which one can best understand those findings of our long-range research project which we will report here.

Television and Society

Television comes to us as a combination of radio, movies, the pulps, games, circuses, comics and cartoons, and a dash of journalism, but it is

[1] The research on which this chapter's discussion is based is a team effort in which our chief associates were Nancy Signorielli, Michael Morgan, Suzanne Jeffries-Fox, Marilyn Jackson-Beeck, and Michael F. Eleey. The research has been conducted since 1967 under grants from the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, the Surgeon General's Scientific Advisory Committee, the National Institute of Mental Health, the White House Office of Telecommunications Policy, and the American Medical Association.

CHILDREN AND THE FACES OF TELEVISION:
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none of these. It is the first mass-produced and organically composed symbolic environment into which all children are born and in which they will live from cradle to grave. No other medium or institution since preindustrial religion has had a comparable influence on what people of a tribe, community, or nation have learned, thought, or done in common.

Although television broadcasting today is private business, it is an officially licensed enterprise operating in the public domain. Television thus becomes an organ of governance as well as of acculturation. The First Amendment's prohibition against "an establishment of religion" did not prevent (in fact, continues to shield) the establishment of its modern functional equivalent. Television relates to the State as only the Church did in former times. Its nearly universal and ritualistic use fits its cyclical and repetitive programming. People attend to television as they used to attend church except that they do it much more often and more religiously.

Universal and Ritualistic Use

Television is now our common and constant learning environment. Over 4 million hours of programming a year are discharged into the mainstream of common consciousness to claim the time and attention of 200 million Americans. Television demands no mobility, literacy, or concentrated attention. Its repetitive patterns come into the home and show, as well as tell about, people and society. Presidents, police officers, doctors and nurses, judges and lawyers, spies, and celebrities are familiar members of a selective and synthetic world that nearly everyone knows most about. Television is a total cultural system with its own art, science, statecraft, legendry, geography, demography, character types, and action structure. The world of television encapsulates those selected features of the larger media culture that lend themselves best to its basic sales and socializing functions.

The television audience is not only the most heterogeneous public ever assembled but also the most nonselective. Most viewers watch by the clock and not by the program. Viewing is a ritual governed by styles of life and time. Different kinds of programs serve the same basic formula designed to assemble viewers for the most profit and sell them at the least cost. The classifications of the print era with their relatively sharp differentiations between news, drama, documentary, and so on, do not apply as much to television. Heavy viewers watch more of everything. Different time and program segments complement and reinforce each other as they present aspects of the same symbolic world.

There is little age, regional, or even ethnic separation of the symbolic materials that socialize members of an otherwise heterogeneous community into a common culture. Most children control their own (if not their whole family's) sets and watch mostly adult programs and problems

depicting this common culture. Minority groups see their own image shaped by the dominant interests of the larger "common" culture.

Television is today's central agency of the established order—the common culture—and as such serves primarily to maintain, stabilize, and reinforce—not subvert—conventional values, beliefs, and behaviors. All societies have ways of explaining the world to themselves and to their children. Socially constructed "reality" gives a coherent picture of what exists, what is important, how things are related, and what is right. The constant cultivation of such "realities" is the task of rituals and mythologies. They legitimize actions along lines that are conventionally acceptable and functional. Television today serves that function in its nearly universal use as a demonstration of social reality.

Cyclical and Repetitive Programming

Most regular viewers of television are immersed in a vivid and illuminating world which has certain repetitive and pervasive patterns. At the center of this coherently constructed world is network drama. Drama is where the bulk of audience viewing time is. Drama is where total human problems and situations, rather than abstracted topics and fragments, are illuminated.

The stories of the dramatic world of television need not present credible accounts of what things *are* to perform the more critical function of demonstrating how things really *work*. The illumination of the invisible relationships of characters and dynamics of life has always been the principal function of drama and fiction. The function is best performed when the "facts" can be invented so as to lend themselves to compelling demonstrations of the inner meaning and order of things. Television has invented characters and actions, especially violent actions, which demonstrate by their consistency the essential order of things. In the following two sections we will describe these characters and violent actions using results reported in some of our previous publications (Gerbner & Gross, 1976; Gerbner, Gross, Jackson-Beeck, Jeffries-Fox, & Signorielli, 1978; Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, & Signorielli, 1980; Gerbner, Gross, Signorielli, Morgan, & Jackson-Beeck, 1979; Gross, 1979) and using the results of new analyses of data from our archives.

Characters. In one week the typical evening (8–11 P.M.) viewer of a single network station will encounter about 300 dramatic characters playing speaking roles. This figure is for drama alone, not counting commercials, news, game or talk shows, documentaries, or, of course, other viewing times. Of these 300 characters, 217 are males, 80 are females, and 3 are animals or robots of no clear gender. The racial composition of this typical slice of the world of primetime dramatic television is 262 whites, 35 members of other races, and 3 whose race is hard to tell. The children

of the typical family will meet an additional 137 dramatic characters in speaking parts during weekend daytime hours. Gender and race in weekend daytime programs (clearly identifiable for only two-thirds of these—mostly cartoon—characters) are about the same as in prime-time. Overall, the world of television is three-fourths American, three-fourths between ages 30–60 (compared to one-third of the real population), and three-fourths male.

Clearly the world of television is not like the real world. Looking at it through the prism of age reveals a population curve that, unlike the real world but much like the curve of consumer spending, bulges in the middle years of life. That makes children and the elderly relatively neglected, old people virtually invisible, and the portrayals of these and other minorities, as well as of women, as sensitive barometers of the dramatic equities—or inequities—of life.

Types of activity—paid and unpaid—also reflect dramatic and social purposes. Six in ten characters are engaged in discernible occupational activity and can be roughly divided into three groups. The first group represents the world of legitimate business, industry, agriculture, finance, and so on. The second group is engaged in activity related to art, science, religion, health, education and welfare, as professionals, amateurs, housewives, patients, students, or clients. The third makes up the forces of official or semiofficial authority and the army of criminals, outlaws, spies, and other enemies arrayed against them. One in every four leading characters fits into this last category as he—or occasionally she—acts out a drama of some sort of transgression and its suppression at home and abroad.

Approximately five in ten characters (or five of the six engaged in any occupational activity) can be unambiguously identified as gainfully employed. Of these, three are proprietors, managers, and professionals. The fourth comes from the ranks of labor—including all those employed in factories, farms, offices, shops, stores, mining, transportation, service stations, restaurants, and households, and working in unskilled, skilled, clerical, sales, and domestic service capacities. The fifth serves to enforce the law or preserve the peace on behalf of public or private clients.

Violent Action. In this world where men outnumber women four to one, it is not surprising that much of the action revolves around questions of power: how to manage and maintain the social order. Violence, which we have defined as the overt expression of physical force compelling action against one's will on pain of being hurt or killed or actually hurting or killing, is the key to the rule of power. It is the cheapest and quickest dramatic demonstration of who can and who cannot get away with what against whom. It is an exercise in norm-setting and social typing. It occupies about one-third of all male major characters (but very few women) in depicting violations and enforcement of the rules of society.

Violence is thus a scenario of social relationships. Its calculus of op-

portunities and risks demonstrates one's odds upon entering the arena. In the world of television, four-fifths of all primetime and weekend daytime programs contain violence, and two-thirds of all major characters get involved. The exercise of power through violence is clearly a central feature of that world. In weekend daytime children's programs the rate of involvement is even greater—80%. Men are more likely to encounter it than are women, and adults are more involved than are children, although about half of all women and children still get involved in violence. The question is who comes out of it and how. A character's chances to be a violent or a victim (or both) suggest degrees of vulnerability and probable fate.

Therefore, violence as a scenario of power has a built-in index of risk: It is the numerical relationship of violents to victims within each social group compared to other groups. That index, called the risk ratio, shows the chances of men and women, blacks and whites, young and old, and so on, to come out of a violent encounter on top instead of on the bottom.

In the world of dramatic television, 46% of all major characters commit violence and 55% suffer it (with many being both violents and victims). Thus, the overall risk ratio is −1.2; meaning that there are 12 victims for each 10 violents. The ratio for women is 13 victims, for nonwhite women 18 victims, and for old women 33 victims for every 10 violents. So, if and when involved, women, nonwhite women, and older women characters bear a higher burden of relative risk and danger than do the majority types.

Of course, not all violence is alike. A blow by the oppressed against unbearable odds or by the exploited against the exploiter may be a message of liberation rather than of established power. Even if the violent hero perishes (and thus counts as a victim in the risk ratio), the tragedy exposes inequity and injustice instead of perpetrating them. But considering that the average output of violent episodes in the massive flow of entertainment programming is 5 episodes per primetime and 18 per weekend daytime hour, such tragic scenes are very rare.

Causes of Cycles and Repetition. Our annual monitoring of network television drama since 1967–1968 shows a remarkably consistent pattern despite changes in program titles, formats, and styles. Many times a day, 7 days a week, the dramatic pattern defines situations and cultivates premises about society, people, and issues. What is the root cause of this unity and coherence of the universal curriculum of the world of television? It is called "cost per thousand," the price advertisers pay television for assembling and delivering a thousand viewers of commercials. It is computed by dividing the number of thousands of viewers (as measured by Nielsen, Arbitron, or whatever) by the price charged for assembling them in front of the set, including the cost of the program. But since most viewers will watch whatever is on, the size of the audience (and the price

paid for delivering it) depends mainly on the time of day rather than on the program. As any Nielsen will show, network differences in audience size tend to be small compared to day-part differences, despite the competitive hue and cry. The best policy is, therefore, the cheapest and least offensive programming, and any program policy that does not strive for competitive audience ratings at the least cost is beyond the scope of serious consideration. This places a premium on the most broadly acceptable, conventional fare. Other types of programs do not sell so well and do not have the same chance of becoming significant parts of the common symbolic environment.

Concerns about Violence

The televised stories that generate the most concern—despite the fact that they are still heavily viewed—seem to be those that contain scenes of violence. Why should this be? First, it is because, even when committed in the name of law and order, acts of physical aggression are suspected of inciting impressionable viewers to commit similar acts. This is an invariable reaction of "established classes" (adults in this case) when members of "subservient classes" (children, here) are exposed to mass-mediated stories.

A second reason for concern about television violence is the frequency of aggressive acts depicted in television drama, particularly in programs aimed specifically at children. It has often been noted that by the time the average American child graduates from high school, he or she will have seen more than 13,000 violent deaths on television. Given the sheer amount of children's potential exposure to televised violence, we worry that children will become jaded, desensitized, and inured to violence not only on television, but in real life as well.

It appears to be a justifiable fear that viewing televised violence will make people, children in particular, somewhat more likely to commit acts of violence themselves (see Chapters 8, 9, and 11, this volume for reviews of the evidence). Our own research (Gerbner *et al.*, 1978) also has found that young viewers who watch a lot of television are more likely to agree that it is "almost always all right" to hit someone "if you are mad at them for a good reason."

Yet, if the most consistent effect of viewing television violence were that it incited real acts of violence, we would not need elaborate research studies. The average sibling, parent, and teacher would be reeling from the blows of television-stimulated aggression. Clearly this is not the case. Imitative aggression among children may be frequent, but it is relatively low-level. Widely publicized cases of serious violence which seem to be influenced by television programs or movies are rare. At any rate, spectacular cases of individual violence threatening the social order (unlike

those enforcing it) have always been "blamed" on some corrupter of youth—from Socrates through pulps, comics, and movies, to television. Are there no other grounds for concern?

Yes! Violence plays an important role in communicating the social order. It provides a calculus of life chances in conflict and shows the rules by which the game is played. It demonstrates the relative distributions of power and of the fear of power. The few incidents of real-life violence it incites may only serve to reinforce that fear. The scenario needs both violents and victims; both roles are there to be learned by viewers. The patterns show the power of dominant types to come out on top. They tend to cultivate acquiescence to and dependence on their rule. If at times (though very rarely) television also incites violence by the ruled against the rulers, that may be the price paid for the tranquilization of the vast majority.

To reduce that tranquilization, it is not enough to decrease the number of violent incidents; the patterns of power and risk would have to give way to those which are more diversified and equitable. But entertainment—the most informative and educational force of any culture—is inherently pleasing precisely because it does not challenge conventional beliefs of right and might. It demands happy endings which prove fate and society to be just as well as strong. The least offensive programming at the lowest cost and best "cost per thousand," as well as the institutional interests of established society, require the cultivation of conventional morality and the stroking of conventional egos. Television violence is by and large a cheap industrial ingredient whose patterns tend to support rather than to subvert the established order. In generating among the many a fear of the power of the few, television violence may achieve its greatest effect.

Teaching the Social Order

We have addressed this hypothesis in the Cultural Indicators project by determining the extent to which exposure to the *symbolic* world of television cultivates conceptions about the *real* world among viewers. This question about broad enculturation is different from the usual research question about individual messages, campaigns, programs, or genres. Traditional procedures of media effects research must be reconceptualized and modified for television.

Research Procedures

First, we cannot presume consequences, as the conventional research paradigm tends to do, without the prior investigation of content. Nor can the content be limited to isolated elements (e.g., news, commercials, specific programs) taken out of the total context or to individual viewer

selections. Only system-wide analysis of television messages can reveal the symbolic world which structures common assumptions and definitions for the generations born into it and provides bases for interaction (though not necessarily of agreement) among large and heterogeneous communities.

Another conventional research assumption is that the experiment is the most powerful method and that change is the most significant outcome. When the treatment is television, however, we must turn this paradigm around: Stability (or even resistance to change) may be the significant outcome. We cannot look for change as the most significant accomplishment of the chief arm of established culture if its main social function is to maintain, reinforce, and exploit rather than to undermine or subvert prevalent conceptions, beliefs, and behaviors. The relative ineffectiveness of many isolated campaigns may itself be testimony to the power of mainstream communications.

Much of the research on media violence has focused on the observation and measurement of behavior which occurs after a viewer has seen a particular program or even isolated scenes from programs. All such studies, no matter how clean the design and clear the results, are of limited value because they ignore a fundamental fact: The world of television drama consists of a complex and integrated system of characters, events, actions, and relationships. It is a total symbol system composed largely of stories whose effects cannot be measured with regard to any single element or program seen in isolation.

Neither can we assume that television cultivates conceptions easily distinguishable from those of other major entertainment media. We assume, instead, that television's historically novel standardizing and legitimizing influence comes largely from its ability to streamline, amplify, ritualize, and spread into hitherto isolated or protected subcultures, homes, nooks, and crannies of the land the conventional capsules of mass-produced information and entertainment. The effects of television are most likely to be those of the centralization and efficient organization and popularization of those elements of mainstream culture that best support the medium's institutional mission.

Therefore, in contrast to the more usual statement of the problem, we do not believe that the only critical correlate of television violence is to be found in the stimulation of occasional individual aggression. The consequences of living in a symbolic world ruled largely by violence may be much more far-reaching. Television violence is a dramatic demonstration of power which communicates much about social norms and relationships, about goals and means, about winners and losers, about the risks of life, and about the price for transgressions of society's rules. "Real-world" victims as well as violents may have to learn their roles. Fear—that historic instrument of social control—may be an even more critical residue of a show of violence than is aggression. Expectation of violence

or passivity in the face of injustice may be a consequence of even greater social concern.

The Findings of Research

To find out what viewers in fact learn from television we search for those assumptions about "facts" of life and society that television tends to cultivate among its more faithful viewers. That search requires two different but related methods of research. The first is the periodic analysis of large and representative aggregates of television output (rather than individual segments) as the system of messages to which total communities are exposed. The purpose of message system analysis is to establish the composition and structure of the symbolic world. The second step is to determine what, if anything, viewers absorb from living in that world. Here the findings of message system analysis are turned into questions about social reality. To each of these questions there is a "television answer" that is like the way things appear in the world of television, and there is another answer which is closer to the way things are in the observable world.

We have asked these questions of samples of adults, adolescents, and children. All responses were related to television exposure, other media habits, and demographic characteristics. We then compared the responses of light and heavy viewers controlling for sex, age, education, and other characteristics. The margin of heavy viewers over light viewers giving the "television answers" within and across groups is the "cultivation differential" indicating conceptions about social reality that viewing tends to cultivate. The independent contribution of television to the cultivation of assumptions can best be seen in those areas where television presents a pattern different from or more extreme than other sources. One such area is violence.

The results of our previous adult and child surveys (Gerbner & Gross 1976; Gerbner *et al.*, 1978, 1980) showed consistent learning and children's particular vulnerability. They confirmed that violence-laden television not only cultivates aggressive tendencies in a minority but, perhaps more importantly, also generates a pervasive and exaggerated sense of danger and mistrust. Heavy viewers revealed a significantly higher sense of personal risk and suspicion than did light viewers in the same demographic groups who were exposed to the same real risks of life. They more often responded in terms more characteristic of the television world than of the real world when asked about their chances of being involved in some kind of violence, the percentage of men employed in law enforcement and crime detection, and the percentage of crimes that are violent. They were more likely to believe that most people just look out for themselves, take advantage of others, and cannot be trusted.

The analysis showed a significant tendency for heavy viewers to

overestimate the prevalence of violence and its concomitants compared to the estimates of the light viewers. The analysis also demonstrated that these presumed effects of television cannot be accounted for in terms of the major demographic variables of age, sex, education, or even, in the case of our children's sample, IQ. The effects were consistent and robust for both children and adults across a range of undoubtedly powerful control comparisons.

Surveys of adolescents extended these findings in important new directions (Gerbner *et al.*, 1979). Analyses were based on data collected from two samples of adolescents, one of seventh and eighth graders from a public school in suburban/rural New Jersey ($N=447$) and one of fifth through twelfth graders from a New York City private school ($N=140$). Students filled out questionnaires which offered two answers to each question, one answer based on facts or statistics and one answer based on the "facts" as depicted on television. Information on viewing habits and demographic variables was also requested. It indicated that the samples were roughly equivalent except that the parents of the New York City children were better educated and that the New York City children watched fewer hours of television per day. Results in four areas—chances of involvement in violence, fear of walking alone at night, perceived activities of police, and mistrust—were examined.

Heavy viewers in both the New York and New Jersey schools were more likely than were light viewers to overestimate the number of people involved in violence and the proportion of people who commit serious crimes. In the New York sample, the finding was especially strong for boys—those of lower socioeconomic status (SES), those who had not been victims of either personal or family-directed violence, and those with middle or low achievement scores. In the New Jersey sample, the relationship was stronger among girls, frequent newspaper readers, and heavy television news viewers, as well as among those whose fathers had not attended college. Despite these variations, the association remained consistently positive for each comparison group: Heavy viewers in every case were more likely than were light viewers to believe that a greater number of people are regularly involved in violence. Similarly, heavy viewers in the New Jersey sample were generally more likely to overestimate how many people commit serious crimes. The relationship was the strongest among females and occasional newspaper readers.

Most of the New Jersey students (about 80%) felt that it was dangerous to walk alone in a city at night. Yet within every comparison group, heavy viewers were more likely than were light viewers to express this opinion. This pattern was most evident among girls, occasional newspaper readers, and infrequent viewers of network news. Although most considered it dangerous, there was a fair degree of variation in who was afraid to walk alone in a city at night. The New Jersey students were more

afraid than were the New York students; in both samples and again, especially in New Jersey, the females were considerably more afraid. Within every group, however, heavy viewers were more likely than were light viewers to express this fear. This pattern was not as consistent in the New York sample, although it persisted notably for females—those of lower SES, low achievers, and those who had not been victims of crime. Responses to a question about one's willingness to walk alone at night in one's own neighborhood showed a strong and consistent relationship between the amount of viewing and being afraid. Females and young students were more afraid overall. These two groups also showed the strongest relationship between the amount of television viewing and the fear of walking alone at night in one's own neighborhood.

Television viewing also seems to contribute to adolescents' images and assumptions about law enforcement procedures and activities. Among the New Jersey students, more heavy than light viewers in every subgroup believed that police must often use force and violence at a scene of violence. Among the New York students, there was a consistent positive relationship between amount of viewing and the perception of how many times a day a policeman pulls out a gun. Adolescents in New Jersey showed a positive relationship across the board between amount of viewing and the tendency to believe that police who shoot at running persons actually hit them.

Finally, adolescent heavy viewers also tended to express mistrust in people and to express the belief that people are selfish. Although the differences were not as pronounced as they were for violence- and fear-related questions, the patterns were stable across most groups. Those who watched more television remained more likely to say that people "are mostly just looking out for themselves" (rather than trying to be helpful) and that one "can't be too careful in dealing with people" (rather than that they can be trusted).

These findings provide considerable support for the conclusion that heavy television viewers perceive social reality differently from light television viewers, even when other factors are held constant. There was considerable variation between groups in the scope and magnitude of these patterns: The extent of television's contribution is mediated, enhanced, or diminished by powerful personal, social, and cultural variables, as well as by other information sources. Yet the relationships remained positive in almost every case. The amount of viewing made a consistent difference in the responses of these adolescents, even the "more sophisticated," "less impressionable" New Yorkers.

Results which parallel and therefore strengthen these have also been found for a slightly younger age group. In a survey of 2200 7- to 11-year-old children and their parents conducted by the Foundation for Child Development, a significant relationship was found between amount of

television viewing and violence-related fears, even with controls for age, sex, ethnic background, vocabulary, and the child's own reports of victimization (Zill, 1979). We may conclude, then, that viewers' expressions of fear and interpersonal mistrust, assumptions about the chances of encountering violence, and images of police activities can be traced in part to television portrayals.

Coping with Power

Given these findings that heavy television viewing cultivates a pervasive fear of violence, as well as its occasional perpetration, why is the most vocal concern about television-incited violence? The answer rests in the complex nature of the social scenario called violence and its multiple functions. As action, violence hurts, kills, and scares. The last is its most important social function because that is what maintains power and compels acquiescence to power. Therefore, it is important who scares whom and who is "trained" to be the victim.

The privileges of power most jealously guarded are those of violence and sex. In the public realm it is government that claims the legal prerogatives to commit violence (in defense of law, order, and national security) and to regulate the commission and depiction of sexual acts (in defense of "decency"). In the private realm, parents assert the same prerogatives over their children—the power to determine the range of permissible and forbidden behavior. It would stand to reason, therefore, that the representatives of established order would be more worried about television violence as a threat to their monopoly over physical coercion, however limited that threat might be, than about insecurities that drive people to seek protection and to accept control.

The violence scenario thus serves a double function. By demonstrating the realities of social power, it generates insecurity and dependence and serves as an instrument of social control. This objective is achieved at a great human price. The price is the inciting of a few to destructive violence, the cultivating of aggressive tendencies among some children and adults, and the generating of a sense of danger and risk in a mean and selfish world.

There is no scientific way to determine what "price is right" for the maintenance of a society's structure of power. But the increasing number of citizens who have a feeling that the price may be too high should recognize that the mechanism for extracting it is rooted deeply in the structure of television as a social institution. Despite all the hue and cry, the frequency of violence has not even changed more than 10% from the norm of 10 years. To alter it and to provide a freer, fairer, and more equitable experience for child and adult viewers alike, far-reaching measures will be necessary.

First, the education of creative resources and critical viewing skills will have to become a primary task of schooling. Liberal education was always designed to liberate the growing person from unwitting dependence on the immediate cultural environment. That is why the "great" art, science, history, and literature of an age was the heart of a liberal education. But that has always involved only a small minority. Today's fresh approach to the liberal arts demands liberation from unwitting dependence on the mass-produced cultural environment that involves everyone every day. We need education for the age of television.

Second, the imperatives of television as a social institution will have to give way to a freer market in television production. The iron censorship of "cost per thousand" viewers makes violence the cheapest—as well as an otherwise attractive—industrial ingredient in the present system of dramatic mass production. The resource base for television will have to be broadened to liberate the institution from total dependence on advertising monies and purposes. The potential riches of television and the willingness to pay for a more diversified fare through cable and other means show that consumers and citizens want a television system more responsive to their needs.

Third, a high-level national commission is needed to examine the ways in which democratic countries around the world manage their television systems in the interest of children and minorities, as well as in the interest of the big middle-consumer majority. The commission should recommend a mechanism that will finance a freer and more democratic system, one that can present a fairer and more democratic world on television. That is the only way to reduce violence and its fallout to what is artistically sound, socially desirable, and humanly defensible. For example, one thing that would reduce violence and restore some sense of equity to the world of television would be the casting of more women. But the few producers who have tried that report that nonconventional casting and dramatic patterns, injected into the present context, suffer in ratings and sales appeal. Therefore, financial resources and the appropriate context are needed to create a freer pattern of representation and cultivation.

Finally, television service should become at least as much a part of the process of self-government, overcoming its present policy insulation from the citizenry, as is energy, education, or health. A broad advisory group composed of prominent citizens representing the major civic organizations concerned with culture, education, and health will have to come into being to offset the pressures of private interest groups and to protect the freedom of creative profesionals from both governmental and corporate dictation. Only then will television's professionals be free to produce the diversified and equitable fare they know how to produce but cannot produce under existing constraints and controls.

Our review of research on the violent face of television and its lessons has led us into a deeper examination of the institution of television, its

role in society, and the conditions for altering that role as the prerequisite for dealing with violence. There is obviously no simple or easy way to transform the mass-produced dreams that hurt our children into the dreams that would heal them.

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