

INSTANT HISTORY: THE CASE OF THE MOSCOW COUP

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Until recently, the historical process was entirely time-bound. Accounts were produced after the fact. News was something that happened. A documentary depicted the past. We read about, rather than witnessed, history.

But now, after a long, slow buildup, history-making has become time-unbound. When the power to act on the world scene merges with the power to direct the show about it, instant history-making becomes possible. Participation, witness and confirmation hitherto limited to those on the scene can now be globally experienced while the event is still going on.

Instant history is made when control of video-satellite-computer technologies makes it possible to blanket the world in real time with selected images, provoke reactions that feed back into the event, speed its resolution, and quick-freeze the outcome into received history. Instant history is image history in a supportive context. The sense of "being there" skirts reasoning and preempts alternatives. Instant history is the simultaneous,

global, mass, living, showing, telling and making history in brief and intensive bursts. Past, present, and future can now be packaged, witnessed, and frozen in a flash into memorable moving imagery.

Films of Vietnam took hours or days to reach us, after the fact. It may have been the first "living room war" but not for the first few years and not in real-time. Starting with the make-believe incident in the Gulf of Tonkin, it was a long, slow, duplicitous buildup. It lasted 11 years, destroyed three countries, and left behind some 2 million dead and continuing hardship (including economic sanctions) for the living.

"Body-counts" were in headlines but did not have public witness. The tide of public reaction turned after victory eluded policy-makers and cameras began to record unsettling images: the Tet offensive, a summary execution of an "enemy" suspect, naked "enemy" children fleeing napalm, thatched "enemy" huts being put to the torch. When cameras turn to focus on the fallen, the war is lost, or soon will be. (The press was barred from Dover Air Force Base where Gulf War body bags landed. It took a freelance reporter posing as a mortician to get an estimate of the casualties.)

The Iraq-Iran war, totally out of sight, dragged on for ten years, claimed more than a million casualties, and

ended in exhaustion. The declaration of emergency by Poland's Jaruzelski took eight years to unravel, and the majority of Poles responding to a survey in 1991 still thought it had been necessary. (*The New York Times*, May 20, 1992, P. 1). But when chaotic *perestroika*, made visible by *glasnost*, rolled into Eastern Europe, each successive counter-revolution took half the time of the previous one.

The quantum leap occurred in 1991. The year began with the world-class spectacular in the Persian Gulf. Six months later, a failed coup in Moscow triggered a counter-coup and the collapse of Soviet power on live television. We shall review the first major successful instant-history making (analyzed more fully in Gerbner, 1992) before we turn to our case study of the Moscow coup.

The Persian Gulf show

The war in the Persian Gulf was an unprecedented global spectacular. It crammed into its first month alone the entire filmic imagery -- and firepower -- of four years of bombing in World War II. But unlike a carpet of explosives leveling cities and setting off firestorms, or of G.I.s "flushing" Vietcong from their hiding places, we were shown "seeing-eye bombs" zooming in on their targets followed by computer graphics tracing the ground offensive against an invisible enemy.

Forming the backbone of the new instant-history-making machine were portable television transmitters, the global satellite network (including the collaborating Soviet satellite), dedicated direct "four wire" telephone lines, fax machines, mobil phones and computer links. This versatile system, tightly guarded at the source and self-censored by mainstream media gatekeepers, made it possible to provide controlled real-time simultaneous live global coverage from several selected sites, even when nothing much was going on. "Today," wrote CNN President Tom Johnson (in Loory and Imse, 1991), "journalists equipped with computers, beepers, satellite telephones, flyaway earth stations, and camera crews bring viewers to the story instead of the story to viewers." (P. 8)

General Schwartzkopf forbade casualty estimates. Sortie-counts replaced body counts. Photographs of battle or of the dead were censored. Sleek aircraft "sortied" over unmentionable people in unfought battles in an unseen country. The few unauthorized shots of bombs falling on civilian targets were attacked as treasonous or rationalized as "collateral damage" (defined by *Time* magazine as "a term meaning dead or wounded civilians who should have picked a safer neighborhood." (Solomon, 1991, p. xviii.) Never before were selected glimpses of actuality strung together with sound-bites of photogenic crews, omniscient voice-overs of

safari-clad reporters, and a parade of military experts with maps and charts at the ready, so mesmerizing, so coherent, and so contrived.

The Soviet coup

Desert Storm was the first major global media crisis orchestration that made instant history. The Soviet coup six months later was the first attempt that miscarried. A year before the coup Gorbachev had signed a new press law that promised editorial staffs a degree of autonomy not known in the democratic West. It made for a relatively fragmented and leaky communication system. When the coup came, the plotters could not control the increasingly cacophonous media orchestra. After the failed attempt to make history, a second coup, globally witnessed but virtually unrecognized, made instant history. Accounts by key participants and observers, and our own research and personal interviews conducted in Moscow before and after the coup made it possible to piece together that story.

We remember the Soviet coup of August 1991 as a quixotic attempt out of the blue, doomed to failure, engineered by fools, and thwarted by a spontaneous uprising. As Vladimir Pozner's (1992) *Eyewitness* put it, our image of the coup leaders is that of "faceless party hacks..."

Hollywood-cast to fit the somehow gross, repulsive, and yet somewhat comical image" of the typical Communist bureaucrat.(P. 10)

That image is false. Morrison (1991) writes that "It would be quite wrong to see the coup as just a bumbling adventure by a group of amateurs that was bound to collapse..." (P. 282) The men who struck on August 19, 1991 were, as Pozner himself writes "far from inept and, indeed, ready to do whatever was necessary to win." (P.11)

Why did they lose? What turned the tide? How did the attempt crash in 72 hours, burying in its ruins all the plotters had set out to save? Why did a second coup, less readily recognized (despite having taken place before a worldwide viewing audience) succeed in sinking Gorbachev and setting off a tidal wave that is still sweeping the geopolitical landscape? What calamity robbed Soviet people of a sense of historical development, identity and purpose? How did a once mighty empire, powerful army, and ruling party -- whose global menace fueled the Cold War, ignited hot wars, and justified repression worldwide -- collapse without a whimper, leaving behind ever deepening crises and the revival of chauvinism, clericalism, and neo-fascism?

The August coup is over but the danger is not. The state of emergency declared by the plotters has been imposed

by their nemesis, Yeltsin. A typical comment in Moscow is that the coup was the right move by the wrong people. But the threat by stodgy and legalistic plotters appointed by Gorbachev has been overtaken by a fierce new alliance the "red-brown forces." These combine the more militant factions of military, industrial, and labor groups, and of the KGB (now called Security Ministry) with assorted hate groups and other ultra nationalists (hence the allusion to Hitler's Brownshirts).

I attended a debate in the Russian parliament on what the proposed new media law. The chaos in the country is reflected in paralysis in Parliament. Media financing, policy and access to the technology capable of making instant history may again hold the balance of power. Seeking an answer to the questions about why one coup failed and the other succeeded brings into focus a new mechanism short-circuiting the political process.

The making of the coup

There was ample warning of an impending coup, wide complicity in the highest circles, little initial resistance, and much support for a change. Reporting afterwards to the Supreme Soviet, Gorbachev (1991) confessed his "responsibility before all the Deputies for the fact that I had not done everything possible to prevent the

August coup." (P. 56) But he offered no credible explanation.

The oversight was all the more baffling in view of Gorbachev's bloody, if bungled, Tbilisi and Baltic crackdowns and the curious overreaction to a bizarre rumor not long before the coup that Yeltsin's forces were planning a coup disguised as a mass meeting on Moscow's Manezh square. The rumor prompted Gorbachev to forbid the rally and order tanks into Moscow for the first time since the arrest of KGB chief Beria in 1953.

The tactic backfired as the demonstrators defied the ban, forcing Gorbachev to back down. With central authority rapidly eroding, the old guard hastened preparations for the real attempt. Yet when that was imminent, despite repeated serious warnings, Gorbachev did not inform his friends, alert the security apparatus, or take special precautions himself. He went off to his vacation compound in the Crimea.

When the plotters struck, they had much going for them. The coup leaders, all appointed by Gorbachev to the highest posts of Soviet government, were riding a wave of popular discontent. Gorbachev's reform movement failed to project a viable vision of society -- socialist or capitalist -- and was sliding into chaos. A similar coup against Nikita

Khrushchev in 1964 went off without a hitch. "Now," wrote Loory and Imse (1991), "Gorbachev was far more disliked than Khrushchev had been." (P. 79)

Gorbachev's trusted lieutenants grabbed the emergency powers he himself forced out of the Supreme Soviet. They set up the Committee for the State of Emergency to "save the Union" that 76 percent voted to preserve in a referendum less than five months before .

The conspirators did have a plan but instant history gave them no time to carry it out. The plan called for tough measures backed up with a show of force but avoiding large-scale arrests and bloodshed. Their appeal, in some ways prophetic, was to widespread frustrations, fears, and grievances. They complained that "lack of faith, apathy, and despair have replaced the original enthusiasm and hopes." Echoing disaffected Gorbachev supporters Shevardnadze and Yakovlev, they warned of "mortal danger" to the policy of reform and democratic development posed by those "striving for unbridled personal dictatorial powers." Along with talk about "labor discipline and order," the Committee emphasized that "measures we envisage are not an attack on human rights." They offered "nationwide discussion," developing a "many-tier" economy including private enterprise, and urgent concentration on critical food and housing problems.

Their warnings resonated to the rising fear of crime, vigilantism, and moral and economic chaos. In a survey we conducted in six Soviet republics a few months before the coup (Gerbner and Mickiewicz, unpublished) more than half of the respondents expressed mistrust in people in general and agreed that "it is not safe to walk alone at night in my neighborhood."

The State Committee captured the mood of many when it declared that citizens are "feeling increasingly uncertain about tomorrow and deep concern about the future of their children." Our survey found that one out of five Soviets expressed the stark view that "the future is so troubled that it would be irresponsible to bring a child into the world." The country's birthrate was at a postwar low, dropping 28 percent in five years of perestroika.) (*The Wall Street Journal*, June 2, 1992 p, A11.)

Gorbachev's approval rating sank to 4 percent by the time of the coup. Pozner (1992) cites polls showing that the sentiment against democracy and for law and order increased by 19 percent in three months before the coup, while the popularity of the Communist Party doubled. (p. 171) The coup leaders "considered the changes engendered by perestroika a disaster," writes Pozner. "Yes, they acted to

preserve their power...But they also acted to save their country and their society as they understood them." (P. 45.)

Resistance to the coup was slow, sporadic, and mostly confined to the Baltic states, cosmopolitan centers, and small crowds brought out by tanks on the streets. Only one Soviet cabinet member and one ambassador came out in opposition. The Supreme Soviet fell silent. "Where was its Presidium? Where were the Deputies themselves" Gorbachev (1991) laments, and writes that "Many party committees decided to help the plotters." (Pp. 43, 46)

The tide turns

The tide began to turn when Boris Yeltsin upstaged the plotters. His defiant imagery magnified the resistance, emboldened the opposition, and divided the armed forces. The coup's failure was sealed when some journalists, printers, video makers and others using cameras, xerox and fax machines, mobile telephones and other electronic devices spread their versions of events. "Television may not lie," writes Smith (in Loory and Imse, 1991), "but it often exaggerates and magnifies, in this case giving the impression of a massive popular rebellion...Instant mass communication, both Soviet and international, carried reports of resistance and fanned the flames of rebellion." (P36)

Gorbachev observes that three planeloads of commandoes would have been enough to remove Yeltsin's government from power. "What was their problem?" he asks. His answer is that the plotters were "...counting primarily on people's discontent." (Pp. 34-35) If that is so, they would have been on solid ground but for two other factors that proved to be their undoing: a split in the military and the media's new role in making instant history.

The role of the media

The media's role began with *glasnost*. Just as Khrushchev's "thaw" twenty years earlier, *glasnost* did not originate as a policy of universal openness. It was, rather, a weapon for exposing and discrediting the past and the "old guard." Soviet radio and television were staffed with Gorbachev's people who used their media as bludgeons, creating resentment and rage in some circles. "Malicious outrage against all state institutions is being imposed," charged the junta. I attended mass meetings in Moscow denouncing the "petty-bourgeois opportunists of Gosteleradio" (the Soviet broadcasting company). The free-swinging style of some of its programs, like having young men at a street drinking-party berate a cabinet minister facing them live in the studio, would have tried the patience of a U.S. network; it certainly infuriated the Ministries.

The tactics that provoked consternation among some won the enthusiastic support of many -- though not all -- journalists, intellectuals and young people of more cosmopolitan outlook. Boris Grushin, well-known sociologist and head of the new *Vox Populi* research firm, conducted a survey of 10 groups of opinion leaders on August 19 and 20 and found journalists the most cautious among them; about one out of five refused to respond. But most others spoke up in opposition. Pozner reports that "Journalists became heroes. Newspapers, magazines, certain TV shows took center stage." (P. 51) The cultural ferment of *glasnost* may have hastened the urgency of the plotters but, at the same time, set the stage for the media backlash.

Glasnost

Glasnost had no legal foundation until the All-Union "Law of the Press and Other Mass Information Media" was signed by Gorbachev on June 12, 1990. One of its drafters, and co-author of the subsequent Russian press law, M. A. Fedotov, law professor and later Deputy Minister of Press and Mass Media of the Russian Federation, told me it was "democratic romanticism," probably because it had no provision for financing a "free press."

The Law limited censorship to state security matters and gave editorial staffs considerable autonomy. When I

interviewed Fedotov a month before the coup, the picture on the wall of his high-ceilinged spacious office was not Lenin or Gorbachev or even Yeltsin but Sakharov. The law's key provision was that editorial staffs (which, according to various definitions may include all those employed, from editors and reporters to the night watchman) elect, by majority vote, their editors-in-chief, and vote on contracts with publishers that specify how policies are to be decided. While all media were still on state budgets and could be ordered closed, they could no longer be easily silenced. (With the selective withdrawal of press subsidies and the growing commercial control over surviving media, the press and media laws are again contested territory.)

The Moscow plotters were more used to controlling media than to manipulating them. Their televised press conference, broadcast live to all the world, was a disaster. "When Yanayev stated that Gorbachev was ill," Pozner relates, "the press hall, packed as it was to capacity, laughed out loud ...When he referred to Gorbachev as 'my friend,' the journalists hooted...Into the conference about twenty minutes, Yanayev's hands began to shake..." (P. 93)

"This was not an Emergency Committee that could strike fear into the hearts of the press..." observe Loory and Imse (1991). "Now it was clear that the glasnost-inspired press was not knuckling under despite the suspension of most of

the capital's newspapers and repression of television...After the press conference, the almost solid front of caution began to crumble."(p. 99) In any case, the spirit of *glasnost*, the new law, instant imagery and the new technologies, made complete control of communications no longer possible. The clock that Gorbachev started ticking in 1985 could no longer be turned back.

Media backlash

At nine o'clock in the morning of the coup, Shevardnadze (1991) sat in his office calling supporters and taking calls from newspapers and television companies at home and abroad. That day he heard from German Foreign Minister Genscher and a day later, from Secretary of State Baker. By noon, an Italian journalist brought Shevardnadze the text of Yeltsin's appeal. The fax was still working, and he sent that and his Movement's appeal to the Interfax and Novosti news agencies and to sources abroad until they ran out of paper. Then a Moscow firm called Astep brought more paper, and kept the fax machine running. The instant history backlash went fully global.

At home, within hours, handbills were circulating, despite the ban. Independent publications resumed production using fax machines, photocopiers and computers. Makeshift newspapers and broadsheets were distributed at

rallies and pasted up on walls. Some newspapers banded together to put out a joint edition entitled *Obshchaya Gazeta*. A limited edition of *Moscow News* appeared. During the few hours that the Russian Federation's television was off the air, its camera crews "made videotapes and shipped them to twenty major cities through airline pilots and sympathetic travelers," write Loory and Imse (1991). "In keeping with the claim of legality, the coup conspirators allowed Western news media to operate; Gorbachev and millions of Soviet citizens followed every breaking development from broadcasts of the BBC, Voice of America, and CNN." (P. 36)

The Union of Journalists issued a declaration calling on the Supreme Soviet to cancel "illegal decisions" banning publications and broadcasts. Two of the eight newspapers allowed to publish printed the statement. The alternative news service Interfax became another channel to media at home and abroad. The staff of *Izvestia* which, emboldened by the spirit of *glasnost* and the letter of the press law, had been feuding with the government for months, went on a brief strike rather than publish the decrees, but, according to Shevardnadze (1991), duplicated Russian government documents with a manual press. (P. 206)

Troops occupied the telephone exchange and yet, somehow, many phone lines remained open. Computer-based

electronic mail traffic was heavy. Computers provided many individuals with a link between the Soviet Union and the outside world. "Please stop flooding the channel with bogus messages and with silly questions," Vadim Antonov urged Westerners attempting to send electronic mail to Russia during the early hours of the coup. "Note that it's neither a toy nor a means to reach your relatives or friends at this time".

Antonov, one of the builders of the Soviet's two-year-old computer communications network known as Relcom, knew its limitations and its potential to spread information. The messages sent from Antonov's computer in Moscow late on the night of August 19 were copied and posted across the United States and abroad on electronic bulletin boards. KGB agents undoubtedly knew about the underground network. Antonov said later: "During the last night of the coup we got a strange phone call. The caller said, 'We are your users, please give us your modem's phone number.' This was an absurd statement, since anyone who knew about the network knew how to interconnect to it. We said to them rude words."

Yeltsin spent most of the three days on the phone, "talking to President Bush and Prime Minister John Major, to his supporters, to hesitating generals, and to the confused plotters," write Solovyov and Klepikova (1992, p. 253).

Pozner relates that the BBC, ABC, CBS, NBC, Australian TV, Canadian Broadcasting and other television companies kept calling him for interviews.

Hundreds of newly independent media, automated circuits, car phones, satellite phones, fax and duplicating machines, as well as electronic mail networks and widespread use of short-wave radio complicated things for the plotters. Moscow Echo, staffed by former journalism students and shut down repeatedly by the KGB, struggled back on the air several times during the coup.

A jerry-rigged Radio Russia went on the air and began to broadcast around the clock. Even though its signal covered only part of Moscow, "it brought hope because of the voices it carried," writes Pozner (1992). "Voices of people known to one and all, writers and actors, politicians and military men, all of them sending a signal: Come to the White House of Russia, come help build the barricades..." (P 113)

Midmorning on the day of the coup Yeltsin was told that Russian video cameras were waiting outside. He climbed a tank that stood outside the White House. The tank commander hid his head and averted his eyes. There was no microphone. Yeltsin began speaking. Before long, his soundless but defiant image dominated the world's screens, and his words

were soon broadcast, feeding back into the crisis. The Voice of America and Radio Liberty increased their broadcasting and reported no jamming of their programs.

By early afternoon Shevardnadze drove, unhindered, to the headquarters of his Democratic Reform Movement and held a press conference to announce that defense of the White House would be organized that night. Shevardnadze tells the story of a group of young producers from television who put together a film of rebel voices and "discovered an honorable man in the Ministry for Long Distance Communication who placed at their disposal a satellite channel. In this way, Russia from Moscow all the way to the Kamchatka Peninsula, received truthful information." (P. 205)

Official Moscow television had been reduced to one channel playing "Swan Lake" interspersed with emergency decrees. But Leningrad television was still on the air, visible throughout much of the Union. Rebellious mayor Anatoly Sobchak was to speak at 8:15 p.m. Orders to cut him off went from the Emergency Committee at 6 p.m. to Valentin Lazutkin, first deputy chairman of Soviet television, who had watched the press conference and decided that the coup won't fly. Lazutkin delayed the cut-off until after 8:30.

Lazutkin next reviewed the footage for the official evening news, Vremya. It had shots of Yeltsin speaking atop

the tank, and voicover quotes from his speech. It also showed crowds gathering at the White House, building barricades. Despite orders to cut it, Lazutkin left them in. The item ran two and a half minutes. When Vremya showed clips of Yeltsin addressing crowds and reported his call for a general strike, the state of emergency still dragged on for another day but the State Emergency Committee was dead in the waters of instant history.

Gorbachev (1991) notes the role of the media only briefly. "The majority of journalists...", he writes, "made no mistake in choosing where and with whom to be... Efforts on the part of the plotters to give the impression that the whole country supported them were seen to be pathetic and laughable." (P. 34)

The second coup

When the Soviet coup collapsed, the instant history scenario was far from over. In a way, it was only just about to begin. Gorbachev returned, he said, to a "different country." He was soon to discover just how different it was.

During the coup, Yeltsin had promulgated decrees not only for Russia but, without legal authority, also for the Soviet Union. The day after the coup, Yeltsin banned

Communist Party dailies and handed the two major news agencies, TASS and Novosti, over to the control of the Russian Federation authorities. (He was forced to back down, at least temporarily, when the Russian Press Law, replacing the all-Union law, passed the Russian Parliament on October 6, 1992.) On August 24, three days after the coup, Yeltsin issued a decree placing all central government communications under Russian Federation control. The entire system of the All-Union Ministry of Communications was transferred to the jurisdiction of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet committee for Communications, Computing and Space, thus gaining control over the full spectrum of electronic communications media.

When the post-coup emergency session of the Supreme Soviet opened in Moscow on August 26, Gorbachev went to the podium, fresh from the Crimea, humbled, and tired but triumphant. Live television, and the power to use it, had given him national and international exposure. At previous sessions he had personally turned off the cameras when the proceedings displeased or alarmed him. But now television was in Russian, not Soviet, control. Now Boris Yeltsin was in charge. Gorbachev's complicity in the coup, possibly to get rid of Yeltsin, was (and still is) is widely and publicly debated in Moscow. So were the circumstances of Yeltsin's rescue and counter coup, achieving the opposite result. Rumors, suspicions, and previous humiliations,

often before an audience on live television, serve as a general backdrop to the dramatic turning point of August 26.

Stormy relationship

After his initial elevation to the post of Moscow Party Secretary, Yeltsin's bull-in-the-China-shop style, including embarrassing televised encounters, earned him demotions and transfers. Reports of drunken orgies during his first American visit, later proved to be fabrications, appeared on the front page of *Pravda*. A Soviet television program showed his speech at Johns Hopkins University slurred, out of sync with his gestures. Later a comparison with the original revealed that studio experts tampered with the tape.

The final indignity came when, after an absence of two weeks from public view, Yeltsin showed up at a televised session of the Supreme Soviet. Suddenly, Gorbachev interrupted a routine debate. He asked the Minister of the Interior to come to the podium and report Comrade Yeltsin's "personal case." The Minister related a bizarre story of Yeltsin clambering from a lake where, he said, he had been thrown by assailants out to kill him. Taking the floor, Yeltsin was evasive. The televised scene was repeated several times during the day, and the next day's *Izvestia* printed a full transcript.

The story Solovyov and Klepikova (1992) piece together from interviews and provincial press accounts is even more bizarre. Yeltsin crashed a birthday party of his old friend and then Prime Minister Ryzhkov, to which he had not been invited, and had a fight with Gorbachev; they even came to blows. Gorbachev, who lost out in the fight, sent his personal bodyguards to dump Yeltsin in the lake, where he caught a bad bronchitis that sidelined him for two weeks. For reasons still unknown, perhaps because of its improbability and fear of more ridicule, Yeltsin did not tell the true story, if that's what it was, on live television before the Supreme Soviet. In any case, August 26 must have been sweet revenge, indeed.

The revenge

Loory and Imse (1991) describe what took place then, again on live television. "Yeltsin forced Gorbachev to read aloud the record of Monday's cabinet meeting, where all but two of his ministers betrayed him...When Gorbachev protested saying he had not read the document, Yeltsin was merciless, insisting: 'Well, read it now.'"

The minutes incriminated in the plot those whom Gorbachev had defended just the day before. Next, "Yeltsin forced Gorbachev to promise publicly he would accept all the

emergency decrees Yeltsin had approved during the coup. Then Yeltsin informed the Soviet President that one of those decrees transferred ownership of all property in Russia from the central government to the republic. The blindsided Gorbachev had suddenly become a kind of tenant-leader in his own country. Technically, his government no longer even owned the Kremlin. But that was just the beginning. Yeltsin whipped out a document. 'On a lighter note,' he said, 'shall we now sign a note suspending the activities of the Russian Communist Party?' He signed with a flourish...Gorbachev was stunned. 'I think you'll be...I don't know what you're signing there,' he stammered." (P. 158)

At that moment, the structure that Mikhail Gorbachev tried to "restructure" came down like a house of cards. Instant history turned floundering *perestroika* into full-fledged counter-revolution. (Yeltsin's actions were soon to be challenged in the newly created Constitutional Court, plunging the country further into a crisis of legitimacy.)

The new phenomenon of instant history short-circuited the time needed for deliberate decisions and orderly transitions. The world was watching, not fully understanding that instant history was made by the very act of its witnessing the scene on live television. A mechanism of global mischief has been added to the agenda of problems

that political communication study and policy must now address.

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