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COMMUNICATION THEORY AND ETHNIC MOBILIZATION

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News comes to grips with the  
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There is a popular detective on the American television scene named "Banacek." He is a handsome blond with an affinity for long skinny cigars and occasionally beautiful women. The fact that his parents were Polish has nothing to do with the plots of his adventures. But somehow in each episode his ethnicity is brought in.

Then there is "Mannix," another hard boiled detective who also lives on television. Mannix is Armenian and his nationality, like Banacek's Polishness, is there for the viewers to see and yet pointless in terms of plot. At least a dozen of such ethnic oriented television programs, such as "Bridget Loves Bernie," in which an Irish girl and a Jewish boy try to make a marriage in ethnicity, and "Kung Fu," where a Chinese-American hero mediates bad guys to their just reward with karate chops, can be seen on a week's programs.

These programs may reflect the society but do not explain it. In the process of this communication we can identify the actors and communicators, describe the message, but certainly know little or nothing about its effect. Is it congruent with an assimilation and nation-building process, or is it part of a re-ethnization phenomenon? Certainly, something is happening and it may well be a new meaning of American-ness, but we know little about it.

An introduction to the function of mass communication in nation-building and in ethnic mobilization seems appropriate at this point. The transmission of culture is one of the main functions of mass communication and is a basic communication activity. In the functional analysis, any communication affects one or more of four targets: society, the individual, subgroups, and the cultural system. The transmission of culture through mass media performs

different functions and dysfunctions at all levels. The functions it performs for society are increasing social cohesion, widening the base of common norms and experiences, reducing anomie, and continuing education by reaching adults after they have left school. The dysfunction performed is the augmenting of "mass" society. To the individual the functions of mass communication are aiding integration by exposure to mass norms, reducing idiosyncrasy, and reducing anomie. The dysfunction is that it depersonalizes the acts of socialization. The functions performed for the subgroups are that it extends power and acts as an agent for socialization. For the culture the function is the standardization and maintenance of cultural consensus and as a dysfunction it reduces the variety of subcultures.<sup>1</sup>

Functions of mass communication such as increasing social cohesion, widening the base of common norms and experiences, and acting as an agent of socialization have been frequently observed in the integration and mobilization of those states which have or are in the process of achieving national solidarity and a universalistic identity. But, as it will be argued here, mass communications can perform a dysfunction to the process of nation-building as it brings to ethnic groups an awareness of not only members of their own group but an awareness of other groups and reinforces those original ethnic boundaries. Mass media, combined with the existence of parallel groups, serves to strengthen ethnic group identity at the expense of a national identity.

#### Social Communication and Ethnicity

Karl W. Deutsch speaks of a nationality as "a people among whom there exists a significant movement toward political, economic, and cultural autonomy." The "significant movement" can be determined by investigating the overlapping clusters of interaction patterns, i.e. the volume and frequency

of actual communication and traffic. This communication and traffic is not limited to messages sent through the various channels of mass media, but includes such factors as mobility, migration, student exchanges, newspaper readership and informal communication, and aspects of market exchanges (national currency exchanges, tariffs, quotas, exchange-control measures). Deutsch defines social mobilization as a process wherein "major clusters of old social, economic, and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people are available for new patterns of socialization and behavior."<sup>2</sup> This depends in turn on the existing facilities for social communication between past and present and amongst contemporaries. Whenever social communication within a group breaks down, due to either external forces (dissonant messages from another ethnic group or from the environment at large) or internal forces or both, mobilization is facilitated. Incompatibilities in facts or contradictions, actual or implied, among habits or values, make the tension-strained individual (or group) susceptible to persuasion towards a state of consonance. What matters in ethnic mobilization, then, is the distribution of individuals and groups that can be persuaded over time ("maintained persuasion"). Deutsch states that this distribution of persuadable people is a function of the general distribution of social communication, past and present. The primary problem is the reallocation of resources, in this case the goals and values of the ethnic population to be mobilized, so that they are consonant (or at least not in conflict) with those of the dominant group.

Up to this point, we have been assuming that ethnic mobilization is in the direction of national unity, but this is not necessarily the case. An ethnic group either may be mobilized and assimilated or mobilized and differentiated. Whether the ethnic group is assimilated or not makes a difference as to whether that ethnic group will tend towards conflict behavior and aggression against the dominant group (a non-assimilated ethnic group, heterodox in nature)

or whether it will tend towards cooperation. This is an extremely important factor in considerations of internal stability of the nation. Deutsch cites six balances which are important in determining the rate of assimilation: the similarity of communication habits (primarily linguistic and cultural compatibility); the teaching-learning balance (availability and quality of teaching facilities and techniques); the frequency of contact (across boundaries as compared to within the group); the balance of material rewards and punishments (employment, promotion, higher income, security, prestige--must be perceived as rewards); the balance of values and desires (common or conflicting values in the old and the new culture); balance of symbols and barriers (what are the unifying symbols and which symbols reinforce or maintain barriers?).<sup>3</sup> One might say that the rate of assimilation must be faster than the rate of mobilization of an ethnic group if that ethnic group is to become part of the national whole. A favorable balance must be achieved in the direction of assimilation.

Deutsch's model, based for the most part on elements of modernization and assimilation, can and has been adequately used to explain the growth of nations in many areas, but little has been said about areas where nation-building is not the case but the maintenance of ethnic identity vis-a-vis national identity is apparent. An explanation of this omission may be that the psychological aspects which find the idea of ethnicity an important and serious matter in national affairs today have not been adequately been taken into account.

Several scholars, among them Andrew C. Janos, claim that Deutsch's theory fails to explain the historical incidence of ethnic states and solidarities outside the context of social and economic modernization (such as the Germanic states and the medieval political community of western Europe) and instances in which societies emerge from the experience of modernization without an

ethnically defined political identity or able to assume a dual identity. This identity, states Janos, is dependent upon the distribution of ethnic and cultural characteristics and a congruity among such components as language, religion, cultural heritage, and physical proximity. Where this congruity exists a particularistic identity and pattern of solidarity is also likely to exist. Conversely, where there are significant incongruities in these components the mobilized individual will opt for an ethnically neutral, universalistic political identity<sup>4</sup> (and it is in this instance that Deutsch's model holds true).

When cultural consciousness precedes political consciousness and where cultural consciousness presupposes an awareness of other cultures, increased antagonisms are likely to occur. Assimilation is even more of a natural foe to self-determination than is the multinational state due to the emotional power of ethnic consciousness.<sup>5</sup>

Social mobilization need not lead to nation-building. Deutsch sees several ethnic elements combining through the process of social mobilization to form a nation but he does not adequately take into account the phenomenon of parallel groups in a society. Deutsch's model of mobilization deals best with vertical groups which have a hierarchical stratification in which ascendancy and social mobilization are restricted by ascriptive criteria. This type of vertical ethnic differentiation is clearly on the decline as has been shown by the demise of the colonial rule. It has been eroded by the spread of egalitarian values, by international contact and communication, and by education.<sup>6</sup> This traditional model of differentiation is apparently one used by Deutsch. What he did not consider were groups with parallel ethnic structure, each with its own criteria of stratification. These groups are more able to survive as distinct units due to this very fact that there are opportunities for mobilization within the ethnic group and that there exists no ascriptive bar to social mobility.

### Communication and the Plural Society

Communication is necessary in the process of mobilization, in the articulation of group preferences, and in the transmission of demands and decisions. Communication in the input portion of the cycle is either information in the form of a demand, or in the form of a feedback message sent to alter policies in a more positive direction in relation to the demand group. Communication in the output portion of the cycle is information as a resource for reallocating other resources, or as a decision redistributing the resources. The idea of the distribution of communication equally among all ethnic groups in society is of primary importance to achieve the integration of the groups into a viable polity, particularly if specific group autonomy is to be maintained.

The equitable representation of each ethnic community through open channels of communication in all types of social transaction--and particularly in politics--would make possible the integration of autonomous groups into a viable contractual polity. Such a polity is a plural bureaucracy based on a contract relationship between all parts, coordinated by the free flow of information, both laterally and vertically. An example of this "contractual integration" is Switzerland, a federation of local autonomous groups which can fulfill ethnic demands while the national government holds a minimum of collective goods. Assimilation is required only to the extent needed to maintain national unity, i.e., the maintenance of open communication channels for purposes of coordination; this may or may not necessitate the sharing of the same institutions, depending on the nation in question.

Mobilization is important in the process of integration as it involves an attempt to change perceptions and the salience of perceptions, i.e. awareness. Awareness is a function of salience and perception of alternatives and is a primary factor in the establishment or eradication of ethnic boundaries.

The populace is often unaware of the relationships between ethnic and inter-ethnic systems, and the individual often does not perceive his role in these systems.

One can distinguish three phases in the process of mobilization: in the first phase, one achieves self-awareness and "identity"; in the second phase, one is led to an awareness of needs based on the new identity; and in the third phase, demands based on the new needs are expressed or "articulated." This process might also be called a process of "demand generation."

Communication, either intraethnically or interethnically, heightens the awareness of future leaders to inequalities, the possibility of increased power, or some other desired goal. In this first phase of mobilization, the course is set for the direction that the mobilization will take--either in the direction of ethnic integration or of ethnic conflict.

The leaders, having reached a new level of awareness, communicate their new perceptions to the ethnic group in question--either stressing the differences from others and reerecting ethnic boundaries or increasing the salience of them; or stressing similitude, expanding boundaries to a national level, and making the ethnic boundary irrelevant.

In the second phase, the salience of the group is raised and group cohesion is heightened; needs based on the new identity are generated. The awareness of self brings an awareness of one's needs. In the third phase, demands, based on the new needs, are made. Political groups and other types of groups (social or economic) are formed to articulate these demands. Thus, mobilization involves the achievement of interest articulation and interest aggregation.

The demand group of the input function is also the response group of the output function. If there is no feedback (no output) or if the feedback is negative, the demand group will respond, if it is not repressed and if the

group is still "mobilized" towards the goal in question. The response of the demand group to this "non-communication" will be either more intense demands or new demands. Demand generation will continue until a saturation point is reached; at this point, mobilization may follow a different direction, and communication and interaction may involve "covert" or "illegitimate" activity.

~~Competitive~~ <sup>a</sup> Politics in <sup>a</sup> the plural <sup>istic</sup> society has been characterized by "ethnic politics," with ethnicity being <sup>a</sup> the major base for the ~~authoritarian~~ allocation of value. Part of the explanation for ~~the choice of~~ ethnicity as a basis for politics lies in the existence of mobilized resources (including the people themselves) and organizations suited for "political deployment" on ethnic issues. One already has the ingredients of a readily organizable pressure group which can maintain a sustained effort for a relatively long period, ~~of time. In ethnic politics, one finds the salience of "primordial sentiments"~~ according to Geertz; Geertz defines a "primordial attachment" as one that stems from the "givens" of social existence--congruities of speech, blood, custom, etc.<sup>7</sup> He also states that political modernization usually quickens, instead of quieting, primordial sentiments, increased interethnic contact making these issues salient in the development of structural unity.<sup>8</sup> Emerson refers to the ethnic group as a "terminal community," i.e., the largest community that effectively commands men's loyalty.<sup>9</sup>

Value conflicts between communities complicate the political process, with communal institutions of aggregation and articulation being rapidly converted into corporate representatives of communal value. An example of this situation was the conversion of a Temne dancing society in Sierre Leone into a political unit that organized the election of one of their members to public office in an attempt to raise Temne prestige in the society and to prevent the desertion of young men to other tribes. In this particular case, the recognition of an opposition of interests by the Temne was more important

in integration than in the discovery of similarities.<sup>10</sup>

Often ethnic preferences are intense and not negotiable. One finds two situations common in ethnic politics in terms of individual values: intra-communal consensus and intercommunal conflict. Intra-communal consensus is the identical perception and expression of political alternatives by ethnic members, while intercommunal conflict arises from the disagreement by different ethnic communities on all issues that face the collectivity.<sup>11</sup> Again one must conceive of consensus and conflict on the basis of degree and not as an "all-or-nothing" affair.

Another interesting concept is that of perceptual consensus in which alternatives are viewed according to a common perceptual framework. Shepsle remarks that in the plural society the lines of conflict are drawn and hardened in full view of everyone. This is often the work of political entrepreneurs. Such men succeed in converting natural communities into active and antithetical political communities, often only to further their own interest--i.e. they are "mobilizers for gain."<sup>12</sup> Differences in salience as well as incompatibilities in preferences contribute to the political stability or instability of a community.

According to the decision theory, individuals make choices on the basis of underlying values. These choices are possible even if the relationship between alternatives and underlying values is unclear. Preference orderings, and the degree of preferences, have implications for behavior, especially under uncertainty.<sup>13</sup> One is again concerned with awareness--salience and perception of alternatives. For example, in the pre-independence era in many African states, the salient issue was the presence of a foreign power; the existence of alien rule was the impetus to interethnic cooperation and the submergence of ethnic differences. However, to attain ethnic cooperation

in the post-independence period when the game changed from the "Game of Extraction" (i.e., the extraction of gains from the dominant--here, alien--group) to the "Game of Division" (i.e., gain at the expense of the coalition partners), divisive communal issues have had to be treated with ambiguity.<sup>14</sup>

The change from playing the Game of Extraction to playing the Game of Division has been traced by Shepsle and Rabushka in ten steps of ethnic politics:

1. The formation of a broad-based multiethnic coalition during the pre-independence period.
2. Survival through post independence
3. Fostered by ambiguous pronouncements on divisive ethnic issues
4. The generation of demand for national issues
5. The emergence of ambitious politicians making appeals to ethnic passions--the "political entrepreneurs"
6. The resurrection of ethnicity as the salient dimension of political competition
7. The development of the politics of "outbidding"
8. The disappearance of brokerage institutions and the concomittant ethnicization of public goods
9. The ineffectuality of moderate elements
10. The decline of democratic competition as a result of electoral manipulation and political violence (Comment: Or are the manipulations an attempt to restore democratic competition to the oppressed group?)

In the proliferation of ethnic communities that result, chaos is rampant in which the momentarily advantaged take steps to secure that advantage.<sup>15</sup> A perfect example is the emergence of Nigeria and the post-independence crises which eventually led to the secession of Biafra and three years of civil war.

One notes the three processes mentioned before: disintegration of the old lines of communication and power; the redistribution of power through changes in access to channels of communication and changes in the efficiency of communication; and a reintegration of the people into new aggregates through mobilization.

The outcome of mobilization is ultimately demand generation; and it is the political entrepreneurs who sensitize the electorate to the dimensions and importance of choice. But the success of the demand generation depends both on the choice of issues and the degree to which this choice corresponds to the individual preferences. An ethnic politician can raise the perception and salience of ethnic demands by making his ethnic group aware of discrepancies in the response of the system (e.g., the national polity) to their particular group. Ethnic mobilization in this case constitutes a gathering of forces of the subject group to combat, literally or figuratively, or both, the groups(s) maintaining the obstacles to social communication, as described earlier.

Ethnic mobilization occurs when communication is blocked in any aspect or aspects of life--social, economic, political, cultural. Non-communication, or "partial non-response" (noise, reduced fidelity), is an act of discrimination; or to put it more succinctly, discrimination is non-communication. By discriminating against any one group, one is restricting the redistribution of power, goods, wealth. Scarce resources will continue to be held in the hands of the dominant group who control access to these scarce resources. By closing the channels of communication--of redistribution--the status quo is maintained.

Communication is a means for redistributing scarce resources and information is the resource involved in the redistribution. Communication within the oppressed group about inequalities, stimulated by the ethnic leader or a political entrepreneur, heightens the awareness of the group of their "oppressed

condition." This heightened awareness makes the group susceptible to appeals to organize for action, to the forces of mobilization directed towards opening new channels of communication, if the old channels remain closed.

This process of opening channels involves a reorganization: disintegration, redistribution, and reintegration. If the old channels are reopened and demands that are generated are met (i.e., the system is responsive), there will probably be a move in the direction of greater integration, perhaps even assimilation. But the outcome will be either a more homogeneous society, or if boundaries are more strongly enforced, a more coordinated or "contractually" integrated society (M. G. Smith would call such a change a movement from a more "plural" society to a more "heterogeneous" or more "pluralistic" society). One would expect a greater degree of national unity and a broader perspective from such cooperative efforts.

However, if the old channels remain closed, it will be necessary to open new ones. These channels may or may not be legitimate; if not, communication through such channels may be referred to as "covert activities." If the new channels are accepted by the dominant group, one again has a movement towards greater integration. On the other hand, if the new channels are rejected by the dominant group, and there are no channels through which to express and to obtain a response to group needs, there is a strong possibility that the "covert activities" will generate further competition in the society between the "oppressed" group and the dominant group (or groups), even to the point of conflict. In such a situation of conflicting forces, there is an increased possibility that a leader will arise who finds it to his advantage--and to that of the oppressed group--to develop new "covert" channels of communication. And he can take advantage of the situation to make appeals against the "common enemy," vying ethnic group against ethnic group (as Malan did in South Africa to win the 1948 election).

Continued non-communication is the communication of expulsion, of rejection. By expulsion of the "oppressed group", the dominant group legitimizes covert activity, and even makes the ground fertile for such activity to germinate. The oppressed group perceives itself "in the right"; due to its exclusion from the society, the only types of communication channels the oppressed group can have, are, ipso facto, illegitimate communication channels--and thus, "illegitimate" communications. The state, unwittingly, is the legitimizer of the illegitimate activity, since it has excluded from the system the "legitimate" activities of the "rebellious" ethnic group.

When Deutsch speaks of mobilized assimilated populations and mobilized differentiated populations, he is speaking of the problem of the degree of coordination between different ethnic systems and the effect of such degrees on the degree of integration in a multiethnic society (or between two separate national polities).

Extremist politics tend to emerge when the channels of communication have been restricted--on both sides--so that anything that is communicated, is communicated more. There are few counter-communications to balance the effect of the extremist messages--and this being so, the salience of the extremist communication crescendoes. Such was the case in South Africa after the 1948 election: "By rallying the mass of the Afrikaner electorate, the Nationalist Party eliminated the necessity of compromise with the English, gained control of the entire country and opened the way for more extremist politics."  
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Limited or restricted access to channels of communication is one incentive for mobilization against the oppressive group. A proposition to be tested is relevant to the problems of communication, described above, in relation to national unity and legitimacy: the greater the obstacles to communication for a given ethnic community and the greater the awareness that these obstacles exist, the greater the possibility of ethnic conflict.

One aspect of this proposition is whether the oppressed are "repressed." If the dominant group forces the oppressed group to keep the channels of communication closed and at the same time forces that group to remain a part of the total society or polity, the oppressed group is also "repressed." It is not repressed if, once awareness of the condition is established, the oppressed group is allowed to voice their grievances. If the oppressed are not repressed, there is the possibility of becoming "unoppressed"; for communication makes it possible to lift the bonds of oppression. Repression, however, closes the channels of communication and the oppressed remain bound by their condition.

Tribalism vs. Nationalism: The Problem of "Subjective Ethnicity"

What are the rewards or punishments that positively or negatively reinforce: (1) Discrimination, or non-communication, of the dominant group against the "oppressed" group? (2) Covert communication by the oppressed group in society? And how are these incentives or threats utilized by ethnic leaders and politicians, for example, in South Africa or in Nigeria? Will the direction of ethnic mobilization be focused on national unity and a cooperative, integrative effort of all groups, or will the direction be focused on communal loyalties and towards greater competition and perhaps conflict? Will nationalistic symbols and appeals have predominance over ethnic symbols and appeals? In what way will the group identify itself?

Van den Berghe has discussed both objective and subjective ethnicity and his comments are of particular importance in the process of mobilization. He states that subjective ethnicity is more common than objective ethnicity and that the growth in the scale of relevant ethnicity or "super-tribalization" is linked with the rise of nationalism. For example, the Luhya of Kenya and the Ibo of Nigeria, who have acquired a sense of nationhood, were still clusters of parochial peasant villages three to four decades ago. But through

the increased flow of communication and the opportunity to make wider comparisons and become acquainted with new and different alternatives, the parochial villagers found themselves more similar to each other than they had thought themselves different. Van den Berghe suggests that nationalism was the "transformation of vague, subjective feelings of common ethnicity into a more articulated form of political consciousness."<sup>17</sup>

Subjective ethnicity is more important than objective ethnicity in the attainment of an integrated society or national unity. It is also of more importance in the process of mobilization: does one perceive himself more as a member of a locally-centered ethnic group or more as a member of a more comprehensive national group (whether the national community is one ethnic group or a confederation of diverse ethnic groups). The perception determines the direction of the ethnic mobilization, and the perception itself is determined by intraethnic and interethnic communications that have aroused the self-awareness of the ethnic group--i.e., pre-mobilization communications moving the ethnic group toward awareness arousal determine the direction of mobilization and the mobilizations communications. This does not rule out the possibility of a change in the direction of the mobilization; a similar process would occur should the direction change, with different issues and different perceptions becoming the salient ones.

The problem of ethnicity has been called "tribalism," "parochialism," and "communalism." Multiethnic groups in Africa regard ethnic diversity as part of their individuality and desire to retain that identity even as members of the national polity.<sup>18</sup> Ethnic blocs reflect the clash between personal identity and political integrity. How does one provide a solution to this clash? Geertz suggests that primordial sentiments be reconciled with the civil order "by divesting them of their legitimizing force with respect to

the governmental authority, by neutralizing the apparatus of the state in relation to them, and by channeling discontent arising out of their dislocation into properly political rather than parapolitical forms of expression."<sup>19</sup> Geertz is demanding specialization of the channels of communication and a reaggregation of interests. He calls this process a "progressive extension of primordial sentiments and differences, generated from the direct, protracted encounter of culturally diverse groups into local contexts to more broadly defined groups in the national context."<sup>20</sup>

The importance of extending the boundaries of identity to achieve national unity is apparent in an historical analysis of many African states. Up to the attainment of power, African nationalism was composed of an anti-colonial awareness, Pan African solidarity uniting all forces against the "common enemy" on vague and general bases, and being suffused with a strong revolutionary force. Since independence, Pan African nationalism has been invoked to obtain optimum conditions for complete decolonization, ethnic consolidation, and the liberation of the colonized south.

The counterbalancing force is local nationalism, which is still a cohesive force compared with tribal separatism. Separatist policies practised by tribal chiefs may be used to salvage the ethnic group and also to retain their privileges in that ethnic group. Similarly, class interests may be hidden by national patriotism.<sup>21</sup> The provocation of regional politics in Nigeria is one of many examples where the political ideology of nationalism was used first as a successful instrument of a united liberal front against a common enemy, and later used to obtain new objectives which were diametrically opposed--the division of the people.

#### Communication and Ethnic Consciousness

Through the examples discussed above, perhaps one will come to an

understanding of the interrelationship between the problems of communication, coordination and control, and of the importance of the direction of mobilization for the persistence of a national polity. The discussion has been based on theories of system interdependence and system persistence; theories of communication; and the concept of self-identification as the determinant of ethnic boundaries.

The proposition that is made is that of "contractual integration." A polity that is contractually integrated is one in which the ethnic community maintains its autonomy and has open and free access to the channels of communication; the system is interdependent and the parts are mutually responsive, making adjustments in order that the polity is perpetuated--i.e., plural bureaucracies are coordinated by lateral, responsive communication among the separate bureaucracies. There is a "communication democracy" in which there is an equitable distribution of social communication among all groups... Information is a resource for allocating other resources; and communication is the means by which the information is distributed. Therefore, equal access to the channels of communication, equal participation in the communication, and mutual sensitivity of all groups allows the possibility of equality of power and the sharing of total resources while still maintaining ethnic autonomy. Coordination, achieved through interaction and mutual adjustment, makes possible (as well as being made possible because of) a free flow of information.

Perhaps this relationship is the reason that "ethnic politics" is described as a "viscious cycle"--a spiralling downward to even greater extremism. But this spiralling effect may also give hope to those countries caught in the grasp of the politics of racial extremism. For, once the cycle is broken and the first step is made towards a more equitable distribution of

social communication in the polity, the spiral upward could lead to greater national solidarity and political integrity.

Advances in communications and transportation have helped to curtail cultural isolation. These advances in technology also tend to increase the cultural awareness of minorities by making them more aware of the distinctions between themselves and other groups. The individual becomes more aware of alien ethnic groups as well as those who share his identity. An unintegrated state poses no threat to the lifeways of the various ethnic groups but the curtailment of this isolation may lead to a xenophobic reaction. As argued, intraethnic as well as interethnic communications play a major role in the creation of ethnic consciousness.<sup>22</sup> Thus, communications plays a pervasive role not only in social mobility and nation-building but also in strengthening ethnic consciousness.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 Charles R. Wright, "Functional Analysis and Mass Communication," Public Opinion Quarterly, XIV, No. 4 (Winter, 1960), pp. 610-613.
- 2 Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review, LV, No. 3 (September, 1961), p. 494. See also Karl W. Deutsch, "The Growth of Nations, Some Recurrent Patterns of Political and Social Integration," World Politics, V, No. 2 (January, 1953), pp. 169-170.
- 3 Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1966), pp. 156-162.
- 4 Andrew C. Janos, "Ethnicity, Communism, and Political Change in Eastern Europe," World Politics, XXIII (April, 1971), pp. 517-518.
- 5 Walker Connor, "Self-Determination," World Politics, XX, No. 1 (October, 1967), pp. 49-50.
- 6 Donald L. Horowitz, "Three Dimensions of Ethnic Politics," World Politics, XXIII (January, 1971), pp. 232, 236. For examples of the communication process in ethnically diverse nations in this chapter, we are indebted to the research assistance of Vicki Morey.
- 7 C. Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution," Old Societies and New States, C. Geertz, ed., Free Press (1963), p. 109.
- 8 Ibid., p. 119.
- 9 A. Rabushka and K. A. Shepsle, Politics in Plural Societies, Charles E. Merrill (1972), p. 63.
- 10 J. C. Mitchell, "Tribalism and the Plural Society," Black Africa, J. Middleton, ed., Macmillan Co. (1970), p. 331.
- 11 Rabushka and Shepsle, pp. 65-67.
- 12 Ibid., pp. 2, 67-69.
- 13 Ibid., p. 43.

14

Ibid., pp. 73-76.

15

Ibid., pp. 91-92.

16

Ibid., p. 77.

17

Pierre van den Berghe, "Ethnicity in the African Experience," International Social Science Journal, XXIII, No. 4 (1971), p. 511.

18

Geertz, pp. 198-199.

19

Ibid., p. 128.

20

Ibid., pp. 153-154.

21

L. Yablotchkov, "L'Évolution du Nationalisme Africain," Présence Africaine, No. 74 (1970), pp. 46-53.

22

Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?" World Politics, XXIV (April, 1972), p. 329.